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ESSAY
ASYMMETRIC CONSTITUTIONAL HARDBALL
Joseph Fishkin∗ & David E. Pozen∗∗
Many have argued that the United States’ two major political
parties have experienced “asymmetric polarization” in recent decades:
The Republican Party has moved signiﬁcantly further to the right than
the Democratic Party has moved to the left. The practice of constitutional hardball, this Essay argues, has followed a similar—and
causally related—trajectory. Since at least the mid-1990s, Republican
officeholders have been more likely than their Democratic counterparts
to push the constitutional envelope, straining unwritten norms of governance or disrupting established constitutional understandings. Both
sides have done these things. But contrary to the apparent assumption
of some legal scholars, they have not done so with the same frequency or
intensity.
After deﬁning constitutional hardball and defending this descriptive claim, this Essay offers several overlapping explanations.
Asymmetric constitutional hardball grows out of historically conditioned
differences between the parties’ electoral coalitions, mediating institutions, views of government, and views of the Constitution itself. The
“restorationist” constitutional narratives and interpretive theories promoted by Republican politicians and lawyers, the Essay suggests, serve
to legitimate the party’s use of constitutional hardball.
Finally, and more tentatively, this Essay looks to the future. In
reaction to President Trump, congressional Democrats have begun to
play constitutional hardball more aggressively. Will they close the gap?
Absent a fundamental political realignment, we submit that there are
good structural and ideological reasons to expect the two parties to revert to the asymmetric pattern of the past twenty-ﬁve years. If this prediction is correct, it will have profound long-term implications both for
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liberal constitutional politics and for the integrity and capacity of the
American constitutional system.
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INTRODUCTION
Donald Trump recently became the ﬁrst President since James
Garﬁeld in 1881 to take office with a vacant Supreme Court seat to ﬁll.1
1. See Barry J. McMillion, Cong. Research Serv., IN10469, Supreme Court Vacancies
that Arose During One Presidency and Were Filled During a Different Presidency 1
(2016). Trump is the ﬁrst President since Abraham Lincoln to take office with a Supreme
Court vacancy that arose when the presidency was controlled by a different political party.
Id. Not included in this accounting, because there was no actual vacancy on the Court, are
the events following Chief Justice Earl Warren’s announcement in June 1968 that he
intended to retire upon conﬁrmation of his successor. Outgoing President Lyndon
Johnson nominated Associate Justice Abe Fortas to be the next Chief Justice. Republicans
and conservative Dixiecrat Democrats successfully ﬁlibustered the nomination, defeating
the key cloture vote on October 1, 1968, after which Johnson withdrew the nomination.
See Attempt to Stop Fortas Debate Fails by 14-Vote Margin, CQ Almanac 1968 (1969),
http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/cqal68-1284316 [http://perma.cc/J4YT-KVP6].
This episode is an interesting if imperfect precursor of the phenomenon this Essay
will discuss. The political factions in 1968 did not match up neatly with the parties. And

2018]

ASYMMETRIC CONSTITUTIONAL HARDBALL

917

Political struggle, as much as luck, produced this result. The vacancy
arose more than eleven months prior to President Trump’s inauguration. After President Obama submitted a “consensus nominee”2 on
March 16, 2016, Senate Republicans refused to give the nominee a
hearing. They resolved to block anyone selected by President Obama
from ﬁlling the seat. They also suggested that more was to come. As
election day approached, one prominent Republican Senator “promise[d]” that his Republican colleagues would likewise “be united
against any Supreme Court nominee that Hillary Clinton, if she were
president, would put up.”3 The arguably unprecedented blockade of the
Merrick Garland nomination4 stands as a classic example of constitutional hardball.5
Fortas had minor ethics problems that became public in the months leading up to the
cloture vote (his more serious ethics problems emerged later). Still, the use of a ﬁlibuster
to stop a Supreme Court nomination was, at the time, unprecedented; observers speculated that the motives of the key Republican Senator leading the charge against Fortas
“were, at least, mixed, and that he really intended to save the nominations for GOP
Presidential candidate Richard M. Nixon, if Nixon was elected.” Id. That is what
happened. After Nixon was elected, he chose Warren Burger to ﬁll the seat, and Chief
Justice Warren honored his stated intention to resign.
2. Thomas Ferraro, Republican Would Back Garland for Supreme Court, Reuters
(May 6, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-hatch-idUSTRE6456QY20100506
[http://perma.cc/7YZD-BWN8] (quoting Republican Senator Orrin Hatch describing
Judge Garland as “a consensus nominee” who would be conﬁrmed with bipartisan support, “[n]o question” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
3. David A. Graham, What Happens if Republicans Refuse to Replace Justice Scalia?,
Atlantic (Nov. 1, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/11/whats-theopposite-of-court-packing/506081 [http://perma.cc/GL2U-WBYV] (quoting Senator
John McCain); see also id. (noting that while Senator McCain “partially walked back his
comments,” other Republican Senators echoed and extended them). When Trump
subsequently defeated Clinton, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell announced that
“the American people simply will not tolerate” Democratic efforts to thwart President
Trump’s choice for the Court. Alexandra Jaffe, McConnell: Public “Will Not Tolerate”
Dems Blocking SCOTUS Pick, NBC News (Jan. 4, 2017), http://www.nbcnews.com/
politics/congress/mcconnell-public-will-not-tolerate-dems-blocking-scotus-pick-n703301
[http://perma.cc/MU6E-TWPW].
4. See, e.g., Jon Huntsman & Joseph Lieberman, Opinion, Jon Huntsman and
Joseph Lieberman: The Republican SCOTUS Blockade Is ‘Not Acceptable,’ Time (Mar.
25, 2016), http://time.com/4271942/supreme-court-compromise (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (“There is no modern precedent for the blockade that Senate
Republicans have put in place.”). As Professors Robin Bradley Kar and Jason Mazzone
have detailed, the Senate had never before “deliberately transfer[red] one President’s
Supreme Court appointment powers to an unknown successor” in the absence of “contemporaneous questions about the status of the nominating President as the most recently
elected President.” Robin Bradley Kar & Jason Mazzone, The Garland Affair: What History
and the Constitution Really Say About President Obama’s Powers to Appoint a Replacement
for Justice Scalia, 91 N.Y.U. L. Rev. Online 53, 60 (2016). For a critical discussion of the
choices made by Kar and Mazzone in construing the historical record, see Josh Chafetz,
Unprecedented? Judicial Conﬁrmation Battles and the Search for a Usable Past, 131 Harv.
L. Rev. 96, 128–30 (2017).
5. See infra Part I (discussing deﬁnitions of constitutional hardball).
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The Democrats’ response to this highly salient and consequential act
of constitutional hardball was comparatively muted. President Obama
did not choose to raise the stakes. He did not, for instance, threaten to
install Judge Garland on the Court on a theory of implied or forfeited
Senate consent, as some commentators urged as early as April 2016.6 Nor
did he give Garland a recess appointment.7 Following President Trump’s
election, Senate Democrats, under heavy pressure from progressive
groups,8 engaged in a bit of constitutional hardball of their own. They
used the ﬁlibuster to block President Trump’s nominee, then-Judge Neil
Gorsuch, for the seat Judge Garland had been denied.9 Senate Republicans
swiftly responded by exercising the “nuclear option” to change cameral
rules so that a Supreme Court nominee no longer needs more than a
simple majority vote.10
In the rush of real-time narration, as history unfolds around us, it is
easy to tell a story about this episode and others before it that emphasizes
tit-for-tat mutual escalation and the constitutional hardball of both sides.
Such stories, we submit, neglect the elephant in the room. For a quarter
of a century, Republican officials have been more willing than Democratic
officials to play constitutional hardball—not only or primarily on judicial
nominations but across a range of spheres. Democrats have also availed
themselves of hardball throughout this period, but not with the same
frequency or intensity. This partisan gap is in some ways analogous to the
phenomenon of “asymmetric polarization” that social scientists have
documented.11 This Essay will suggest that the two phenomena are
intertwined.
6. See Gregory L. Diskant, Obama Can Appoint Merrick Garland to the Supreme
Court if the Senate Does Nothing, Wash. Post (Apr. 8, 2016), http://wapo.st/2gNmhkM
[http://perma.cc/E65J-RP6R].
7. See, e.g., David Dayen, Obama Can and Should Put Merrick Garland on the
Supreme Court, New Republic (Nov. 16, 2016), http://newrepublic.com/article/138787/
obama-can-put-merrick-garland-supreme-court (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review)
(urging an intersession recess appointment).
8. See David Weigel, Activists Celebrate Democrats’ Push to Filibuster Gorsuch,
Wash. Post (Apr. 4, 2017), http://wapo.st/2o7aily?tid=ss [http://perma.cc/BF2Z-QWD6].
9. See Chafetz, supra note 4, at 108–09 (reviewing these events).
10. See id. at 109. Neither of these moves was entirely novel. Although ﬁlibusters of
Supreme Court nominations have been exceedingly rare, the tactic was successfully
pioneered by Senate Republicans in the Fortas affair. See supra note 1. The use of the
“nuclear option” to overcome the Gorsuch ﬁlibuster has a more recent precedent in
Democratic Senators’ use of this method, in 2013, to remove the ﬁlibuster for non–
Supreme Court nominations. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
11. See Nolan McCarty, What We Know and Don’t Know About Our Polarized
Politics, Wash. Post: Monkey Cage (Jan. 8, 2014), http://wapo.st/1ifmRzK [http://
perma.cc/3N3B-JKB2] (“The evidence points to a major partisan asymmetry in polarization. Despite the widespread belief that both parties have moved to the extremes, the
movement of the Republican Party to the right accounts for most of the divergence
between the two parties [since the 1970s].”). As we discuss below, asymmetric constitutional hardball is not simply an epiphenomenon of asymmetric polarization, although
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The small-c constitution12 now ﬁnds itself at a crossroads. As the ﬁlibuster of Justice Gorsuch demonstrates, we are at a liminal moment in
political time, in which Democratic Party leaders are showing a new
appetite for playing constitutional hardball in response to President
Trump. Will they close the hardball gap with their Republican counterparts in the months and years ahead? And would it be a good thing if
they did?
The answer to such questions may be clouded temporarily by the
political and constitutional turmoil wrought by the Trump Administration,
which has put some unusual cross-pressures on congressional Republicans.
We hazard no guess here about when a post-Trump political order will
arrive or exactly what shape it will take. But our account of recent
constitutional history leads us to offer one important prediction. Barring
a fundamental realignment in the party system, we believe the nowfamiliar pattern of asymmetric constitutional hardball is likely to continue for the foreseeable future: While Democrats may well become
more aggressive practitioners of constitutional hardball,13 they will not
keep pace with Republicans—and this partisan difference will continue
to be a pivotal feature of American constitutional government.
This might seem like a reckless prediction to make at a moment when
so much is in ﬂux. But this Essay will document a number of longer-term

the latter is almost certainly one of the former’s causes. See infra notes 101–104, 177–180
and accompanying text.
12. See David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 Harv.
L. Rev. 1457, 1459 (2001) (noting the distinction between “the small-‘c’ constitution—the
fundamental political institutions of a society, or the constitution in practice—and the
document itself”). The small-c constitution is often associated with “unwritten” norms of
politics and governance. Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from
Congressional Practice, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 573, 574 (2008).
13. In January 2018, Senate Democrats took the once-unthinkable (for Democrats)
step of shutting down the government in a bid to prompt legislative action on the
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program that the Trump Administration had
announced it would end. Yet to the dismay of their activist base, the Democrats “collapsed
and accepted the Republican terms for reopening the government” within three days.
Newt Gingrich, Opinion, Newt Gingrich: Schumer Shutdown Turns into Schumer
Surrender, Fox News (Jan. 24, 2018), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2018/01/24/
newt-gingrich-schumer-shutdown-turns-into-schumer-surrender.html (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review); see also Tim Murphy, Liberal Activists Are Furious that Democrats
“Caved” on the Shutdown, Mother Jones (Jan. 22, 2018), http://www.motherjones.com/
politics/2018/01/liberal-activists-are-furious-that-democrats-caved-on-the-shutdown [http://
perma.cc/XTU8-PHAQ] (describing activists’ criticisms of “weak-kneed” Democrats for
“caving” rather than maintaining the shutdown (internal quotation marks omitted));
Nicky Woolf, The Democrats Ended the US Government Shutdown—but at What Price?,
New Statesman (Jan. 23, 2018), http://www.newstatesman.com/2018/01/democrats-usgovernment-shutdown-republicans-state-spending-bill [http://perma.cc/4T5T-PXT2] (contrasting the January 2018 shutdown with the shutdowns forced by Republicans in 1995 and
2013 and concluding that “Democrats have demonstrated that they don’t have the stomach for that kind of brinkmanship”).
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dynamics that seem poised to perpetuate the divide.14 To come to grips
with the constitutional period the country has just lived through, and
also with the new one it may be entering, we need to understand better
both the causes and the consequences of asymmetric constitutional
hardball.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL HARDBALL AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS
Professor Mark Tushnet has deﬁned constitutional hardball as “political claims and practices . . . that are without much question within the
bounds of existing constitutional doctrine and practice but that are
nonetheless in some tension with existing pre-constitutional understandings.”15 Constitutional hardball tactics are viewed by the other side as
provocative and unfair because they ﬂout “the ‘go without saying’ assumptions that underpin working systems of constitutional government.”16
Such tactics do not generally ﬂout binding legal norms. But that only
heightens the sense of foul play insofar as it insulates acts of hardball
from judicial review.
Although Tushnet allows for the possibility of judicial constitutional
hardball,17 his account focuses on legislative and executive actors, and
the most straightforward cases of hardball often occur in legislatures.
Legislative bodies teem with rules and norms, not expressly required by
constitution or statute, that govern the interactions among political blocs
within the institution. Tushnet’s original examples of constitutional hardball include the impeachment of President Clinton, the 2002-to-2003
Democratic ﬁlibusters of judicial nominations by President Bush, and the
2003 efforts of Republican representatives in Colorado and Texas to push
through mid-decade redistricting plans.18 The recent blockade of Judge
Garland ﬁts Tushnet’s model nicely, as there is a longstanding custom,

14. See infra Part III.
15. Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. Marshall L. Rev. 523, 523 (2004)
[hereinafter Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball].
16. Id. at 523 n.2; see also Mark Tushnet, 1937 Redux? Reﬂections on Constitutional
Development and Political Structures, 14 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1103, 1108 (2012)
[hereinafter Tushnet, 1937 Redux] (describing constitutional hardball as “the development of practices that violate previously well-understood and accepted ways in which members of political parties who disagreed on matters of policy conducted their debates—and
ﬁghts—over policy development”).
17. Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, supra note 15, at 537–38.
18. See id. at 524–28; cf. Lawrence Wright, America’s Future Is Texas, New Yorker
(July 10, 2017), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/07/10/americas-future-istexas (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (stating that Texas’s 2003 “redistricting process has since been replicated in statehouses around the country, creating congressional
districts that are practically immune to challenge and giving Republicans an impregnable
edge in Washington”).
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but no clear-cut legal obligation, that the Senate provides timely advice
and consent on Supreme Court nominations.19
In what sense are these examples of constitutional hardball, rather
than simply political hardball? We believe that the use of “forceful
uncompromising methods”20 by government actors can qualify as
constitutional hardball in one of two basic ways. The ﬁrst involves what
some call constitutional conventions.21 Constitutional conventions are
“unwritten norms of government practice” that emerge in a decentralized fashion and “are regularly followed out of a sense of obligation
but are not directly enforceable in court.”22 Whatever explains their
existence, constitutional conventions may foster consistency, coordination, and comity in governance by prescribing “the way in which legal
powers shall be exercised” by high-level officials.23 They ﬁll in the gaps of
adjudicated structural constitutional law.24
A political maneuver can amount to constitutional hardball when it
violates or strains constitutional conventions for partisan ends.25 In other

19. See Kar & Mazzone, supra note 4, at 58–82.
20. Hardball, Merriam-Webster, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
hardball [http://perma.cc/9DT8-HREZ] (last visited Jan. 18, 2017); see also Hardball,
Oxford Dictionaries, http://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/hardball [http://
perma.cc/3ULJ-YWPY] (last visited Feb. 15, 2017) (defining hardball as “[u]ncompromising and ruthless methods or dealings”); Hardball, Urban Dictionary, http://www.
urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=hardball [http://perma.cc/R5UU-MPRF] (last
visited Feb. 15, 2017) (deﬁning hardball as “playing any kind of game, including real life,
in the toughest possible way but without breaking the law”).
21. This is an extension of Tushnet’s account; Tushnet himself suggests this move in
passing. See Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, supra note 15, at 523 n.2.
22. David E. Pozen, Constitutional Bad Faith, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 885, 930 (2016)
[hereinafter Pozen, Bad Faith]. More formally, constitutional conventions “(1) are norms
of domestic governmental behavior (2) that emerge from decentralized processes, (3) are
regularly followed (4) out of a sense of obligation, and (5) are not directly enforceable in
court but rather (6) are enforced by political sanctions, if not also by ‘the internalized sanctions of conscience.’” David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 Yale
L.J. 2, 29 (2014) [hereinafter Pozen, Self-Help] (quoting Adrian Vermeule, Conventions
of Agency Independence, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1163, 1182 (2013)). Less formally, they are
rules of the policy game that the players themselves have developed over time, the breach
of which triggers disapproval.
23. Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada 17 (3d ed. 1992).
24. See Pozen, Self-Help, supra note 22, at 33 (“Conventions help to organize public
life in . . . the vast domain in which the [constitutional] text underdetermines outcomes.
They help to shape a normative order in which representative politics is transacted.”
(footnote omitted)). Following a path laid by Commonwealth theorists, American scholars
have increasingly begun to explore the role of constitutional conventions in our domestic
system. See id. at 32–33.
25. By partisan ends, we mean the collective goals or objectives of one side in a political conﬂict. Often, the two sides in such conﬂicts will be identiﬁed with the two major
political parties. But not always: A bipartisan coalition of senators, for example, could play
constitutional hardball versus the President in order to advance the institutional interests
of their branch or chamber.
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words, if all forms of hardball are marked by “questionable, qualmproducing means,”26 when the means are seen as questionable and
qualm-producing because they disrupt an especially respected or resilient
interbranch or interparty practice, now we are talking about constitutional hardball. Uncompromising methods that do not disrupt the
“machinery of government,”27 by contrast, lack this small-c constitutional
dimension. Although necessarily fuzzy at the edges, this formulation
clariﬁes the ambiguous phrase “pre-constitutional understandings” in
Tushnet’s definition. This formulation also highlights something distinctively constitutional about constitutional hardball tactics: They put pressure
on the “norms of good institutional citizenship” that help to structure
and “sustain the constitutional system.”28
Given that constitutional conventions are thought to serve this systemic function, acts of hardball that subvert them are experienced by
officials and observers on the other side as breaches of “constitutional
morality,”29 not merely as breaches of political etiquette. When the
Republican-controlled Congress shut down the executive branch in 1995
and 1996 to gain leverage over President Clinton in budget negotiations,
or when Senate Democrats started holding pro forma “gavel-in, gavelout” sessions in 2007 to block President Bush’s recess appointments,
We include practices that violate or strain conventions on account of the possibility
that participants in these conﬂicts “may not view their actions as a change in existing
conventions at all, but rather as the best interpretation of existing conventions with respect to a question that has never been clearly decided, or an issue that has never arisen
before in precisely the same way.” Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Hardball and Constitutional
Crises, 26 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 579, 585 (2008) [hereinafter Balkin, Constitutional Hardball
and Constitutional Crises]. Thus, some have suggested that Senate Republicans’ refusal to
consider the Garland nomination was within the bounds of convention, given that (among
other things) the Senate had previously stonewalled many lower court nominees and executive branch nominees. See, e.g., Michael D. Ramsey, Why the Senate Doesn’t Have to
Act on Merrick Garland’s Nomination, Atlantic (May 15, 2016), http://www.
theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/senate-obama-merrick-garland-supremecourt-nominee/482733 [http://perma.cc/GT8H-RR96]. As with all historically informed
inquiries, the patterns of behavior said to give rise to conventions can be described at
different levels of generality. For a detailed discussion of the malleability of claims of “unprecedentedness” in the judicial nominations context, see Chafetz, supra note 4.
26. William A. Galston, The Obligation to Play Political Hardball, Phil. & Pub. Pol’y
Q., Winter 1989, at 6, 6.
27. Jon Elster, Unwritten Constitutional Norms 21 (undated) (unpublished
manuscript) [http://perma.cc/YPN8-764G] (“With virtually no exception, [constitutional
conventions] regulate . . . the ‘machinery of government’, that is, the relation between the
main branches of government, their prerogatives, and the limitations on their powers.”).
28. Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Constitutional Conventions,
and the Judicial Separation of Powers, 105 Geo. L.J. 255, 266 (2017) (discussing constitutional conventions). On account of the textual thinness and old age of the Founders’
Constitution, the difficulty of formal amendment, and judicial reticence to intervene in
legislative–executive disputes, it is plausible to think that conventions play an especially
important role in the American constitutional system.
29. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the
Study of the Law of the Constitution 346 (3d ed. 1889)).
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many believed these tactics were legally permissible yet nevertheless constitutionally worrisome in some deep sense.30 Both tactics are fairly
classed as constitutional hardball because both violated or strained constitutional conventions for partisan ends.
The second way in which a political maneuver can amount to
constitutional hardball is more direct: if it is reasonably viewed by the
other side as attempting to shift settled understandings of the Constitution in an
unusually aggressive or self-entrenching manner. Put differently, constitutional hardball can involve efforts to change big-C constitutional law
that are themselves seen as violations of small-c constitutional norms
regarding how such changes may legitimately be made. This category,
too, is necessarily fuzzy around the edges. At any given time, a variety of
actors may be trying to nudge constitutional interpretations and constructions in their preferred direction through a variety of means, such as
bringing strategic lawsuits or introducing legislation that tests existing
legal boundaries. These are standard moves in our constitutional politics
and, without more, they are not constitutional hardball.31 But sometimes,
one side tries to do something bolder: to take a substantive position that
was up until that moment “off the wall”32 and turn it into constitutional
law in a more abrupt and self-serving fashion, without the extended
period of public argumentation and mobilization and the incremental
advances that typically enable such transformations. In such a situation,
members of the other side are apt to protest that their adversaries have
pressed some handy institutional advantage—such as ﬁve votes on the
Supreme Court or control of the executive branch—to rewrite the constitutional rules in their favor.

30. On the convention-straining nature of the government shutdowns, see Peter
M. Shane, When Inter-Branch Norms Break Down: Of Arms-for-Hostages, “Orderly
Shutdowns,” Presidential Impeachments, and Judicial “Coups,” 12 Cornell J.L. & Pub.
Pol’y 503, 516–21 (2003) [hereinafter Shane, Inter-Branch Norms]. On the conventionstraining nature of the pro forma sessions, see Alexander M. Wolf, Note, Taking Back
What’s Theirs: The Recess Appointments Clause, Pro Forma Sessions, and a Political Tugof-War, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 2055, 2067–68 (2013).
31. Tushnet suggests that political actors play constitutional hardball when they
“propose legislation that pushes the envelope of existing constitutional doctrine.”
Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, supra note 15, at 535. Without some element of ruthlessness or foul play, however, this suggestion threatens to divorce constitutional hardball
from ordinary understandings of hardball. It also seems to be in tension with Tushnet’s
own deﬁnition of constitutional hardball as practices that “are without much question
within the bounds of”—rather than pushing the envelope of—“existing constitutional
doctrine.” Id. at 523.
32. See Jack M. Balkin, From Off the Wall to On the Wall: How the Mandate
Challenge Went Mainstream, Atlantic (June 4, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/
national/archive/2012/06/from-off-the-wall-to-on-the-wall-how-the-mandate-challengewent-mainstream/258040 [http://perma.cc/T449-4S97] [hereinafter Balkin, Mandate
Challenge] (“Off-the-wall arguments are those most well-trained lawyers think are clearly
wrong . . . .”).
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Many liberals viewed the early litigation against the Affordable Care
Act (ACA) as an instance of constitutional hardball not because there
was anything unusual or untoward about the formal tactic involved (ﬁling a lawsuit), but rather because the litigation aimed to destroy the Act
by creating an activity–inactivity distinction that they saw as having no
basis in modern Commerce Clause doctrine.33 The embrace of this
formerly off-the-wall argument by conservative litigants and judges, from
the liberals’ perspective, represented an exercise of raw partisan power to
change constitutional law. Many liberals saw the Supreme Court’s
reliance on a novel, case-speciﬁc theory of equal protection in Bush v.
Gore 34 in similar terms.35 For their part, many conservatives characterized
various initiatives of the Obama Administration that were not clearly reviewable in court when they were undertaken—most notably, its “deferred action” programs for millions of unlawfully present immigrants—
as constitutional hardball of this sort. Instead of waiting for a legislative
overhaul, the Administration’s programs enacted what critics argued was
an unprecedented expansion of executive enforcement discretion.36 It is
this sense of a radical, and opportunistic, departure from shared

33. See, e.g., John T. Valauri, Federalism, Mandates and Individual Liberty, 43 N. Ky.
L. Rev. 175, 178 (2016) (“[M]andate defenders point out that the activity/inactivity
distinction is a novelty without foundation or support in constitutional text or precedent.”); Balkin, Mandate Challenge, supra note 32 (“Three years ago, the idea that the
Act’s mandate to purchase health insurance might be unconstitutional was, in the view of
most legal professionals and academics, simply crazy.”).
34. 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (“Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes generally presents many
complexities.”).
35. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and
Politics, 110 Yale L.J. 1407, 1431 (2001) (describing as “inescapable” the suspicion that the
Court’s equal protection argument was “a makeweight designed primarily to stop the recounts”); cf. Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Constitutional History,
89 Calif. L. Rev. 1721, 1730 (2001) (“The Court’s equal protection rationale was so novel
and far-fetched that Bush’s lawyers came exceedingly close to not even bothering to raise
it.”).
36. See, e.g., David E. Bernstein, Lawless: The Obama Administration’s
Unprecedented Assault on the Constitution and the Rule of Law 141 (2015) [hereinafter
Bernstein, Lawless] (“Even if one concludes that there is at least a plausible legal defense
of Obama’s immigration unilateralism, no president had ever used the discretion provided
by immigration laws and inherent to his office simply to evade congressional
opposition . . . , nor to extend de facto legal status to so many people.”); Peter H. Schuck,
Opinion, Why Congress Can Impeach Obama, N.Y. Times (Nov. 21, 2014), http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/11/22/opinion/the-impeachment-of-obama-on-immigrationmay-be-legal-but-its-wrong.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing against
conservative calls for impeachment over the issue, but contending that “granting legal
status and work permits to millions of people most likely exceeds [the President’s] discretion” and that “no one, including Congress, has legal standing to challenge his order in
court”). Depending on how exactly this objection is framed, it may imply a breach of constitutional convention, an attempt to shift the substantive principles governing the constitutional order, or both.
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constitutional understandings that deﬁnes this second variant of constitutional hardball.
What connects these two forms of hardball—tactics that defy
constitutional conventions and efforts to achieve especially aggressive or
self-entrenching forms of constitutional change—is that they break the
perceived rules of normal constitutional politics. They may reﬂect a
sincerely held, long-term vision of a good constitutional order, as with
libertarian arguments for the activity–inactivity distinction. Or they may
seek a one-time victory with a powerful political effect, as with the equal
protection argument in Bush v. Gore.37 Either way, these maneuvers elicit
in their opponents a feeling that constitutional institutions or ideas have
been instrumentalized for partisan gain, that there has been a process
breakdown, that they have “been had.” Recognizing such behaviors as
constitutional hardball is not to deny their fundamentally political character, but rather to illuminate the nature of the stakes and the norms
involved. And recognizing such behaviors as hardball is not to suggest
they are inherently bad. While all acts of constitutional hardball create
systemic risks, as Part III will discuss,38 speciﬁc acts may be justiﬁed for a
variety of contextual normative reasons; sound political judgment might
even require that certain types of hardball be played in certain situations.39
Many Beltway behaviors are contentious or obnoxious without being
constitutional hardball. Rhetorical attacks on the other side will rarely
disrupt the machinery of government or effect dramatic constitutional
change.40 So too with most policy proposals and programs. The Obama
Administration’s national security surveillance activities, for example, certainly became controversial, and some of them may have even been unlawful. But they did not generate charges of unfair dealing or upend the
rules of the policy game.

37. Cf. Balkin, Constitutional Hardball and Constitutional Crises, supra note 25, at
584 (“[P]olitical actors might play constitutional hardball for two reasons. First, they want
to establish that the Constitution means one thing rather than another. Second, they want
to stay in power and keep those who agree with them in power as long as possible.”).
38. See infra notes 197–199 and accompanying text. We return to this theme in the
Conclusion.
39. See Galston, supra note 26, at 6–8; cf. Thomas Nagel, Ruthlessness in Public Life,
in Mortal Questions 75, 82 (1979) (proposing that the “moral impersonality of public
action . . . warrants methods usually excluded for private individuals, and sometimes it
licenses ruthlessness”). Theorizing the conditions under which constitutional hardball is
justiﬁed as a matter of political or constitutional morality is an important task, but one that
would require another, very different sort of paper.
40. But cf. Dylan Matthews, I Asked 8 Experts if We’re in a Constitutional Crisis.
Here’s What They Said., Vox (Feb. 13, 2017), http://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/
2017/2/13/14541974/constitutional-crisis-experts-unanimous [http://perma.cc/6YZJP4EV] (quoting Tushnet as saying that “rhetoric can count as a form of constitutional
hardball” when “inconsistent with settled ways of doing things” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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Although our deﬁnition for the most part builds on and reﬁnes
Tushnet’s, it differs from his in that it does not limit constitutional hardball to periods of large-scale constitutional transformation.41 While constitutional hardball may be more likely to occur “when one side sees an
opportunity to shift the constitutional order,” we agree with Professor
Jack Balkin that the phenomenon is more general.42 In any event, Tushnet
maintains that the United States has been undergoing an “extended period of constitutional transformation” since around 1980,43 and no one
seems to deny that we have been living with substantial amounts of constitutional hardball for decades now. At this point, it is the only world our
politicians know.
II. PARTISAN PATTERNS (AND PERCEPTIONS) OF
CONSTITUTIONAL HARDBALL
Because acts of constitutional hardball are seen as provocative and
high-stakes, they tend to invite a response. Often this response involves
another act of constitutional hardball. And just as in the schoolyard, the
question of who started it arises and becomes part of the dispute itself.
Typically, Tushnet writes, “each side contends that the other breached
the relevant implicit understandings”—or constitutional conventions—
“ﬁrst.”44 “The prior breach then is said to have destroyed the implicit
understandings already, thereby taking the sting out of the charge that
one is breaching taken-for-granted norms.”45
In his account of this dynamic, Tushnet seems to suggest that a
rough sort of symmetry, or parity, characterizes the partisan practice of
constitutional hardball. Whichever side resorts to hardball, the other side
will follow suit in a predictable sequence of tit-for-tat.46 Following
Tushnet, other legal scholars have suggested the same.47 We agree that
41. See Mark Tushnet, Response, 26 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 727, 732 (2008) (“For me,
constitutional hardball is—deﬁnitionally—a transitional phenomenon that occurs when
one side sees an opportunity to shift the constitutional order . . . .”).
42. See Balkin, Constitutional Hardball and Constitutional Crises, supra note 25, at
586–90.
43. Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, supra note 15, at 549.
44. Tushnet, 1937 Redux, supra note 16, at 1109.
45. Id.
46. See Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, supra note 15, at 524 n.4 (“The structure
of my argument . . . strongly suggests that when one side starts to play constitutional hardball, the other side will join in.”); see also Balkin, Constitutional Hardball and
Constitutional Crises, supra note 25, at 581 (“As soon as one side begins to play constitutional hardball, the other usually will quickly follow with a defensive version . . . .”).
47. See, e.g., Michael Greve, Our Polarized, Presidential Federalism, in Parchment
Barriers: Political Polarization and the Limits of Constitutional Order (Zachary C. Courser
et al. eds., forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 3), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2885932 (on
ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (stating that partisan polarization has generated “‘constitutional hardball’ on all sides” of federalism debates); Bruce G. Peabody, The Twice and
Future President Revisited: Of Three-Term Presidents and Constitutional End Runs, 101
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constitutional hardball lends itself to retaliation and escalation—and that
both Democratic and Republican officeholders engage in it to some
substantial extent.
Yet even if constitutional hardball is by nature reciprocal, it nonetheless remains possible that one side may play hardball more frequently
or intensively than the other side over a sustained period of time. This is
what we submit has happened for the past quarter century or so, since
roughly the Gingrich Revolution48 of the mid-1990s.49 Constitutional
hardball remains reciprocal but not symmetrical. One party, the Republican
Party, has become especially identiﬁed with hardball tactics during this
period, with large consequences for our constitutional system.
A.

Methodological Challenges

We acknowledge at the outset that studying this potential asymmetry
poses a considerable challenge. Because of the reciprocal character of
constitutional hardball and the open texture of constitutional norms,
both sides will frequently have a nonfrivolous claim to be responding to a
transgression or provocation by the other side. And given the partisan
overlay, perceptions among Democrats that Republicans play more
Minn. L. Rev. Headnotes 121, 154 (2016), http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/11/Peabody-2.pdf [http://perma.cc/6SHY-XZJM] (discussing
“the ascension of . . . ‘constitutional hardball’” and its possible use by “[f]uture partisans,”
without reference to party affiliation); cf. Matt Grossmann & David A. Hopkins, Ideological
Republicans and Group Interest Democrats: The Asymmetry of American Party Politics, 13
Persp. on Pol. 119, 120 (2015) [hereinafter Grossmann & Hopkins, Asymmetry of
American Party Politics] (“Most theories of American political parties are designed to
apply equally to Democrats and Republicans without recognition of party asymmetry.”). A
notable exception in the legal literature is Professor David Fontana, who suggests in a
recent essay that the Obama Administration’s “mostly . . . cooperative” approach to judicial nominations contrasts with the “more aggressive political strategies” of prior Republican
administrations, leading to “asymmetric usage of ‘constitutional hardball’” in that ﬁeld.
David Fontana, Cooperative Judicial Nominations During the Obama Administration,
2017 Wis. L. Rev. 305, 307–08.
48. Led by Newt Gingrich, the Republican Party took back control of the House of
Representatives for the ﬁrst time in more than thirty years following the 1994 midterm
elections. See generally Thomas E. Mann & Norman J. Ornstein, It’s Even Worse than It
Looks: How the American Constitutional System Collided with the New Politics of
Extremism 31–43 (paperback ed. 2016) (reviewing Gingrich’s confrontational tactics and
their legacy). In a recent blog post that offers a relatively symmetrical account of constitutional hardball in Senate circuit court conﬁrmations, Professor Keith Whittington nonetheless identiﬁes an escalation in the late 1990s so signiﬁcant that he divides his data into
two periods, “Pre- and Post-Lewinsky.” Keith E. Whittington, Partisanship, Norms and
Federal Judicial Appointments, Balkinization (Nov. 29, 2017), http://balkin.blogspot.com/
2017/11/partisanship-norms-and-federal-judicial.html [http://perma.cc/2ZL3-NZXM].
49. An alternative starting point for the period explored in this Essay might be the
Reagan Revolution at the turn of the 1980s. See Peter M. Shane, Madison’s Nightmare:
How Executive Power Threatens American Democracy 119 (2009) (cataloging a long list
of “right-wing norm-breaking initiatives” since 1981 and suggesting that they can be traced
to Republicans’ suspicion of “pre-Reagan institutional norms of governance”).
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constitutional hardball, or harder hardball, are almost inevitably going to
be colored by “partyism,”50 conﬁrmation bias, myside bias, or the like.
The same goes for us. Like Tushnet, we are keenly aware that our own
political location may make us “more attuned to examples of hardball
practices [we] see on the right.”51
Further complicating matters, the structure of constitutional
hardball itself confounds objective measurement. By deﬁnition, constitutional hardball consists of counter-conventional behaviors and efforts
at constitutional change that may take any number of forms across any
number of institutional and substantive domains—and that are therefore
hard to count and compare. An interpretive judgment is always required
to establish that a political maneuver amounts to constitutional hardball,
because one must ﬁrst determine what the relevant constitutional
traditions and settled understandings are, at what level of generality to
assess the historical record, and whether and to what extent the
maneuver deviates from them. These judgments as to what is conventional or unconventional, norm-abiding or norm-defying, are to some
extent endogenous to constitutional practice. There is no Archimedean
point from which we, as observers of politics, can stand outside politics
and be completely conﬁdent in the accuracy of our assessments.
In light of these challenges, one might be tempted to conclude that
it is simply impossible to investigate the symmetry or asymmetry of constitutional hardball in a credible or useful manner, at least beyond
certain discrete patches of government activity.52 We think this conclusion cannot be right. For one thing, it proves too much. Many different
public law practices have long been inﬂected with partisanship. It would
be perverse to exempt some or all of them from scholarly inquiry on that
basis. Moreover, the phenomenon of asymmetric constitutional hardball—if it exists—would be an extremely signiﬁcant feature of American
constitutional politics, with potential causes and effects too important for
constitutional theorists to ignore.
Given its inherently contested and shape-shifting nature, we know of
no good way to reduce the overall practice of constitutional hardball to a
50. See Cass R. Sunstein, Partyism, 2015 U. Chi. Legal F. 1, 1–8 (deﬁning partyism as
hostility “to the opposing party and willing[ness] to believe that its members have a host of
bad characteristics” and reviewing evidence of implicit and explicit cross-party bias).
51. Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, supra note 15, at 524 n.4.
52. Thus, Professor Josh Chafetz suggests in a new essay on the Garland–Gorsuch
imbroglio that claims that the other side has acted in an “unprecedented” manner ought
to be taken with a grain of salt in the judicial nominations context, as such claims have
long been a standard move in political argument. See generally Chafetz, supra note 4. The
strongest version of Chafetz’s thesis would hold that there is no way to say objectively, or
even somewhat objectively, whether one side is playing more hardball than the other. We
resist this hyper-relativist version of Chafetz’s argument—as well he might, too. But we
agree with Chafetz that it is important to maintain a skeptical stance toward one’s own intuitive assessments of these matters, as his essay underscores.
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numerical scale, no scientiﬁc test to measure or code it.53 And we suspect
that such scales and tests, if devised, would be vulnerable to the biases
and value choices of the politically aware humans who create them. In an
exploratory Essay like this, we believe it is appropriate to take a more
encompassing, qualitative approach. As a ﬁrst cut, our basic strategy is to
scour the legal, political science, and popular literatures on constitutional conﬂict in the political branches; to identify behaviors that
plausibly satisfy the deﬁnition of constitutional hardball given in Part I;
and to relate these examples to the growing bodies of research on
partisan polarization, party organization, and the Constitution outside
the courts. There are a number of speciﬁc domains of constitutional
hardball (such as debt ceiling brinkmanship and restrictions on voting)
within which the Republican–Democratic discrepancy seems plain, other
domains (such as Senate obstruction of circuit court nominations) where
the balance is more even. Taken together, however, the evidence suggests
that constitutional hardball has been plausibly asymmetric for a quarter
century. Laying out this evidence is the work of the rest of this Part.
B.

Motivating Observations

What leads us to suspect that constitutional hardball has become
asymmetric? The next section and Part III will consider numerous forms
of indirect evidence. But the most immediate reason for suspecting as
much is this: The recent historical record appears to contain more, and
more distinctive, examples of constitutional hardball on the Republican
side. Meanwhile, a perception of partisan asymmetry has emerged.54 While
this would be notable regardless of the reality, the perception has an
empirical basis.
Our focus here is on the period from the mid-1990s through the end
of the Obama Administration. Republicans and Democrats both controlled the presidency and each house of Congress for parts of this period. Partisan conﬂict was a near-constant, and President Trump had not
yet brought his openly norm-shattering approach to the White House.
There is no obvious a priori reason why one side would have become
more identiﬁed with constitutional hardball than the other.

53. This is not to say that constitutional hardball could not be measured more
rigorously than we have attempted in this Essay. Systematic discourse analysis, for example,
could be used to determine the partisan distribution of “hardball” allegations and hardball-equivalent allegations. Surveys and interviews might be used to gauge the views of
Washington insiders. At least some familiar categories of hardball tactics, such as minoritarian blocking and delaying tactics in the Senate, may be subject to certain forms of
aggregation and quantiﬁcation. See, e.g., infra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing
the increased use of the ﬁlibuster during the Obama presidency). If it is plausible that constitutional hardball has become asymmetric along partisan lines, then such empirical efforts may well be warranted, notwithstanding their evident limitations.
54. See infra notes 89–95 and accompanying text.
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And yet that is what happened. The literature on constitutional conﬂict in the political branches has identiﬁed an impressive array of examples from this period that arguably qualify as constitutional hardball on
the Republican side. A partial catalog from the pre-Obama years 55 might
include the government shutdowns of 1995 and 1996;56 Newt Gingrich’s
efforts in that same Congress to consolidate power in the Speaker’s office
and “dismantle” congressional institutions with professional staff;57 the
impeachment of President Clinton in 1998;58 the 1,052 subpoenas issued
by Dan Burton, then-Chair of the House Oversight and Government
Reform Committee, to the Clinton Administration and other Democratic
targets from 1997 to 2002;59 a range of techniques used in Florida to

55. This catalog is focused on the actions of federal government officials. Given that
(i) the two parties have also become increasingly ideologically cohesive and polarized
throughout the ﬁfty states, see Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 Harv. L.
Rev. 1077, 1086–87 (2014), that (ii) state and federal politicians from the same party have
increasingly collaborated around shared agendas, see id. at 1089, and that (iii) Republican
state legislators on the whole have “clearly” been “polarizing faster than Democrats” over
the past two decades, Boris Shor, Asymmetric Polarization in the State Legislatures? Yes
and No, Measuring Am. Legislatures (July 29, 2013), http://americanlegislatures.com/
2013/07/29/partisan-polarization-in-state-legislatures [http://perma.cc/4DFT-LZNX];
but cf. id. (noting “lots of differences across states”), we expect that most of our claims
about asymmetric constitutional hardball are likely to hold at the subfederal level as well.
A sustained analysis of state-level constitutional hardball is beyond the scope of this Essay,
however. For a prominent recent example of the phenomenon, see Jedediah Purdy, North
Carolina’s Partisan Crisis, New Yorker (Dec. 20, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/news/
news-desk/north-carolinas-partisan-crisis [http://perma.cc/RA2T-675W] (discussing a
variety of tactics used by North Carolina Republicans, including secretive legislative sessions and new limits on the governor’s appointment powers, “intended to maximize partisan advantage . . . by pressing or breaking norms”).
56. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
57. Bruce Bartlett, Gingrich and the Destruction of Congressional Expertise, N.Y.
Times: Economix (Nov. 29, 2011), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/29/
gingrich-and-the-destruction-of-congressional-expertise (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review). Gingrich’s approach to the speakership was subsequently reinforced by his
successors’ use of the so-called Hastert Rule, the principle that Republican Speakers will
only bring up a bill for a ﬂoor vote if a majority of their caucus supports it. See Holly
Fechner, Managing Political Polarization in Congress: A Case Study on the Use of the
Hastert Rule, 2014 Utah L. Rev. 757, 764–66.
58. See supra note 18 and accompanying text; see also Shane, Inter-Branch Norms,
supra note 30, at 525 (describing the Clinton impeachment as “an inexcusable assault on
inter-branch norms”).
59. See Henry Waxman with Joshua Green, The Waxman Report: How Congress
Really Works 148–51 (2009) (recounting this “notorious” history); Alex Slater & Calvin
Harris, Darrell Issa, the Man Who Would Be Nemesis, Guardian (Nov. 30, 2010), http://
www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/nov/29/republicans-us-politics
[http://perma.cc/86YK-8GFX] (“Burton issued a total of 1,052 subpoenas in his attempt
to paralyse the Clinton administration . . . . Many of these investigations bordered on the
farcical. Burton subpoenaed thousands of pages of documents on every conceivable issue—relevant or not.”).
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restrict access to voting during the 2000 presidential election,60 which
inspired Republican regulators nationwide and opened up a new front in
what some now call the “voting wars”;61 various tactical moves by the
Bush side in the Bush v. Gore litigation and the ensuing Supreme Court
decision;62 the ﬁring of the Senate Parliamentarian in 2001;63 the exclusion of congressional Democrats from conference committee deliberations64 and the turn toward “closed” rules for bills on the House ﬂoor
from 2001 to 2006;65 the mid-decade redistricting plans developed in
60. See David Schultz, Less than Fundamental: The Myth of Voter Fraud and the
Coming of the Second Great Disenfranchisement, 34 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 483, 493
(2008) (reviewing voter suppression allegations leveled in 2000 against Katherine Harris,
the Florida Secretary of State and state chair of the Bush election committee).
61. See Ari Berman, How the 2000 Election in Florida Led to a New Wave of Voter
Disenfranchisement, Nation (July 28, 2015), http://www.thenation.com/article/how-the2000-election-in-florida-led-to-a-new-wave-of-voter-disenfranchisement [http://perma.cc/
YLP9-97KL]; see also Sheldon Whitehouse, Conservative Judicial Activism: The
Politicization of the Supreme Court Under Chief Justice Roberts, 9 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev.
195, 207 (2015) (criticizing “a raft of voter-identiﬁcation laws, cuts to early voting, bans on
same-day registration, and voter-roll purges” and arguing that “[v]oter suppression of the
kind [allowed by current doctrine] works virtually exclusively in favor of Republicans”);
Paul Rosenberg, Destroying Democracy Is the GOP’s Goal: Obstruction, Dysfunction and
the Sneaky, Decades-Long Plan to Steal Your Vote, Salon (Mar. 30, 2015), http://
www.salon.com/2015/03/30/destroying_democracy_is_the_gops_goal_obstruction_dysfu
nction_and_the_sneaky_decades_long_plan_to_steal_your_vote [http://perma.cc/8R8VMFP5] (stating that a “major front” of Republican “constitutional hardball in the Obama
era has been the attack on voting rights centered in state legislatures”). The post-2000
wave of Republican-sponsored measures aiming to restrict voting in one way or another
came as a surprise to voting rights scholars, who had generally assumed that “vote denial”
controversies were a thing of the past. Cf. Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where
Election Reform Meets the Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. Rev. 689, 693–718 (2006)
(surveying post-2000 developments and the emergence of a “new generation of vote denial claims”). For a helpful overview, see generally Richard L. Hasen, The Voting Wars:
From Florida 2000 to the Next Election Meltdown (2012).
62. See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text.
63. See Charles Tiefer, Out of Order: The Abrupt Dismissal of the Parliamentarian
Threatens to Rip Apart the Fragile Fabric of Senate Procedure, Legal Times, May 14, 2001,
at 62 [hereinafter Tiefer, Out of Order].
64. See Eric Schickler & Kathryn Pearson, The House Leadership in an Era of
Partisan Warfare, in Congress Reconsidered 207, 211 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I.
Oppenheimer eds., 8th ed. 2005) (“The degree to which Republicans exclude Democrats
from conference deliberations is unprecedented in the modern era . . . .”); Charles Tiefer,
Congress’s Transformative “Republican Revolution” in 2001–2006 and the Future of OneParty Rule, 23 J.L. & Pol. 233, 265–72 (2007) [hereinafter Tiefer, Republican Revolution]
(reviewing “dramatic alterations of conference procedure” in the early 2000s); see also
Hong Min Park et al., Politics over Process: Partisan Conﬂict and Post-Passage Processes in
the U.S. Congress 70, 131 (2017) (describing a “dramatic drop in the frequency of using
conference committees to resolve House-Senate differences,” along with changes in the
composition of these committees, that the authors attribute in substantial part to reforms
“initiated by House Republicans after the 1994 elections” to advance “partisan efficiency
and control”).
65. See Tiefer, Republican Revolution, supra note 64, at 256–63 (reviewing the rise of
closed and semi-closed rules). Closed rules deny minority-party legislators the opportunity
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Colorado, Georgia, and Texas after the 2002 elections,66 followed by the
broader and more systematic partisan redistricting initiative known as
REDMAP; 67 and the “seemingly endless” ways in which the Bush
Administration “pushed the legal envelope” following 9/11 in its interactions with the other branches, from increased reliance on presidential
signing statements to withholding information from congressional oversight bodies to aggressive interpretations and applications of the commander-in-chief power.68
During the Obama Administration, Republican constitutional hardball further escalated—and, in the Senate, became programmatic. Committed self-consciously to a stance of “united and unyielding opposition,”69
Republicans used ﬁlibusters and “holds” to block legislation and nominations on an unprecedented scale;70 threatened repeatedly to default on
to offer amendments to a bill. During this period, according to Juliet Eilperin, Republican
House members viewed Democrats “as a bunch of sore losers who assail them on procedural grounds because they lack a compelling vision of how to rule the country,” while
Democrats viewed “the GOP majority as a ruthless band that will do anything to maintain
its power.” Juliet Eilperin, Fight Club Politics: How Partisanship Is Poisoning the U.S.
House of Representatives 6 (2006).
66. See supra note 18 and accompanying text; see also Elections A to Z 331 (Dave
Tarr & Bob Benenson eds., 4th ed. 2012) (“Nothing in the Constitution or federal law
barred mid-decade redistricting, but an unspoken compact between the parties prevailed
until the ﬁrst decade of the twenty-ﬁrst century, when Republicans used their control of
the state legislatures in Colorado, Georgia, and Texas to enact partisan, mid-decade redistricting plans.”).
67. See David Daley, Ratf**ked: The True Story Behind the Secret Plan to Steal
America’s Democracy, at xviii (2016) (describing REDMAP’s efforts “to redraw the political map coast to coast, with the express goal of locking in Republican control of the U.S.
House of Representatives and state legislative chambers for the next decade or more,” as
“gerrymandering’s shock-and-awe campaign”).
68. Jack Balkin, Constitutional Hardball in the Bush Administration, Balkinization
(July 13, 2007), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2007/07/constitutional-hardball-in-bush.html
[http://perma.cc/J4JU-2N68]. “These acts of constitutional hardball,” according to
Balkin, “were designed to transform the constitutional order to a new regime,” oriented
around “an expansive . . . conception of Presidential power to combat a potentially endless
war on terror.” Id.
69. Robert Draper, Do Not Ask What Good We Do: Inside the U.S. House of
Representatives, at xix (2012) (describing “united and unyielding opposition to the
president’s economic policies” as one pillar of a plan devised by top congressional
Republicans on the night of President Obama’s inauguration); see also Michael Grunwald,
The New New Deal: The Hidden Story of Change in the Obama Era 19 (2012) (quoting
former Republican Senator George Voinovich as stating that “[i]f [President Obama] was
for it, we had to be against it” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Michael A. Memoli,
Mitch McConnell’s Remarks on 2012 Draw White House Ire, L.A. Times (Oct. 27, 2010),
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/oct/27/news/la-pn-obama-mcconnell-20101027 [http://
perma.cc/C9QL-QQDT] (quoting Senator McConnell as stating that “the single most
important thing we want to achieve is for President Obama to be a one-term president”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
70. See Pozen, Self-Help, supra note 22, at 39–40 (reviewing these developments);
see also Allison Graves, Did Senate Republicans Filibuster Obama Court Nominees More
than All Others Combined?, PolitiFact (Apr. 9, 2017), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-
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the national debt;71 “employed a battery of unorthodox procedural
maneuvers,” including a government shutdown, “in a campaign to
defund ‘Obamacare’”;72 and refused to permit any appointments to
leadership posts at the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) or
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).73 Senate Republicans’
stonewalling of the Garland nomination thus represented the culmination of a long line of convention-straining, yet not clearly law-violating,
obstructionist maneuvers. “From its very ﬁrst months,” journalist
Matthew Yglesias opined in 2015, “Obama’s presidency has been marked
by essentially nothing but constitutional hardball.”74
To be sure, Democratic officeholders have also resorted to constitutional hardball numerous times since the mid-1990s—and many more
times before then, perhaps most notably during the New Deal.75 Hardball
in the 1930s may well have had a partisan skew opposite to the one described in this Essay. More recently, the 1987 Senate campaign against
Judge Robert Bork’s Supreme Court nomination was an important
example of constitutional hardball; many observers, especially conservatives, viewed it at the time as an unprecedented escalation of the
political battles over judicial appointments.76 A historical study with a
meter/statements/2017/apr/09/ben-cardin/did-senate-republicans-filibuster-obama-courtnomi [http://perma.cc/YUL6-T6UB] (explaining, based on Congressional Research
Service data, that whereas “[l]ess than one [judicial] nominee per year was subject to a
cloture ﬁling in the 40 years before Obama took office,” from 2009 to 2013 “the number
of nominees subject to a cloture ﬁling jumped to over seven per year”).
71. See Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, Don’t End or Audit the Fed: Central
Bank Independence in an Age of Austerity, 102 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 3–4 (2016) (explaining
that “Tea Party-affiliated congressional Republicans repeatedly threatened not to raise the
debt ceiling—and thus raised the specter of a ﬁrst-ever default by the government of the
United States—in order to obtain deep cuts in government spending”); see also Lori
Montgomery et al., Origins of the Debt Showdown, Wash. Post (Aug. 6, 2011), http://
wapo.st/nLw7LO [http://perma.cc/DF6P-LRRN] (quoting then-Senate Minority Leader
Mitch McConnell as saying that what Republicans “learn[ed]” from the debt ceiling
showdown of 2011 “is this—it’s a hostage that’s worth ransoming” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
72. Pozen, Self-Help, supra note 22, at 45.
73. See John C. Roberts, The Struggle over Executive Appointments, 2014 Utah L.
Rev. 725, 736 (remarking that Republicans’ “blatant misuse of the constitutional adviceand-consent power . . . came to a head in 2011 when the Senate minority resolved to prevent two entities established by Congress—the CFPB and the NLRB—from carrying out
their statutory responsibilities”).
74. Matthew Yglesias, American Democracy Is Doomed, Vox (Oct. 8, 2015),
http://www.vox.com/2015/3/2/8120063/american-democracy-doomed [http://perma.cc/
RV95-88Q9].
75. See, e.g., Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, supra note 15, at 535–36, 544–45
(analyzing the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 and President Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan of 1937 as constitutional hardball).
76. Indeed, from the perspective of some Republicans, the Bork nomination’s defeat
remains the canonical act of modern constitutional hardball, from which many later iterations followed. See, e.g., Charles G. Geyh, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability,
and the Role of Constitutional Norms in Congressional Regulation of the Courts, 78 Ind.
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longer time horizon might reveal that asymmetric constitutional hardball
has an epicyclical character in the American system, with the party that
feels it was on the losing end of prior periods of hardball becoming the
dominant hardball player in subsequent periods.77
Over the past twenty-ﬁve years, arguable examples of Democratic
constitutional hardball include the Clinton Administration’s increasingly
controversial assertions of executive privilege from 1995 to 1999,78 the
repeated ﬁlibusters of President Bush’s ﬁrst-term circuit court nominations,79 and the use of pro forma sessions to block President Bush’s
recess appointments in 2007 and 2008.80 More recently, the Obama
Administration and its congressional allies made a variety of moves that
might be classiﬁed as constitutional hardball, from using the reconciliation process to amend the ACA without a supermajority vote,81 to
“repeatedly test[ing] the limits of executive authority in implementing
the ACA,”82 to making recess appointments to the CFPB and NLRB when
L.J. 153, 155 (2003) (“Some trace the ignition source of the ongoing appointments
conﬂagration to the nomination of Robert Bork to the United States Supreme Court in
1987, whose rejection at the hands of Senate Democrats politicized the judicial appointments process in unprecedented ways.”); Steven G. Calabresi & Shams Hirji, Judicial
Appointments After Judge Robert H. Bork, Balkinization (Nov. 27, 2017), http://
balkin.blogspot.com/2017/11/judicial-appointments-after-judge.html [http://perma.cc/
2WY5-EGYD] (defending a proposed judgeship bill, widely understood as a Republican
court-packing plan and an extreme effort at constitutional hardball, with reference to “the
unprecedented treatment given to Judge Robert H. Bork by Senate Democrats in 1987”).
We see an unmistakable tit-for-tat pattern in the parties’ behavior surrounding judicial
nominations, going back before the mid-1990s and continuing up to the present. But we
also observe, since the mid-1990s, an asymmetry emerging within that ongoing tit-for-tat
pattern.
77. Cf. infra section III.B.2 (explaining how theories of “constitutional restorationism” have helped to motivate and justify recent Republican hardball).
78. See Mark J. Rozell, Restoring Balance to the Debate over Executive Privilege: A
Response to Berger, 8 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 541, 550 (2000) (criticizing President
Clinton’s “extensive use of executive privilege in circumstances that do not warrant the exercise of that power”).
79. See supra note 18 and accompanying text; see also Republican Nat’l Comm.,
2004 Republican Party Platform 77 (2004) (calling upon “obstructionist Democrats in the
Senate to abandon their unprecedented and highly irresponsible ﬁlibuster of President
Bush’s highly qualiﬁed judicial nominees”).
80. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
81. See Mark A. Graber, A Tale Told by a President, 28 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. Inter Alia
13, 23 (2010), http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/fac_pubs/1149 (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review) (describing President Obama and his congressional allies as playing
“far more constitutional hardball” than they had played before in their push to enact the
ACA). To work around a Senate ﬁlibuster, some Democratic legislators also threatened to
use the “constitutionally controversial ‘deem and pass’ procedure” in the House, should
the need have arisen. Id.
82. Nicholas Bagley, Legal Limits and the Implementation of the Affordable Care
Act, 164 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1715, 1715–16 (2016). As Professor Bagley has explained, “congressional antipathy . . . precluded looking to the legislature to iron out” difficulties that arose
during the ACA’s rollout. Id.
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Senate Republicans were holding pro forma sessions,83 to eliminating the
ﬁlibuster for non–Supreme Court nominees,84 to announcing initiatives
that would defer the deportation of large categories of unauthorized
immigrants in the absence of legislative reform.85 Republican officeholders clearly have no monopoly on constitutional hardball.
They appear to have a dominant market position, however. Especially within Congress, plausible examples of Democratic constitutional
83. The NLRB appointments were invalidated by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Noel
Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).
84. See Jeremy W. Peters, In Landmark Vote, Senate Limits Use of the Filibuster,
N.Y. Times (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/22/us/politics/reid-setsin-motion-steps-to-limit-use-of-filibuster.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (describing this as “the most fundamental alteration of [Senate] rules in more than a generation” and noting that “[f]urious Republicans accused Democrats of a power grab”); see
also id. (“[The 2013 ﬁlibuster reform] represented the culmination of years of frustration
over what Democrats denounced as a Republican campaign to stall the machinery of
Congress, stymie President Obama’s agenda and block his choices for cabinet posts and
federal judgeships . . . .”). Judicial appointments may well be the ﬁeld with greatest overlap
in Democratic and Republican hardball tactics. But cf. Fontana, supra note 47, at 306–08,
319–20, 322–26, 332–33 (detailing ways in which the Obama Administration declined to
play Republican-style hardball on judicial nominations).
85. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. For an overview of these initiatives
within the context of the Administration’s broader immigration policy, see Adam B. Cox &
Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux, 125 Yale L.J. 104, 135–
42 (2015).
The examples listed in the main text strike us as the most signiﬁcant and salient acts
of constitutional hardball by the Obama Administration and its congressional supporters,
assuming one does not view the Iran nuclear deal or the Paris climate agreement as such.
Cf. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Presidential Control over International Law,
131 Harv. L. Rev. 1201, 1204 (2018) (explaining that the “Paris Agreement and the Iran
deal are but two recent instances in what has been a long accretion of presidential control
over international law since the constitutional Founding”). But there may be others. In the
summer of 2016, for instance, after Republican leadership refused to allow gun-control
measures with bipartisan support to come up for a vote, Democrats responded with a “sitin” on the House ﬂoor. See Heather Caygle, GOP Approves New Fines for Livestreaming
Protests on House Floor, Politico (Jan. 3, 2017), http://www.politico.com/story/2017/
01/house-ﬁnes-livestream-protests-233145 [http://perma.cc/XYF3-S37F]. While this sit-in
does seem to qualify as constitutional hardball, the immediate practical impact was
minimal, and Republicans promptly responded with vigorous hardball of their own—
adopting new rules that ﬁne House members “up to $2,500 for using their phones to take
pictures or shoot videos on the House ﬂoor.” Id. See also, e.g., Josh Blackman,
Presidential Insulation, Josh Blackman’s Blog (Dec. 28, 2016), http://joshblackman.com/
blog/2016/12/28/presidential-insulation [http://perma.cc/R43V-ZVTF] (cataloging
actions allegedly taken by the Obama Administration in late 2016 to insulate its policies
from reversal by the Trump Administration). Earlier, critics argued that certain “Dear
Colleague” letters sent by the Department of Education in 2011 and 2014 “radically”
departed from traditional Title IX enforcement and amounted to “a crusade against due
process for students accused of sexual assault.” Stuart Taylor Jr. & KC Johnson, The New
Standard for Campus Sexual Assault: Guilty Until Proven Innocent, Nat’l Rev. (Dec. 30,
2015), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/428910/campus-rape-courts-why-arentrepublicans-resisting [http://perma.cc/LU83-U6M7]. Depending on their framing, such
arguments could be construed as alleging a form of constitutional hardball.
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hardball in recent decades are harder to ﬁnd. And intriguingly, when
Democrats have played hardball, they have been more diffident and apologetic about it. During the Clinton and Bush years, Balkin has argued,
Democratic constitutional hardball largely arose out of, and responded
to, “the Republican Party’s desire to cement a lasting conservative
political order.”86 President Obama’s most controversial maneuvers were
framed and defended as regrettable yet necessary acts of “self-help” in
the face of extraordinary partisan obstruction.87 Republican
constitutional hardball, it seems, has been not only more common in
practice since the mid-1990s but also more conﬁdent in justiﬁcation.88
In line with these observations, a rough consensus has emerged
among analysts of Washington politics that Republicans have a decided
edge in constitutional hardball. Political scientist Jonathan Bernstein
wrote in 2012, for instance, that “the party that’s been [playing constitutional hardball] over the last 20 years . . . is the Republican Party.”89
“[T]he most distinctive and damaging feature of Republicans’ right
turn,” according to Professors Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson, “is that
they have steadily ramped up the scale, intensity, and sophistication of
their attacks on government and the party most closely associated with it”
through constitutional hardball tactics.90 Thomas Mann and Norman
Ornstein describe the contemporary Republican Party as an “insurgent
outlier in American politics” that displays “disdain for negotiation and
compromise” and has embraced “cynical and destructive means to
advance political ends.”91 Liberal pundits routinely echo these sentiments—remarking with envy as well as dismay that Republicans have
“perfect[ed] constitutional hardball”92 and “become past masters of the

86. Balkin, Constitutional Hardball and Constitutional Crises, supra note 25, at 588.
87. See Pozen, Self-Help, supra note 22, at 4–8, 41–47.
88. For examples of assertive Republican rhetoric concerning government shutdowns
in particular, see infra notes 189–194 and accompanying text.
89. Jonathan Bernstein, Opinion, Why the Dysfunctional Republican Party Matters,
Wash. Post (Apr. 30, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/post/
why-the-dysfunctional-republican-party-matters/2012/04/30/gIQAihKNsT_blog.html
[http://perma.cc/8DPC-T797]; see also Jonathan Bernstein, Playing Constitutional
Hardball with the Electoral College, Am. Prospect (Jan. 7, 2013), http://prospect.org/
article/playing-constitutional-hardball-electoral-college [http://perma.cc/W7VW-3N32]
(referring to “20 years of Republican-led Constitutional hardball”).
90. Jacob Hacker & Paul Pierson, No Cost for Extremism, Am. Prospect (Apr. 20,
2015), http://prospect.org/article/no-cost-extremism [http://perma.cc/N77F-DCZV]
[hereinafter Hacker & Pierson, No Cost for Extremism].
91. Mann & Ornstein, supra note 48, at 185. “Democrats are hardly blameless and
have their own . . . predilection to hardball politics,” Mann and Ornstein acknowledge. Id.
at 186. “But . . . those tendencies have not generally veered outside the normal boundaries
of robust politics.” Id.
92. Scott Lemieux, The End of the Supreme Court as We Know It, New Republic
(Feb. 16, 2016), http://newrepublic.com/article/129944/end-supreme-court-know [http://
perma.cc/U9CD-GMK6].
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art,”93 leaving Democrats “on the receiving end of constitutional hardball
for more than two decades.”94 We do not doubt that some conservative
pundits would dispute these claims. Yet whereas allegations that
Republicans play more constitutional hardball have become commonplace on the left, it is hard to ﬁnd any published commentary that alleges
the reverse.95
In sum, while the academic legal literature generally continues to
treat constitutional hardball as symmetric or to ignore its partisan distribution, the idea of asymmetric constitutional hardball has become increasingly familiar (if seldom analyzed in depth) outside the legal academy.96 Hence the motivation for this Essay: to deepen these ongoing
93. Kevin Mahnken, Democrats Will Pay for Nuking the Filibuster. But They Would
Have Paid, Anyway., New Republic (Nov. 22, 2013), http://newrepublic.com/article/
115702/democrats-go-nuclear-senate-filibuster-gop-would-have-done-same [http://perma.cc/
66FP-SZQP].
94. Republican Obstruction Is Routine, Not Revenge, First Person Pol. (Apr. 23,
2015), http://www.firstpersonpolitics.com/republican-obstruction-is-routine-not-revenge
[http://perma.cc/Y9GC-7AHN]; see also Ben Fountain, Welcome to the Reign of King
Trump, Guardian (Nov. 22, 2016), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/
nov/22/king-trump-republican-party-donald-trump-presidency [http://perma.cc/ZX72C2H4] (attributing “the constitutional hardball and scorched-earth tactics that have
characterized the past quarter-century of American politics” to choices made by
Republican leaders in Congress); Rosenberg, supra note 61 (observing “a profound asymmetry in how constitutional hardball has been played over the period of the past 25
years”). “The Democrats,” according to former Tennessee Congressman John Tanner,
“have always been . . . a little Pollyanna-ish about things and don’t want to play much hardball, or whatever the hell you want to call it.” Daley, supra note 67, at 109 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
95. Allegations that Democrats are more treacherous, corrupt, or otherwise
malevolent are part of the ordinary stuff of heated partisan commentary. And as we have
suggested, plenty of Republicans argue that Democrats “started it” and should bear the
blame for any given breakdown of norms, especially with regard to judicial conﬁrmations.
See, e.g., Orrin G. Hatch, Opinion, Sen. Orrin Hatch: Democrats Have Only Themselves
to Blame for Rules Change, Time (Apr. 6, 2017), http://time.com/4730017/hatchfilibuster-nuclear-option [http://perma.cc/4AYF-3WNQ] (“I’m not happy Senate
Republicans had to eliminate the ﬁlibuster for Supreme Court nominees . . . . But let me
be clear: We are here because of what Democrats have done over the last thirty years to
poison the conﬁrmation process.”). However, we have found no one seriously advancing
the claim that Democratic officeholders are more likely than their Republican counterparts, on the whole, to avail themselves of constitutional hardball. Perhaps the closest
claim is the charge, developed most fully by Professor David Bernstein, that the Obama
Administration engaged in “rampant lawlessness.” Bernstein, Lawless, supra note 36, at
xxiv. Notably, such charges have tended to focus on Democratic Presidents rather than
Democratic members of Congress, where we observe greater asymmetry. Moreover, their
gravamen is not so much that President Obama violated constitutional conventions, or
“the ‘go without saying’ assumptions that underpin working systems of constitutional
government,” Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, supra note 15, at 523 n.2, but rather that
he violated the big-C Constitution by exceeding legally binding limits on executive
power—an accusation that opponents have regularly leveled at every one of the last several
Presidents, Democratic and Republican.
96. The immediate reaction to the 2016 presidential vote underscored this point.
“[W]e know [what] the Republicans would have done[] [i]f Mr. Trump had lost the
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conversations and to spark a new scholarly conversation about this asymmetry, its causes, and its implications for constitutional law and politics.
C.

The Plausibility of Asymmetry

Perhaps, though, we and all of the commentators we cite are misreading the historical record. As discussed above, the hardball asymmetry
thesis cannot be “proved” in any straightforward manner, given that the
phenomenon itself resists numerical calculation and the proper characterization of nearly every possible example, including those listed
above, is subject to debate. Nevertheless, we believe that a number of
factors, taken together, strongly support our reading of the post-1994
record as containing more methodical and unabashed constitutional
hardball on the right.
First, certain constitutional hardball tactics used repeatedly by contemporary Republican legislators have not migrated to the other side of
the aisle, whereas the hardball tactics attributed to Democratic legislators
(such as pro forma sessions in the Senate, unilateral ﬁlibuster reform,
and pushing the limits of the budget reconciliation process) have been
used by both sides alike. For instance, Democrats have not threatened
credibly to default on the national debt.97 They have not enacted measures likely to suppress Republican voter turnout in federal elections.98
Electoral College while winning the popular vote,” a New York Times op-ed lamented last
December: In contrast to “the Democrats’ do-nothingness,” they would have “thr[own]
everything they could muster against the wall to see if it stuck.” Dahlia Lithwick & David S.
Cohen, Opinion, Buck Up, Democrats, and Fight like Republicans, N.Y. Times (Dec. 14,
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/14/opinion/buck-up-democrats-and-fight-likerepublicans.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review); see also, e.g., Michael Tomasky,
Trump: The Gang, N.Y. Rev. Books (Jan. 19, 2017), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/
2017/01/19/trump-the-gang (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (imagining similarly
what Republican Party leaders would be doing “if the situation were reversed” and
asserting that, among other things, they “would certainly have demanded that the members of the Electoral College reject Clinton”). The online version of this Times op-ed attracted 2,259 reader comments—most of them from Democrats, but a substantial fraction
from self-identiﬁed independents or Trump supporters. See Lithwick & Cohen, supra.
Based on our reading of all these comments, the one point on which everyone seemed to
agree was the plausibility of the counterfactual premise that Republicans would have
fought in ways Democrats did not, had the shoe been on the other foot. Members of both
parties have been interpreting political events through the prism of hardball asymmetry.
97. There have been some recent murmurs of Democratic opposition to raising the
debt ceiling, although so far they have not amounted to much; the greater threat appears
to come from the House Freedom Caucus. See, e.g., James Arkin, Congress’ Summer of
Fiscal Woe, Real Clear Politics (July 11, 2017), http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/
2017/07/11/congress_summer_of_fiscal_woe_134430.html [http://perma.cc/3K8E-8ZPG]
(“Democrats originally took a hard line in June, saying they wouldn’t back any increase
without guarantees that any GOP tax reform wouldn’t increase the deﬁcit. They quickly
backed away from that gambit . . . .”).
98. The closest thing to a counterexample we have been able to ﬁnd is the claim that,
at the state and local levels, Democrats favor off-cycle or off-year election calendars—
which greatly reduce turnout—more often than Republicans do. See Sarah F. Anzia,
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They have not ﬁred their own hand-picked Senate Parliamentarian in an
effort to overturn rulings that displeased them.99 They have not appointed agency heads known to oppose the agencies they will be
leading.100 And they have not impeached a President. This tactical divide
suggests that there is a qualitative, not just a quantitative, difference in
how the parties have been playing constitutional hardball—which we
Timing and Turnout: How Off-Cycle Elections Favor Organized Groups 118–19 (2014)
(describing what might “seem to be a baffling reversal in the major political parties’
positions”: “In the case of school board elections, Republicans claim to be champions of
increasing voter turnout, and Democrats have become the defenders of the status quo of
off-cycle election timing”); Eitan Hersh, How Democrats Suppress the Vote,
FiveThirtyEight (Nov. 3, 2015), http://ﬁvethirtyeight.com/features/how-democratssuppress-the-vote [http://perma.cc/H73F-U4PM] (characterizing Anzia’s data provocatively as showing that Democrats deliberately reduce turnout by resisting efforts to
consolidate elections in November of even-numbered years). But even if this claim were
true across the board, which it is not, see, e.g., Anzia, supra, at 33 (describing California
Democrats’ unsuccessful push to move statewide referenda to November), it would be the
sort of exception that proves the rule. Whatever their drawbacks, off-cycle elections do not
actually block Republicans, or anyone else, from voting. If this is as far as Democrats will
go, it highlights the limits of their use of hardball in the highly contested constitutional
sphere of voting.
99. Both parties, in recent times, have tended to choose a new Parliamentarian upon
regaining control of the Senate. The novel form of hardball pioneered by Senate
Republicans is to replace their own chosen Parliamentarian in response to a disfavored
ruling. See Tonja Jacobi & Jeff VanDam, The Filibuster and Reconciliation: The Future of
Majoritarian Lawmaking in the U.S. Senate, 47 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 261, 336–39 (2013)
(discussing the 2001 ﬁring of Senate Parliamentarian Robert Dove, after Dove had ruled
against using budget reconciliation for tax cuts, and the threatened decline in the
Parliamentarian’s power); Tiefer, Out of Order, supra note 63, at 62 (same).
100. See, e.g., Gillian Metzger, The Supreme Court, 2016 Term—Foreword: 1930s
Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 10 (2017) (“President
Trump’s cabinet is composed of individuals who have long opposed the agencies and programs they now lead . . . .”); cf. Donald P. Moynihan & Alasdair S. Roberts, The Triumph
of Loyalty over Competence: The Bush Administration and the Exhaustion of the
Politicized Presidency, 70 Pub. Admin. Rev. 572, 574 (2010) (contending that Presidents
Reagan and Bush II prioritized political loyalty over competence and experience in executive branch appointments).
In terms of judicial appointments, while both parties may have chosen individuals
with strongly held jurisprudential views, Democrats have not pushed through young
judges to the same extent as Republicans have. Presidents Clinton and Obama, for instance, together appointed zero individuals to a circuit court who were under the age of
forty at the time of nomination, whereas Presidents Reagan, Bush I, and Bush II respectively appointed eight, three, and two such individuals (in order: Kenneth Starr, J. Harvie
Wilkinson III, Frank Easterbrook, Edith Jones, Alex Kozinski, Deanell Reece Tacha, James
Edmondson, Douglas Ginsburg, Samuel Alito Jr., J. Michael Luttig, Timothy Lewis, Neil
Gorsuch, and Kimberly Moore). See Biographical Directory of Article III Federal Judges:
Export, Fed. Judicial Ctr., http://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/biographical-directoryarticle-iii-federal-judges-export [http://perma.cc/3N64-JNX5] (last visited July 11, 2017)
(select “Database Export” to download the Excel spreadsheet containing relevant data).
The average ages of circuit court and district court nominees were also lower during these
Republican presidencies. See Sheldon Goldman et al., Obama’s First Term Judiciary:
Picking Judges in the Mineﬁeld of Obstructionism, 97 Judicature 7, 41 tbl.6, 43 tbl.8
(2013).
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contend in section III.B.1 is grounded in part in Republicans’ greater
willingness to incapacitate the government.
Second, our story takes place against a backdrop of asymmetric
polarization: Social scientists have shown convincingly that since the
1970s, Republicans have moved further to the right than Democrats have
moved to the left.101 This is true for rank-and-ﬁle voters as well as party
elites; it can be observed in public polling data as well as congressional
voting patterns.102 Moving beyond patterns of polarization, survey evidence suggests that Republican partisans are also strikingly more likely
than Democratic partisans to reject consensual politics in principle. A
2010 poll, for instance, found that “a clear majority of Republicans”
prefer politicians who “stand firm,” whereas “a large majority of Democrats”
prefer politicians who “compromise.”103 Insofar as constitutional hardball depends on political actors with strong substantive views eschewing
compromise in order to advance those views, these differences in the
parties’ attitudes seem illuminating. They suggest an overarching reason
why constitutional hardball tactics would tend to hold greater appeal and
less downside for Republican officeholders.104 Asymmetric constitutional
101. For overviews of the evidence, see Mann & Ornstein, supra note 48, at 51–58;
Michael Barber & Nolan McCarty, Causes and Consequences of Polarization, in Am.
Political Sci. Ass’n, Negotiating Agreement in Politics 19, 19–26 (Jane Mansbridge &
Cathie Jo Martin eds., 2013). Professor David Schleicher usefully distinguishes (1) the increasingly uniform orientation of all political issues around a single axis of liberal–
conservative disagreement from (2) the movement of Democrats and Republicans toward
more extreme points along the dominant axis. David Schleicher, Things Aren’t Going that
Well over There Either: Party Polarization and Election Law in Comparative Perspective,
2015 U. Chi. Legal F. 433, 439–40 (2015). Political scientists have good evidence that both
(1) and (2) are occurring, but it is only with respect to (2) that it is conceptually possible
to observe an asymmetry. That asymmetry tends to be linked with a third variable
Schleicher discusses: (3) the intensity or fundamentalism with which partisans espouse
their views. Id. at 440–41. As we explain in section III.B, there is evidence of asymmetry
here as well.
102. See Mann & Ornstein, supra note 48, at 56–57.
103. Michael R. Wolf et al., Incivility and Standing Firm: A Second Layer of Partisan
Division, 45 PS: Pol. Sci. & Pol. 428, 430 (2012); see also Mann & Ornstein, supra note 48,
at 57 (describing additional survey evidence indicating that Democratic voters value
political compromise more than Republican voters do); David M. Kennedy, What Pildes
Missed: The Framers, the True Impact of the Voting Rights Act, and the Far Right, 99
Calif. L. Rev. 351, 357 (2011) (suggesting that asymmetric polarization has made the
Republican Party “much less inclined to compromise on value-laden social issues than the
much more heterogeneous Democratic Party”); Wolf et al., supra, at 430 (describing Pew
Research Center ﬁndings “that Democrats have been signiﬁcantly more likely to prefer
compromise than Republicans since 1987 . . . , with this gap growing over time”). In
Facebook posts and press releases from 2015 and 2016, a recent study found, Republican
members of Congress expressed “indignant disagreement” with the other party at roughly
four times the rate that Democratic members did. Pew Research Ctr., Partisan Conﬂict and
Congressional Outreach 18 (2017), http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/
sites/5/2017/02/25100146/LabsReport_FINALreport.pdf [http://perma.cc/ENN4-87UX].
104. Cf. Jacob S. Hacker & Paul Pierson, Confronting Asymmetric Polarization, in
Solutions to Political Polarization in America 59, 66 (Nathaniel Persily ed., 2015) (con-
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hardball cannot be reduced to asymmetric polarization—the relationship
between a party’s ideological evolution and its approach to constitutional
conﬂict is complex—but the existence of the latter surely makes the existence of the former more plausible.
Third, there is considerable evidence that the modern Republican
Party acts more like a movement party, with clear and cohesive ideological goals, while the Democratic Party acts more like an amalgamation
of interest groups. This is an oversimpliﬁed characterization of both
parties, of course, but political scientists have repeatedly found a significant distinction along these lines.105 Perhaps as a result of being more
like a movement party, the current Republican Party also has fewer moderates in positions of power.106 Insofar as constitutional hardball tactics
tending that “[t]he most alarming feature of asymmetric polarization has been the increasing resort to forms of ‘constitutional hardball’” by “the increasingly off-center and
confrontational GOP”).
105. See, e.g., Jo Freeman, The Political Culture of the Democratic and Republican
Parties, 101 Pol. Sci. Q. 327, 329 (1986) (“Essentially, the Democratic party is pluralistic
and polycentric. It has multiple power centers that compete for membership support in
order to make demands on, as well as determine, the leaders.”); id. (“The Republicans
have a unitary party in which great deference is paid to the leadership, activists are expected to be ‘good soldiers,’ and competing loyalties are frowned upon.”); Grossmann &
Hopkins, Asymmetry of American Party Politics, supra note 47, at 120 (arguing that the
“Republican Party is best viewed as the agent of an ideological movement whose members
are united by a common devotion to . . . limited government,” whereas “the Democratic
Party is properly understood as a coalition of social groups whose interests are served by
various forms of government activity”); Yphtach Lelkes & Paul M. Sniderman, The
Ideological Asymmetry of the American Party System, 46 Brit. J. Pol. Sci. 825, 840 (2016)
(ﬁnding that Republican Party supporters “have strikingly higher levels of ideological
awareness and coherence” than do Democratic Party supporters).
Relatedly, there is intriguing evidence, which we do not have the space to explore
fully here, that Republicans favor a more hierarchical form of internal party organization.
See, e.g., Richard M. Skinner et al., 527 Committees and the Political Party Network, 40
Am. Pol. Res. 60, 64–65 (2012) (reviewing “numerous observational and experimental
studies” ﬁnding that Republicans are “more comfortable than Democrats in leaving important party decisions up to party leaders” and that “Republican Party organizations tend
to be more hierarchical than Democratic ones”). By reducing intraparty collective action
problems, and by reducing the effective veto power of moderates who might oppose some
tough tactics, this tendency could also facilitate constitutional hardball.
106. See James E. Campbell, Polarized: Making Sense of a Divided America 185 (2016)
(noting that while “the ranks of moderate Democrats have also been depleted,” moderate
Republicans in Congress have faced “virtual extinction”). Prior to the Trump presidency,
the fact that Republicans had fewer moderates in elected positions was easily transformed
into a perception that they were more disciplined as a party. See, e.g., Jonathan Chait,
Why Are Republicans More Disciplined than Democrats?, New Republic (Dec. 2, 2010),
http://newrepublic.com/article/79578/why-are-republicans-more-disciplined-democrats
[http://perma.cc/SKV4-6CXL]; Robert Reich, Why Republicans Are Disciplined and
Democrats Aren’t, Huffington Post (July 24, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
robert-reich/republican-party-discipline_b_3646393.html [http://perma.cc/3SUR-57AM]
(last updated Sept. 23, 2013). The question of whether there was in fact an asymmetry in
discipline is a matter of some debate. Compare Eliza Newlin Carney, Standing Together
Against Any Action, CQ Wkly., Mar. 16, 2015, at 37, 38 (showing signiﬁcant overlap in the
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depend on the existence or perception of an ideologically committed
party with a shared vision of political change, these data points also help
support the plausibility of asymmetric constitutional hardball.
Finally, differences in the constitutional philosophies of liberals and
conservatives suggest different normative orientations toward constitutional hardball. We will return to this issue below.107 Among other
potentially relevant differences, stronger commitments on the Republican
side to the theory of originalism and the idea of a “lost” Constitution are
apt to yield considerably less deference toward the constitutional status
quo and the set of unwritten norms that have evolved to facilitate
moderation and cooperation in government.108 Democrats’ comparatively dynamic (or “living”) understanding of the constitutional order’s
legitimacy and ontology, in contrast, gives them a general reason to view
destabilizing constitutional hardball tactics with suspicion. They may engage in such tactics anyway, but the effort will involve greater cognitive
dissonance.
These different constitutional commitments of the two parties, it
bears emphasis, are contingent and bounded in political time.109 Perhaps
in some future period, it will be liberals who think and speak in terms of
restoring a lost constitutional order and conservatives who are more
focused on defending a body of judicial precedents that has developed
case by case.110 But over the past quarter century or so, as Part III
explains, it has been conservatives who have had more to gain from
dramatic departures from established constitutional understandings,
parties’ average “unity scores” on roll call votes over the past half century), with Betsy
Sinclair et al., Agreement Scores, Ideal Points, and Legislative Polarization 21 (2011)
(unpublished manuscript), http://mason.gmu.edu/~jvictor3/Research/Conferences/
AgreementScores_.pdf [http://perma.cc/3CRU-BA5Z] (ﬁnding, based on legislator-pair
“agreement scores,” that congressional “Republicans tend to vote with greater internal cohesion than Democrats do”). In any event, the Trump years seem likely to scramble these
calculations, increasing unity on the Democratic side and division on the Republican side,
at least temporarily.
107. See infra section III.B.2.
108. The idea that liberals (Democrats) and conservatives (Republicans) have systematically different views about the Constitution is a familiar one. The idea that these groups
might, as a result, have systematically different normative orientations toward constitutional conventions and toward breaches thereof is, as far as we are aware, new to the legal
literature.
109. See generally Jack M. Balkin, The Last Days of Disco: Why the American Political
System Is Dysfunctional, 94 B.U. L. Rev. 1159 (2014) [hereinafter Balkin, Last Days of
Disco] (extending Stephen Skowronek’s theory of political time to trace the rise, and perhaps now the end, of a single coherent conservative political and constitutional regime beginning in the early 1980s, which aimed in part to repudiate the prior liberal regime).
110. As we have suggested, built-in counterdynamics may tend to complicate or reverse the directionality of asymmetric constitutional hardball over long political cycles. See
supra notes 75–77 and accompanying text. At least some of the factors that contribute to
the present asymmetry, however, seem likely to be more enduring. See, e.g., infra section
III.B.1 (describing how a political coalition’s views on the value of government may affect
that coalition’s willingness to engage in forms of hardball that hobble the government).
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forged during the New Deal and Warren Court eras, while liberals have
been pushed toward a more incrementalist and cautious constitutionalism.
The proposition that Republicans play harder hardball, in short,
plausibly follows not just from the social science evidence on polarization
and the structure of the parties, but also from the internal logic of each
side’s constitutional vision.
III. EXPLAINING ASYMMETRIC CONSTITUTIONAL HARDBALL
Having established that asymmetric constitutional hardball is at least
plausible, let us now examine its potential origins and meaning a little
more carefully. Why would the officeholders of different political parties
be differently disposed toward playing constitutional hardball, particularly in Congress? There are two basic ways to approach this question.
The ﬁrst looks to the incentives and constraints facing these officials as
actors embedded in a web of institutional relationships, not only with
fellow legislators but also with the voters, donors, advocacy groups, media
outlets, and other important players who deﬁne the political environment within which they operate.
From this angle, we can disaggregate the question into a series of
smaller ones. Which of these players tend to reward or punish elected
officials for playing constitutional hardball, and under what circumstances? And do these dynamics vary across the parties? We suggest in
section A of this Part that while both Republicans and Democrats face
political pressure to play constitutional hardball, such pressure has been
considerably stronger and more systematic on the Republican side.
However, this ﬁrst approach to the question may risk begging it. Why
are various crucial players within the Republican coalition more inclined
than their Democratic counterparts to reward constitutional hardball or
to punish its absence? A second approach moves the analysis to the level
of values and ideas. Although all political parties are ideologically
diverse, substantial segments of their coalitions hold identiﬁable clusters
of beliefs that are part of what makes the coalitions cohere. We argue in
section B that differences in the party coalitions’ moral, legal, and cultural beliefs further explain the asymmetry we observe.
Asymmetric constitutional hardball is not the sort of phenomenon
that can be modeled in a neat, monocausal manner. As one examines the
potential factors behind it, one quickly ﬁnds that many of them do not
really offer alternative explanations; rather, they are interlocking elements of related causal stories. We cannot hope in an Essay like this to
tease out the relative magnitude of the different causal stories, if doing so
is possible at all. But we think it is useful to gather together their elements because, collectively, they can help us understand both why asymmetric constitutional hardball has become such a prominent feature of
our politics, and whether it is likely to continue in the Trump era and
beyond.
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Asymmetric Institutions and Incentives

In order to get into office and stay in office, elected representatives
need votes. To get votes, they need to secure numerous forms of political
support, including the labor of campaign workers and volunteers, the
money of campaign contributors and those willing to make officially
independent expenditures on a candidate’s behalf, and the endorsements of activists, issue groups, public ﬁgures, and power brokers of
various kinds. Successful politicians, accordingly, become embedded in a
complex set of networks—local, state, and national—that generate powerful and sometimes conﬂicting incentives for their behavior while in
government.
In recent decades, some of these networks have gained in importance while others have declined. A political scientist discussing these dynamics a generation ago likely would have emphasized the role of top
party officials and, beyond them, top fundraisers and civil society leaders
closely connected to those officials.111 Without support from such “insiders,” candidates’ paths to victory in most electoral contexts seemed
few and narrow. The inﬂuence of these insiders has been waning for
some time, however, as the elections of the past decade brought into
sharp relief. The center of gravity within each of the two major party
coalitions has shifted considerably in the direction of so-called “outside”
groups, which are not part of the formal party structure and have their
own independent bases of support among donors and volunteers.112
These outside groups include comprehensive ideological players such as
FreedomWorks and Democracy Alliance; issue-speciﬁc outﬁts such as the
Sierra Club, the National Riﬂe Association, and Planned Parenthood; a
few unions that remain powerful locally or nationally on the Democratic
side; and a large number of donor-driven groups organized under
various legal categories, such as Super PACs or 501(c)(4)s.
111. For a classic in this genre, see generally Marty Cohen et al., The Party Decides:
Presidential Nominations Before and After Reform (2008), which argues that even after
reforms in the 1970s aimed to promote more populist forms of democracy in presidential
primary politics, party insiders reasserted control of the agenda. See also id. at 15
(theorizing parties as larger coalitions but noting that most political scientists have viewed
them as “the creatures of officeholders or top party officials”). Several authors of this book
have acknowledged that since its publication, a shift away from these elite networks has
become more pronounced. See, e.g., Hans Noel, Why Can’t the G.O.P. Stop Trump?, N.Y.
Times (Mar. 1, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/01/opinion/campaign-stops/
why-cant-the-gop-stop-trump.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review); Danielle
Kurtzleben, Celebrities, Lies and Outsiders: How This Election Surprised One Political
Scientist, NPR (June 21, 2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/06/21/482357936/celebritieslies-and-outsiders-how-this-election-surprised-one-political-scienti (on ﬁle with the Columbia
Law Review) (interviewing Cohen).
112. See Joseph Fishkin & Heather K. Gerken, The Party’s Over: McCutcheon, Shadow
Parties, and the Future of the Party System, 2014 Sup. Ct. Rev. 175, 176–77, 186–92 (2015)
(describing these trends); see also Bulman-Pozen, supra note 55, at 1085 & n.20 (collecting sources that describe today’s parties as “networks” of elected representatives, party officials, and informally affiliated individuals and organizations).
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These various “intense policy demanders”113 may have strong views
about whether elected officials should or should not engage in acts of
constitutional hardball. Recall that constitutional hardball, as we have
deﬁned it, involves either breaching constitutional conventions for partisan ends or attempting to shift constitutional law in an unusually bold or
self-entrenching manner—and very often it involves both. For any given
elected official, the risks and rewards of playing constitutional hardball
will therefore depend, ﬁrst, on whether and to what extent key political
constituencies and policy demanders wish to change settled understandings of the Constitution; and, second, on whether and to what
extent these actors wish to see their goals pursued in a manner consistent
with prevailing norms of government practice. On both of these dimensions, there is good cause to believe that the Republican coalition—
including both the policy demanders and the voters114—generates
stronger incentives than the Democratic coalition to play hardball.
1. Safe Seats and Primary Challenges. — One source of this imbalance
is the primary system. A signiﬁcant fraction of members of Congress from
both parties now hold “safe seats,” with little prospect of general-election
defeat to a candidate from the other political party.115 While partisan
gerrymandering may have contributed to this phenomenon in the
House, rising levels of geographic polarization and party loyalty in voting
have extended it to the Senate as well.116 Structurally, this means that the
113. See Cohen et al., supra note 111, at 20 (applying this label to “interest groups,
ideological activists, and others” who organize political parties “to get the government policies they want”).
114. We can only speculate as to this point, but to the extent that the rise of the digital
age and new forms of social media and government transparency have made the typical
act of constitutional hardball more widely publicized in recent years as compared to prior
periods, this added publicity may tend to make the views of more members of the coalition
matter.
115. See Alan I. Abramowitz, U.S. Senate Elections in a Polarized Era, in The U.S.
Senate: From Deliberation to Dysfunction 27, 30 (Burdett A. Loomis ed., 2012) (“Fewer
senators represent so-called swing states, or those states that remain competitive for both
parties, while more senators represent states that are relatively safe for their own party.”);
Nate Silver, As Swing Districts Dwindle, Can a Divided House Stand?, N.Y. Times:
FiveThirtyEight (Dec. 27, 2012), http://ﬁvethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/27/asswing-districts-dwindle-can-a-divided-house-stand (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review)
(“Most members of the House now come from hyperpartisan districts where they face
essentially no threat of losing their seat to the other party.”).
116. See Abramowitz, supra note 115, at 30 (discussing the Senate); Richard H. Pildes,
Romanticizing Democracy, Political Fragmentation, and the Decline of American
Government, 124 Yale L.J. 804, 821 n.46 (2014) (discussing the empirical literature). It is
possible that gerrymandering in the House has also contributed indirectly to ideological
polarization in the Senate, given that so many senators are former House members who
have, over the past generation, been exposed to repeated primary contests in that
chamber. See Sean M. Theriault & David W. Rohde, The Gingrich Senators and Party
Polarization in the U.S. Senate, 73 J. Pol. 1011, 1012 (2011) (ﬁnding that “the growing
divide between the voting scores of Democrats and Republicans in the Senate can be
accounted for almost entirely by the election of a particular breed of senator: Republicans

946

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 118:915

main threat to many members’ electoral survival comes from the party
primary.
In theory, this threat applies equally to Democrats and Republicans.
In practice, its effects have been far from equal. Very few liberal primary
challengers have defeated Democratic congressional incumbents in recent years.117 Over a dozen “Tea Party” challengers, in contrast, unseated
Republican incumbents from 2010 to 2014, including House Majority
Leader Eric Cantor.118 And well before the Tea Party emerged on the
scene, Republican Senators and Representatives were experiencing a
greater vulnerability to primary challenges—a trend that began in 1996.119
Ever since the Gingrich Revolution, then, Republican members of
Congress have had to worry considerably more than their Democratic
counterparts about ideologically extreme rivals from their own party.
Insofar as these rivals tend to favor a combative style of politics and to
hold Beltway conventions in low regard, this dynamic pushes Republican
officeholders in the direction of constitutional hardball. There is some
intriguing anecdotal evidence from the Obama years that the most forceful demands for constitutional hardball within the House came from
those representatives whose districts are overwhelmingly Republican,
where these dynamics are likely the most pronounced.120 The difficult
who previously served in the House after 1978”). Our argument in this section does not
depend on any claim that more Republicans than Democrats occupy safe seats or are the
beneﬁciaries of partisan gerrymandering.
117. See Robert G. Boatright, Getting Primaried: The Changing Politics of
Congressional Primary Challenges 2, 76–77 (2013) (describing the one successful defeat
of a Democratic Representative by a challenger from the left between 2004 and 2008); id.
at 133 (describing the two Democratic Senators successfully challenged between 1996 and
2010); see also Lauren Cohen Bell et al., Slingshot: The Defeat of Eric Cantor 14–16
(2016) (listing additional primary defeats of Democratic House incumbents between 2010
and 2014, most of which involved scandal rather than ideological challenge).
118. See Kiran Dhillon, Before Cantor: Seven Other Tea Party Upsets, Time (June 12,
2014), http://time.com/2864303/before-cantor-seven-other-tea-party-upsets [http://
perma.cc/5K7P-HJL3]; Associated Press, A Look at the Tea Party’s Primary Season Wins,
Salon (Sept. 15, 2010), http://www.salon.com/2010/09/15/us_tea_party_wins [http://
perma.cc/QV6K-7MKT]; see also David Wasserman, What We Can Learn from Eric
Cantor’s Defeat, FiveThirtyEight (June 20, 2014), http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/
what-we-can-learn-from-eric-cantors-defeat [http://perma.cc/52F4-8J3U] (“Overall, 32
House incumbents have taken less than 75 percent of the vote in their primaries so far this
year, up from 31 at this point in 2010 and just 12 at this point in 2006. What’s more, 27 of
these 32 ‘underperforming’ incumbents have been Republicans.”).
119. See Boatright, supra note 117, at 76–77 (showing that between 1996 and 2010,
twenty-seven of the thirty-nine contested primaries were between Republican candidates);
id. at 86 (showing that “ideology” was the most frequent reason or a common reason for
primary challenges in every congressional election cycle between 1996 and 2010). In notable contrast, Democratic incumbents were more vulnerable than their Republican counterparts to primary challenges from 1970 to 1994. See id. at 76–77, 100–01.
120. See, e.g., Ryan Lizza, Where the G.O.P.’s Suicide Caucus Lives, New Yorker (Sept.
26, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/where-the-g-o-p-s-suicidecaucus-lives [http://perma.cc/8DJ9-AFM9] (explaining that the House members who
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question remains, though, why primary challenges have been playing out
so differently on the Republican side. The balance of this Part offers
some partial explanations.
2. Outside Funders. — One driving force behind Republican primary
challenges and constitutional hardball over the past decade or so has
been the Tea Party. The Tea Party arose both as a movement of voters
within the Republican coalition and as a movement of groups within the
Koch brothers’ network, most prominently FreedomWorks and Americans
for Prosperity.121 Like their precursors the Gingrich revolutionaries,122 the
leaders of this uprising viewed the conventional methods of political
bargaining in Washington, as practiced by both parties, as a form of
corruption that they sought to purge.123 As we will discuss in section B,
they also linked this ambition to a powerful vision of constitutional
change, styled as constitutional restoration. In pressing its “no-compromise ideology,”124 the movement drew organizational and ﬁnancial
pushed in 2013 to use a government shutdown as leverage in their long-shot bid to force a
repeal of the ACA represented such districts).
121. See Theda Skocpol & Vanessa Williamson, The Tea Party and the Remaking of
Republican Conservatism 83–87 (2012). Republican supporters sometimes idealize this
movement as a grassroots citizen uprising, while Democratic critics sometimes characterize
it as a classic case of “astroturﬁng” by elite interests. Compare Ronald T. Libby, Purging
the Republican Party: Tea Party Campaigns and Elections 1 (2014) (describing the Tea
Party as a “populist, grassroots movement sweeping the country”), with George Monbiot,
The Tea Party Movement: Deluded and Inspired by Billionaires, Guardian (Oct. 25, 2010),
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/oct/25/tea-party-kochbrothers [http://perma.cc/FH9Q-99DB] (calling the Tea Party “the biggest Astroturf
operation in history”). In fact, the Tea Party was both of these things at once, which is part
of why it was effective. See Skocpol & Williamson, supra, at 83; Angelia R. Wilson, Tea
Time? The Rise of the Tea Party, Pol. Insight, Apr. 2014, at 36, 37.
122. In 2010, FreedomWorks helped launch a “Contract from America,” evoking
Gingrich’s 1994 Contract with America. See Teddy Davis, Tea Party Activists Craft ‘Contract
from America,’ ABC News (Feb. 9, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/tea-partyactivists-craft-contract-america/story?id=9740705 [http://perma.cc/5LFK-A4MC].
123. This aspect of the Tea Party’s approach was on prominent display in the 2011
debt ceiling confrontation. After sweeping into power in the 2010 midterms, House
Republicans demanded steep spending cuts in exchange for raising the debt ceiling in
August 2011, forcing the U.S. Treasury to the verge of default. See Skocpol & Williamson,
supra note 121, at 180 (discussing Tea Party opposition to raising the debt ceiling, despite
potential adverse consequences); Roy T. Meyers, The Implosion of the Federal Budget
Process: Triggers, Commissions, Cliffs, Sequesters, Debt Ceilings, and Shutdown, Pub.
Budgeting & Fin., Winter 2014, at 1, 8–9 (noting the view of Democrats that Tea Party–
fueled “hardball” led to an “implosion” of the budget process). According to Jane Mayer,
right-wing donors and advocacy groups such as Americans for Prosperity and the Club for
Growth played a crucial role in encouraging the Republican Young Guns, led by thenHouse Majority Leader Eric Cantor, to push the party to the brink in this episode. See
Jane Mayer, Dark Money: The Hidden History of the Billionaires Behind the Rise of the
Radical Right 297 (2016) [hereinafter Mayer, Dark Money].
124. Juan Williams, Opinion, Don’t Underestimate the Tea Party’s Staying Power, Fox
News (May 9, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2012/05/09/dont-underestimatetea-party-staying-power.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review); see also Jared A.
Goldstein, The Tea Party Movement and the Perils of Popular Originalism, 53 Ariz. L. Rev.
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support from a set of Republican-affiliated funders who have been developing, since the 1970s, an institutional infrastructure that channels
monetary resources toward an agenda of deregulation, tax cuts, and
generally reducing the scope of government.125 These funders’ sheer
ﬁnancial clout, and willingness to spend, has had a substantial long-term
effect on our politics.
On the Democratic side as well, the center of political gravity has
been shifting from party leaders and officials to nominally outside
groups, as noted above.126 But the Democratic network of outside groups
does not similarly revolve around large, well-resourced, and broad-gauge
ideological players. Instead, on the left the story remains one of coalition
politics.127 It is a story of a few remaining major unions, environmental
groups like the Sierra Club, PACs like EMILY’s List (which supports prochoice female candidates), trial lawyers, and so on; the list is long, and all
of these groups make their demands on Democratic officeholders.128 But
no ﬁnancially signiﬁcant group exerts constant pressure on them to
upend prevailing norms of governance. On the contrary, many of the
wealthy donors and funders on whom Democrats depend tend to have a

827, 862 (2011) (“As Tea Party supporters declare, there can be no compromise or
dialogue with those who would destroy America.”).
125. While initially obscure, the role of the Koch brothers’ network in funding and
shaping the Tea Party movement has become much more well known, especially through
Mayer’s work. See Mayer, Dark Money, supra note 123, at 203–42; Jane Mayer, Covert
Operations: The Billionaire Brothers Who Are Waging a War Against Obama, New Yorker
(Aug. 30, 2010), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/08/30/covert-operations
[http://perma.cc/VP6V-YJXX]; see also, e.g., Frank Rich, Opinion, The Billionaires
Bankrolling the Tea Party, N.Y. Times (Aug. 28, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/08/29/opinion/29rich.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review). The tobacco industry also played a key role in the development of the Tea Party, building on the success
of earlier “smokers’ rights” groups that sought to fend off restrictions on cigarettes. See
generally Amanda Fallin et al., “To Quarterback Behind the Scenes, Third-Party Efforts”:
The Tobacco Industry and the Tea Party, 23 Tobacco Control 322 (2014). For instance,
tobacco companies funded Citizens for a Sound Economy (CSE), a predecessor to
FreedomWorks and Americans for Prosperity. See id. at 326–27. In a recently published
exposé, an early communications director for CSE portrays the proto–Tea Party of the
1990s as an alliance of big oil and big tobacco. See generally Jeff Nesbit, Poison Tea: How
Big Oil and Big Tobacco Invented the Tea Party and Captured the GOP (2016).
126. See supra notes 111–113 and accompanying text.
127. See Matt Grossmann & David A. Hopkins, Asymmetric Politics: Ideological
Republicans and Group Interest Democrats 3 (2016) (“While the Democratic Party is
fundamentally a group coalition, the Republican Party can be most accurately characterized as the vehicle of an ideological movement.”). “In contrast to the variety of single-issue
interest groups and social movements that collectively constitute the activist population of
the Democratic Party,” Professors Grossmann and Hopkins show, Republican politics in
recent decades has been “dominated by a broadly organized, cross-issue conservative
movement . . . .” Id.
128. See id. at 100 (noting the “plethora of specialized groups that each make their
own separate demands on [Democratic] candidates and elected officials”).
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moderating effect on the party, rewarding candidates who cater to the
professional class and stake out centrist positions.129
To be sure, there are some individual donors with strong ideological
views who have an outsized role in contemporary Democratic politics. In
the two most recent election cycles, the highest-proﬁle example was
hedge fund manager Tom Steyer. Before that, it was George Soros. The
case of Steyer is instructive: While his funding may have encouraged
Democrats to make addressing climate change a higher political priority,
it is hard to see how any Democratic officeholder would have faced
stronger incentives to play constitutional hardball, at least prior to the
Trump presidency, because of support or lack of support from Steyer.130
In the mid-twentieth century, when unions represented a much larger proportion of American workers, one could imagine how they might
have spurred Democratic politicians to play constitutional hardball, at
least on issues related to workers’ rights to organize and strike.131 Their
role in not only funding campaigns but also staffing them and organizing
members on their behalf was for decades unparalleled.132 Certain unions
also brought a pugnacious style to Democratic politics. Yet after years of
decline,133 the labor movement was not even able to convince a sufficient
129. See, e.g., Douglas Schoen, Opinion, Why Democrats Need Wall Street, N.Y.
Times (Oct. 17, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/17/opinion/why-democratsneed-wall-street.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing that Democrats
“should keep ties with Wall Street,” both because it “keeps their coffers full” and because
this dependence helps ensure centrist, “pro-capitalist” policies that appeal to the American
electorate). If the “Wall Street” donors envisioned by this op-ed press in any general tactical or temperamental direction, it is presumably toward bipartisanship rather than toward hardball.
130. Steyer spent $74 million on the 2014 midterm elections, with $67 million going
to his Super PAC NextGen Climate to support Democrats who made climate change a
central issue. See Coral Davenport, Billionaire Environmentalist to Spend $25 Million to
Turn Out Young Voters, N.Y. Times (Apr. 25, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/
26/us/politics/thomas-steyer-nextgen-climate-change-voters.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia
Law Review). He was the largest individual donor once again in the 2016 cycle, giving over
$91 million to Democratic candidates and liberal outside groups. See Top Individual
Contributors: All Federal Contributions, OpenSecrets.org, http://www.opensecrets.org/
overview/topindivs.php [http://perma.cc/FEC8-53A4] (last visited July 11, 2017). However, Steyer speciﬁcally refused to contribute to Democratic candidates during the 2016
primaries, see Davenport, supra, suggesting his avoidance of the internecine ﬁghts
through which Republican donors have pushed their representatives to the right.
131. Consider, for an executive branch example, President Kennedy’s dramatic 1961
intervention in negotiations between the major steel producers and the United Steelworkers
Union, forcing the steel companies to accept higher wages without raising prices. See
Michael L. Wachter, Labor Unions: A Corporatist Institution in a Competitive World, 155
U. Pa. L. Rev. 581, 614–17 (2007).
132. See Daniel Schlozman, When Movements Anchor Parties: Electoral Alignments
in American History 50 (2015) (explaining that starting in the late 1930s, and for the next
several decades thereafter, “labor traded votes, money, and networks for policy” with
Democratic officeholders).
133. See Dan Clawson & Mary Ann Clawson, What Has Happened to the US Labor
Movement? Union Decline and Renewal, 25 Ann. Rev. Soc. 95, 97 (1999) (reviewing
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number of Democrats to overcome a ﬁlibuster of the Employee Free
Choice Act in 2009, when Democrats controlled both houses of Congress
and enjoyed a ﬁlibuster-proof majority in the Senate.134 Moreover, it has
been a long time since the labor movement seriously pressed for a
wholesale change in the direction of the Democratic Party, let alone a
wholesale change framed in constitutional terms. For the past half
century, labor leaders have tended, instead, to make deals with incumbent players as part of Democratic coalition politics.135
There is, in short, no institutional equivalent on the left of the most
powerful groups on the right that funded the Tea Party and its predecessors and that continue to threaten “moderate” members of Congress
with primary challenges.136 As we write these words, the Koch brothers’
donor network is reportedly pressing Senate Republicans to play constitutional hardball by doing away with the “blue-slip” custom through
which home-state Senators have traditionally been allowed to block

measures of union decline, including that unions have “exercised less and less leverage
within the Democratic party”); see also Mike Konczal, Opinion, Why Don’t Liberals Have
Their Own Tea Party?, Al Jazeera Am. (Dec. 5, 2013), http://america.aljazeera.com/
opinions/2013/12/liberals-democraticteapartypolitics.html [http://perma.cc/NMJ3-AKW8]
(“[W]e shouldn’t discount the fact that the conservative movement has come to power
during a period when the main source of liberal infrastructure, the labor movement, has
fallen into disarray.”). But cf. Dorian T. Warren, Labor in American Politics: Continuities,
Changes, and Challenges for the Twenty-First-Century Labor Movement, 42 Polity 286,
286–87 (2010) (“The labor movement is still the most powerful core constituency of the
national Democratic Party by several measures, including campaign contributions, grassroots mobilization efforts of the Party’s key voters, lobbying, and setting the Party’s legislative agenda.”).
134. The bill, which was aggressively championed by unions, would have changed the
National Labor Relations Act to allow employees to organize by collecting signature cards.
The signature-card provision was removed after several moderate-to-conservative Democrats
announced their opposition. See Steven Greenhouse, Democrats Drop Key Part of Bill to
Assist Unions, N.Y. Times (July 16, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/17/business/
17union.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
135. Thus, while unions over the past half century have been a source of political
strength on the left, we ﬁnd no evidence to suggest they have been a major source of
primary challenges from the left. There was a time in American history when parts of the labor
movement—the United Automobile Workers under Walter Reuther in the mid-twentieth
century, to cite the most prominent example—played a substantial role in pulling the
Democratic Party leftward on questions of tax-and-transfer policy and economic justice.
See generally Kevin Boyle, The UAW and the Heyday of American Liberalism 1945–1968
(1995); Nelson Lichtenstein, The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit: Walter Reuther and the
Fate of American Labor (1995). These dynamics were long gone during the period of
asymmetric constitutional hardball we are considering.
136. On the efforts of such groups to threaten moderate Republicans with primary
challenges, see, for example, Jonathan Easley, FreedomWorks Launches PAC Ahead of
2016, Hill (Apr. 16, 2015), http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/senate-races/239082freedomworks-launches-pac [http://perma.cc/3DXB-C25N]; Maggie Haberman, Club for
Growth Targets Republicans, Politico (Feb. 27, 2013), http://www.politico.com/story/
2013/02/club-for-growth-targets-republicans-088153 [http://perma.cc/VE4N-PHZN].
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certain judicial nominees.137 But this answer to our main question, once
again, may seem to raise the same question in a new form. Why are
Republican donors, like Republican voters, seemingly so much less
interested in rewarding bipartisanship, incumbency, and dealmaking—
and so much more interested in rewarding political hardball generally
and constitutional hardball speciﬁcally? We will return to this question in
section B of this Part.
3. Other Mediating Institutions. — So far, we have focused on the
parties and some of the funders and advocacy groups in their coalitions.
But many of the most important mediating institutions in American
politics are none of these. The most obvious institution that mediates
political reality for millions of Americans is the media: mass-communication outlets and the individual hosts, commentators, and journalists
they feature. Another important but less obvious set of mediating organizations and individuals are the think tanks and experts who are called
on to articulate competing sides in policy debates. Together, the news
industry, think tanks, and the expert voices they credential play an essential role in constructing the American public sphere. For our purposes, a
particularly signiﬁcant set of speakers are those credentialed to speak
about the law and the Constitution. But the general run of pundits matters
as well.
Both the Democratic and Republican coalitions have media outlets
that tend to take their side of policy debates. And at any given time, factions within each coalition have particular speakers whose voices they
seek to promote and legitimate. Is there any reason, then, to believe these
institutions generate asymmetric incentives for the parties to engage in
constitutional hardball?
There is. To see why, it helps to step back and view the development
of the relevant institutions in political time.138 In the 1970s and ’80s,
American conservatives emerged from the long wilderness of the post–
New Deal era, eventually ﬁnding a popular president, Ronald Reagan,
who brought many conservative ideas into the mainstream. That success
belies signiﬁcant challenges conservatives had to surmount during this
period. From the perspective of those in the vanguard of an emerging
137. See Fredreka Schouten, Why the Koch Brothers Want to Kill an Obscure Senate
Rule to Help Shape the Federal Courts, USA Today (July 4, 2017), http://usat.ly/2uG3VFT
[http://perma.cc/FCB6-8P83]; cf. Robert Barnes & Ed O’Keefe, Senate Republicans
Likely to Change Custom that Allows Democrats to Block Judicial Choices, Wash. Post
(May 25, 2017), http://wapo.st/2qnTKU1 [http://perma.cc/NZG3-WURW] (observing
that while adherence to the blue-slip rule “has waxed and waned, depending on the views
of Senate leaders[,] . . . the rule was strictly observed during the Obama administration”).
Our point here involves no claim about the merits of the blue-slip convention, but simply
about a potential partisan asymmetry in the extent to which the Senate chooses to follow
it.
138. Some parts of the following historical narrative may be familiar to readers. But
the signiﬁcance of this story for the dynamics of constitutional hardball has not, as far as
we are aware, received scholarly attention.
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coalition that was considerably to the right of the prior regime, it seemed
that major institutions of almost every important type were unsympathetic to their cause, from print and broadcast media outlets139 to
Washington think tanks (Brookings being the preeminent one)140 to
philanthropic foundations.141 The policy experts considered qualiﬁed, by
the standards of the time, to speak on important issues seemed centrist at
best. Some were the alumni of recent, relatively liberal or heterodox political administrations; some were university professors; very few were
members of the conservative movement.142
And so, the conservative movement began a massive institutionbuilding effort across a number of spheres,143 an effort whose trajectory
one might usefully trace from the creation of the Heritage Foundation

139. For a sampling of these claims from the 1970s and ’80s, see Les Brown, News
‘Bias’ Seen Tied to Schools, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1974, at 73 (describing remarks by
Governor Ronald Reagan criticizing “the liberal bias he perceived in the news media,”
which he traced to the “ideology many [members of the media] are exposed to in classrooms”); Nixon Aide Scores TV News Practice, N.Y. Times, May 6, 1972, at 1 (reporting on
White House speechwriter Patrick J. Buchanan’s suggestion that “the Nixon Administration consider antitrust legislation against the three television networks” because their
“liberal bias” had served to “freeze out opposing points of view and opposing information”); Sally Bedell Smith, Conservatives Seeking Stock of CBS to Alter ‘Liberal Bias,’
N.Y. Times (Jan. 11, 1985), http://www.nytimes.com/1985/01/11/arts/conservativesseeking-stock-of-cbs-to-alter-liberal-bias.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing an attempt led partly by Senator Jesse Helms to “buy sufficient stock in CBS to
change what the North Carolina Republican sa[id] [was] the ‘liberal bias’ in coverage by
CBS News of ‘political events, personages and views’”). What matters for our purposes
here is not whether these accusations of liberal bias were correct (although we do discuss
that question brieﬂy infra notes 150–156 and accompanying text), but rather the ubiquity
of the accusations themselves and the way they would shape the conservative movement’s
institutional development.
140. See, e.g., Stephen Isaacs, Coors Beer—and Politics—Move East, Wash. Post, May
4, 1975, at A1 (noting that the founders of the Heritage Foundation hoped it would “some
day be a right-wing equivalent to the Brookings Institution, which they see as left-wing”);
Robert Shogan, Liberal Think-Tank Seeks Republicans, L.A. Times, Feb. 20, 1977, at B7
(describing efforts by the Brookings Institution, “which many regard as a citadel of liberal
Democratic ideas,” to “recruit some prominent Republican scholars”).
141. See, e.g., Ghost-Written Ads, Pranks OK, Nixon Aide Says, L.A. Times, Sept. 26,
1973, at A2 (reporting that Patrick J. Buchanan recommended “measures to counter taxexempt organizations like the Ford Foundation whose policies, he said, are ‘in basic disagreement with our own political philosophy’”); Martin Morse Wooster, Conservatives
Create It, and Liberals Spend It—the Dead Must Be Spinning, Wall St. J., Dec. 26, 1989, at
A8 (“In nearly all foundation histories, conservatives create the endowment; liberals spend
it. One wonders if the liberal program officers of the MacArthur Foundation and the
Carnegie Corporation, in their ceaseless effort to expand the welfare state, have ever bothered to consider the morality of their actions.”).
142. See, e.g., Shogan, supra note 140 (quoting Brookings Institution president Bruce
K. MacLaury as saying that many of the Institution’s senior fellows “have come out of the
Kennedy-Johnson era”).
143. For an early overview, see Dan Morgan, Conservatives: A Well-Financed Network,
Wash. Post, Jan. 4, 1981, at A1.
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and the Cato Institute in 1973 and 1977, respectively,144 through the 1996
launch of the Fox News Channel.145 In the middle of this period, the
Federalist Society emerged as a network of lawyers and law students that
aimed to challenge the prevailing liberalism of law schools and to promote a conservative vision of American constitutionalism.146 And of
course, many existing organizations, from the Chamber of Commerce to
groups on the religious right, aligned with different parts of the emerging conservative coalition and began to expand their political and legal
work as well.147
The story of this explosion of new and newly invigorated institutions
is not uniform across all these different spheres. Many of the new think
tanks and foundations were the result of an infusion of capital from
wealthy, mobilized advocates of deregulation.148 The Fox News Channel,
in contrast, came into being when its founders saw a business opportunity to frame cable news for a more conservative audience—an opportunity that was partly regulatory, partly technological, and partly both a
144. See About Cato, Cato Inst., http://www.cato.org/about [http://perma.cc/K7H5XCJL] (last visited July 14, 2017); A Timeline of Heritage Successes, Heritage Found.,
http://www.heritage.org/article/timeline-heritage-successes [http://perma.cc/D5W4-FSWP]
(last visited July 14, 2017).
145. See Paul Farhi, Murdoch Joins Crowded Cable News Field, Wash. Post, Oct. 3,
1996, at D10. We do not have the space here to explore the considerable importance of
the rise of conservative talk radio, especially after the partial repeal of the “fairness
doctrine” in 1987. Following its national syndication in 1988, The Rush Limbaugh Show’s
“blend of news, entertainment, and partisan analysis became the model for legions of
imitators” and was, as David Foster Wallace observed, “the ﬁrst great promulgator of the
Mainstream Media’s Liberal Bias idea,” which functioned “as a mechanism by which any
criticism or refutation of conservative ideas could be dismissed.” David Foster Wallace,
Host: Deep into the Mercenary World of Take-No-Prisoners Political Talk Radio, Atlantic
(Apr. 2005), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/04/host/303812 [http://
perma.cc/5R7P-PUYT].
146. See About Us: Our Background, Federalist Soc’y, http://www.fed-soc.org/ourbackground [http://perma.cc/4FCJ-Q37B] (last visited July 14, 2017) (“Founded in 1982,
the Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies is a group of conservatives and
libertarians dedicated to reforming the current legal order.”); see also Steven M. Teles,
The Rise of the Conservative Legal Movement: The Battle for Control of the Law 135–80
(2010) (examining the origins and development of the Federalist Society within the context of the larger conservative legal movement).
147. See, e.g., U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Chamber of Commerce: The Early
Years 31, http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/ﬁles/uscc_HistoryBook.pdf [http://
perma.cc/UE4G-8Y2E] (last visited July 14, 2017) (explaining that the Chamber,
“inspired” by Justice Lewis Powell’s now-famous 1971 memorandum, created the National
Chamber Litigation Center in 1977). For one journalist’s account of the Chamber’s
political rise, see generally Alyssa Katz, The Inﬂuence Machine: The U.S. Chamber of
Commerce and the Corporate Capture of American Life (2015).
148. See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 143 (discussing the “entrepreneurial money”
behind conservative think tanks, foundations, and scholarly centers that arose in the
1970s); see also Michael J. Graetz & Ian Shapiro, Death by a Thousand Cuts: The Fight
over Taxing Inherited Wealth 241–47 (2005) (collecting sources on the rise of right-leaning think tanks).
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consequence and a cause of ideological polarization.149 Yet despite their
somewhat different origin stories, there are some commonalities across
these institutions, particularly in their character and self-conception as
insurgent challengers to what they perceived as the dominant liberalism
of the established order.
These new institutions not only often disagreed with their “mainstream” counterparts, but also often operated according to a different
ethic. To see why, it helps to understand that when conservatives complained in the 1970s and ’80s that the media and various centers of learning were generally “liberal,” there was good data corroborating their
complaints. Print and broadcast journalists,150 college professors,151 and
scholars working in settings like the Brookings Institution152 were indeed
mostly liberal, as were the faculties and student bodies of law schools.153
Such liberal leanings undoubtedly affected the way some of these actors
thought about and addressed political issues. At the same time, however,
such liberal leanings were constrained by norms of professional role
morality that structured the work of these older institutions. Established
foundations, for instance, “tended to disperse control among a large and
diverse group of board members and staff” and “steered clear of political
activism.”154 Journalists in the mid-twentieth-century American tradition
149. See generally David Folkenﬂik, The Birth of Fox News, Salon (Oct. 19, 2013),
http://www.salon.com/2013/10/19/the_birth_of_fox_news [http://perma.cc/AJC9-3UTM].
Getting the channel off the ground required some raw political muscle. See Time Warner
Cable of N.Y.C. v. City of New York, 943 F. Supp. 1357, 1403 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (ﬁnding that
the City, under Mayor Rudy Giuliani, violated the First Amendment by engaging in “a
pattern of conduct with the purpose of compelling Time Warner to alter its constitutionally-protected editorial decision not to carry Fox News”), aff’d sub nom. Time Warner
Cable of N.Y.C. v. Bloomberg L.P., 118 F.3d 917 (2d Cir. 1997).
150. Surveys from the period suggested that journalists on the whole leaned left, and
were more likely to be Democrats than Republicans by approximately a two-to-one margin.
See, e.g., Stephen Hess, The Washington Reporters 67, 87 (1981) (ﬁnding, in a 1978
survey of Washington, D.C. journalists, that forty-two percent identiﬁed as liberal, thirtynine percent as middle-of-the-road, and nineteen percent as conservative).
151. See Neil Gross & Solon Simmons, The Social and Political Views of American
College and University Professors, in Professors and Their Politics 19, 19–25 (Neil Gross &
Solon Simmons eds., 2014) (reviewing historical research into the political views of
American academics and noting that studies in the 1960s, ’70s, and ’80s indicated that
“professors are more liberal than members of other occupational groups”).
152. See Shogan, supra note 140 (quoting a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution
as estimating that, in 1977, Brookings had more Democratic than Republican scholars “in
the economic and foreign policy areas” and “the public policy area,” though not in “government studies”).
153. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis et al., The Patterns and Implications of Political
Contributions by Elite Law School Faculty, 93 Geo. L.J. 1167, 1177 (2005) (ﬁnding that,
among professors at twenty-one leading law schools who contributed at least $200 to a
federal election campaign between 1992 and 2002, roughly eighty-one percent contributed to Democrats and ﬁfteen percent to Republicans).
154. Martha T. McCluskey, Thinking with Wolves: Left Legal Theory After the Right’s
Rise, 54 Buff. L. Rev. 1191, 1217, 1219 (2007) (book review); see also id. at 1215 (“Although a number of non-conservative foundations funding intellectual work are wealthier
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viewed the “objectivity norm,” and its expression in practices such as the
separation of news reporting and editorializing, as central to their
craft.155 They were outraged when conservative critics accused them of
shading their news coverage in ways that favored liberal policy
positions.156
The architects of the emerging conservative movement generally
viewed these sorts of depoliticizing norms as either minor or ﬁctitious.157
Accordingly, when they established institutions to act as counterweights,
they designed them in a more partisan manner, with diminished rolemorality constraints. They built grantmaking nonproﬁts with highly
centralized governance structures and a “consciously revolutionary
political mission.”158 They built a Heritage Foundation that proudly
champions “conservative public policies” and makes no attempt to duplicate the Brookings Institution’s aspiration (or pretense) of being nonideological.159 In the world of television news, where the pull of an
[than conservative foundations], ‘most . . . are centrist, and their philanthropy is cautious
and apolitical’ . . . .” (quoting Mark Dowie, American Foundations: An Investigative
History 218 (2001))).
155. See generally Michael Schudson, The Objectivity Norm in American Journalism,
2 Journalism 149 (2001). The norm against commingling of news reporting and editorializing was formalized in a prominent 1973 code of journalistic ethics. See Soc’y of Prof’l
Journalists, Code of Ethics § IV.8 (1973), http://ethics.iit.edu/ecodes/node/3702
[http://perma.cc/MM2W-XC83] (“Special articles or presentations devoted to advocacy
or the writer’s own conclusions and interpretations should be labeled as such.”); cf. S.
Robert Lichter, The Media, in Understanding America: The Anatomy of an Exceptional
Nation 181, 188–89 (Peter H. Schuck & James Q. Wilson eds., 2008) (arguing that this
objectivity norm became central to the dominant media model of the latter half of the
twentieth century for economic reasons yet coexisted with a modest partisan skew, whereby journalists covered politicians of all stripes negatively but in some election cycles covered Republicans even more negatively).
156. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, CBS Defends Independence, N.Y. Times (Apr. 18,
1985), http://www.nytimes.com/1985/04/18/business/cbs-defends-independence.html
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (quoting CBS Inc.’s chairman and CEO as stating
that “[t]he integrity of CBS News and the independence of CBS News are inextricably
linked” and that “[t]hose who seek to gain control of CBS” to end CBS News’s alleged
liberal bias “threaten that independence and that integrity—and this country” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
157. See, e.g., John E. Yang, Gingrich Tells Activists to Outgun “Elite Media,” Wash.
Post, Apr. 23, 1996, at A6 (quoting Representative Newt Gingrich as urging Republican
activists to become “personal radio stations” to counteract the news media’s “overwhelming” liberal bias).
158. McCluskey, supra note 154, at 1217.
159. Compare Brookings Policies on Independence and Integrity, Brookings Inst.,
http://www.brookings.edu/about-us/brookings-policies-on-independence-and-integrity
[http://perma.cc/EVH8-RFHM] (last visited July 14, 2017) (“The Brookings Institution is
a nonproﬁt organization devoted to independent, in-depth research that leads to pragmatic and innovative ideas on how to solve problems facing society. The integrity and
objectivity of Brookings scholars and their research constitute the Institution’s principal
assets.”), with About Heritage: Mission, Heritage Found., http://www.heritage.org/aboutheritage/mission [http://perma.cc/PUA5-U53B] (last visited July 14, 2017) (“The mission of The Heritage Foundation is to formulate and promote conservative public policies
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objectivity norm remains particularly strong, Fox News famously branded
itself “fair and balanced.” It nonetheless conceived of and sold itself as
an ideological player to a degree that was unmatched among its “mainstream media” rivals.160
The 2000s brought a liberal counter-reaction to these developments.
New liberal think tanks and scholarly institutions such as the Center for
American Progress (founded in 2003) and the American Constitution
Society (founded in 2001) explicitly modeled themselves on conservative
counterparts founded in the 1970s and 1980s, as they sought to challenge those institutions’ dominance during the early twenty-ﬁrst century.161 Following the 2008 elections, MSNBC moved to market itself as a
liberal cable channel in the mold of Fox News.162 By then, liberals and
conservatives were increasingly learning about constitutional developments through different outlets, which credential different experts and
privilege different scholarly institutions as sources of legal and policy
analysis.163

based on the principles of free enterprise, limited government, individual freedom, traditional American values, and a strong national defense.”). As Professor Daniel Drezner
explains, Heritage led a wave of think tanks that “diverged in key ways from their
predecessors”: “[M]ost obvious[ly],” the new outﬁts “were overtly ideological in orientation”; they also “concentrated more on political advocacy” and “placed less weight on
academic credentials.” Daniel W. Drezner, The Ideas Industry: How Pessimists, Partisans,
and Plutocrats Are Transforming the Marketplace of Ideas 133–34 (2017).
160. The claim that the mainstream media is in fact simply the liberal media is central
to the channel’s self-understanding and justiﬁcation. See, e.g., Marshall Sella, The RedState Network, N.Y. Times Mag. (June 24, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/24/
magazine/the-red-state-network.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (quoting
Roger Ailes, founding chairman and CEO of Fox News, as stating that “[i]f we look conservative, it’s because the other guys are so far to the left”).
161. See, e.g., Bob Dreyfuss, An Idea Factory for Democrats, Nation (Feb. 12, 2004),
http://wwww.thenation.com/article/idea-factory-democrats [http://perma.cc/94QY-2MJX]
(“In a city heavy with well-funded right-wing think tanks (Heritage Foundation, Cato
Institute, American Enterprise Institute, Hudson Institute, Federalist Society), the [Center
for American Progress] is designed to provide some ballast for the other side.”); Crystal
Nix Hines, Young Liberal Law Group Is Expanding, N.Y. Times (June 1, 2001), http://
www.nytimes.com/2001/06/01/us/young-liberal-law-group-is-expanding.html (on ﬁle
with the Columbia Law Review) (quoting the founder of the American Constitution Society
as saying, “We view it as a counter to the Federalist Society”).
162. See Rebecca Dana, Slyer than Fox, New Republic (Mar. 25, 2013), http://
newrepublic.com/article/112733/roger-ailes-msnbc-how-phil-griffin-created-lefts-fox-news
[http://perma.cc/763K-WNEM].
163. See, e.g., Vlad Niculae et al., QUOTUS: The Structure of Political Media
Coverage as Revealed by Quoting Patterns, 24 Int’l World Wide Web Conf. Proc. 798, 807
(2015) (ﬁnding that “[t]here is systematic bias in the quoting patterns of different types of
news sources” and that “an important dimension of [such] bias is roughly aligned with an
ideology spectrum”). This phenomenon can be studied at various levels of granularity with
similar results. See, e.g., Lauren Feldman et al., Climate on Cable: The Nature and Impact
of Global Warming Coverage on Fox News, CNN, and MSNBC, 17 Int’l J. Press/Pol. 3, 6
(2012) (discussing prior ﬁndings that “Fox News interviewed a lower ratio of guests who
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Yet if many on both the left and the right now occupy media
“bubbles” or “echo chambers,” which are themselves shaped by larger
networks of idea generation and dissemination, there is a signiﬁcant
asymmetry in the way the bubbles work. Liberals mainly continue to rely
on, and to place greatest trust in, legacy media outlets such as CNN,
NPR, and the New York Times,164 whose institutional cultures continue to
prize objectivity and to foster a relatively strong degree of respect for government and government officeholders.165 In the world of opinion journalism, unabashedly liberal outlets abound. But their audiences have
been small compared to the audience for conservative talk radio or the
Fox News Channel,166 and they themselves may be more constrained than
their conservative counterparts by certain norms of professionalism.167
Liberals do not tend to get their straight news from overtly ideological
believed in global warming to those who doubted global warming, relative to CNN”); id. at
14–15 (replicating those ﬁndings).
164. See Pew Research Ctr., Political Polarization and Media Habits 11–16 (2014),
http://www.journalism.org/ﬁles/2014/10/Political-Polarization-and-Media-Habits-FINALREPORT-7-27-15.pdf [http://perma.cc/UB9E-ZXP3] [hereinafter Pew Research Ctr.,
Political Polarization and Media Habits].
165. See, e.g., J. Benjamin Taylor, Extreme Media and American Politics: In Defense
of Extremity 1 (2017) (“Viewers of broadcast network nightly news . . . generally see evenhandedness and objectivity.”); Stephen Ansolabehere et al., The Orientation of
Newspaper Endorsements in U.S. Elections, 1940–2002, 1 Q.J. Pol. Sci. 393, 400 (2006)
(“[N]ewspapers today endorse the incumbent four out of ﬁve times . . . .”); see also Liz
Spayd, Seeking More Voices, Even if Some Don’t Want to Hear Them, N.Y. Times (Apr.
22, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/22/public-editor/seeking-more-voiceseven-if-some-dont-want-to-hear-them.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (describing the New York Times’s efforts, following President Trump’s election, to “put an outstretched hand toward Red America” and feature more conservative voices).
166. See, e.g., Abram Brown, Why All the Talk-Radio Stars Are Conservative, Forbes
(July 13, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/abrambrown/2015/07/13/why-all-the-talkradio-stars-are-conservative [http://perma.cc/57ZN-6Y88] (“You would’ve thought a single liberal [radio] personality could have emerged on a major scale. But that just hasn’t
happened.”); Jesse Holcomb, 5 Facts About Fox News, Pew Research Ctr.: Fact Tank (Jan.
14, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/01/14/five-facts-about-fox-news
[http://perma.cc/F8XG-5NSV] (“[W]ith 1.7 million viewers each evening [in 2013], the
[Fox News Channel] . . . drew a bigger audience than CNN, MSNBC and HLN
combined.”).
167. Opinion journalists and commentators do not conceive of their work in the same
terms as other journalists; they do not systematically aim to separate news coverage and
editorializing. Even still, prominent commentators on the left have long complained about
what they sometimes call the “hack gap,” or the sense that right-wing pundits operate with
less regard for empiricism or with greater fealty to their political side. See, e.g., Jonathan
Chait, The Hack Gap, New Republic (June 22, 2011), http://newrepublic.com/article/
90492/the-hack-gap [http://perma.cc/W8F3-FJ9X]; Kevin Drum, The Hack Gap Rears Its
Ugly Head Yet Again, Mother Jones (Oct. 9, 2012), http://www.motherjones.com/kevindrum/2012/10/hack-gap-rears-its-ugly-head-yet-again [http://perma.cc/5WJY-X3XP];
Matthew Yglesias, Hack Gap, Atlantic (Aug. 14, 2007), http://www.theatlantic.com/
politics/archive/2007/08/hack-gap/45795 [http://perma.cc/KD4Q-K379]. This is a
difficult proposition to assess with any real objectivity. We simply note here that there is a
perception on the left of a persistent and politically consequential gap.
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sources—think of Daily Kos or Democracy Now!—whose editors and producers have more leeway to feature voices arguing that the current
conventions of politics or current constitutional understandings need radical revision.168
The conservative echo chamber of the past two decades has been
less staid and more self-contained.169 Survey data show that a large
plurality of conservatives, to an extent that has no parallel on the left,
orient themselves around a single news source: Fox News.170 And as already suggested, Fox News is less beholden than its mainstream rivals to
conventions of bipartisanship and nonpartisanship.171 Fox News journalists do operate with signiﬁcant role constraints172 as compared to, say,
conservative talk-radio hosts.173 But across the core media outlets and
think tanks on the conservative side, for reasons having to do with their
development in political time, the authorities presented tend to be more
explicitly partisan and more willing to argue that the actions or priorities
168. It is possible that the Trump era could alter these dynamics. MSNBC, in particular, has gained many more viewers recently, although it still trails Fox News. See Joe
Otterson, TV Ratings: Cable News Viewership Surges in May as Fox News, CNN, MSNBC
Log Double-Digit Gains, Variety (May 31, 2017), http://variety.com/2017/tv/news/cablenews-ratings-may-2017-fox-news-cnn-msnbc-1202448761 [http://perma.cc/VDM6-766N].
169. Cf. Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, Democracy and Dysfunction: An
Exchange, 50 Ind. L. Rev. 281, 320 (2016) (discussing how the development of “a separate
set of conservative media, think tanks, and educational institutions,” combined with other
factors, has “created a conservative echo chamber” and arguing that this echo chamber
helps explain President Trump’s political ascent).
170. See Pew Research Ctr., Political Polarization and Media Habits, supra note 164, at
4 (“[C]onservatives orient strongly around Fox News. Nearly half of consistent conservatives (47%) name it as their main source for government and political news . . . . No
other sources come close. Consistent liberals, on the other hand, volunteer a wider range
of main sources for political news . . . .”).
171. See supra note 160 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Project for Excellence
in Journalism, The State of the News Media 164 (2005), http://assets.pewresearch.org.
s3.amazonaws.com/files/journalism/State-of-the-News-Media-Report-2005-FINAL.pdf [http://
perma.cc/8J49-KHJK] (ﬁnding in content analysis that “Fox was measurably more onesided than the other networks, and Fox journalists were more opinionated on the air”). It
is nearly impossible to disentangle the speciﬁc contributions of Fox News from other
factors contributing to asymmetric polarization, but an intriguing recent study uses the
quasi-random variable of cable news channel numbering (lower-numbered channels draw
more viewers) to estimate the size of the “Fox News effect” on viewers’ political preferences, and ﬁnds that this effect has increased over time and exceeds that of any other news
channel. Gregory J. Martin & Ali Yurukoglu, Bias in Cable News: Persuasion and
Polarization, 107 Am. Econ. Rev. 2565, 2565–68 (2017).
172. See, e.g., Sarah Ellison, “It’s a Disaster. It’s a Nightmare.” Is a Civil War Brewing
Inside Fox News?, Vanity Fair (Mar. 21, 2017), http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/03/
inside-fox-news-after-megyn-kelly-nbc-scandal [http://perma.cc/PK5S-ZPUR] (“Despite its
appearance to the outside world as a monolithic force on the right, the [Fox News] network operates internally with a distinction between its news side and its commentary
side.”).
173. See Pew Research Ctr., Political Polarization and Media Habits, supra note 164, at
10 (“Fox News sits to the right of the midpoint, but is not nearly as far right as several
other sources, such as the radio shows of Rush Limbaugh or Glenn Beck.”).
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of the other side are egregious and indefensible.174 From Fox News
suggesting in the 1990s that President Clinton be impeached175 to Cato
Institute scholars suggesting in the early 2010s that the debt ceiling is
“overrated,”176 it is plausible to infer that these institutions are more
likely to explicitly or implicitly promote constitutional hardball—urging
officials to upend governmental norms, just as these institutions themselves upended elite extragovernmental norms, when necessary to rescue
the country or the Constitution from the damage being done by political
opponents.
B.

Asymmetric Ideological Commitments

The two coalitions that make up our major political parties once
teemed with internal ideological diversity. In recent decades, however,
they have become increasingly ideologically coherent and distinct.177 The
174. Many of the right’s leading mediating institutions are also more willing to
challenge perceived moderates on their own side. See, e.g., Konczal, supra note 133
(“[T]he Heritage Foundation has been willing to burn relationships with [moderate]
House Republicans to maintain outside pressure, something inconceivable for liberal organizations, much less centrist ones like the Brookings Institution, to do.”).
175. See Jane Mayer, Roger Ailes, the Clintons, and the Scandals of the
Scandalmongers, New Yorker (Aug. 24, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/news/dailycomment/roger-ailes-the-clintons-and-the-scandals-of-the-scandalmongers [http://perma.cc/
5DQY-S7X9] (discussing “Fox’s breathless coverage of the Clinton-impeachment proceedings”); see also Monica Lewinsky, Opinion, Monica Lewinsky: Roger Ailes’s Dream
Was My Nightmare, N.Y. Times (May 22, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/22/
opinion/monica-lewinsky-roger-ailess-dream-was-my-nightmare.html (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review) (stating that Roger Ailes, as head of Fox News, “took the story of the
[Clinton–Lewinsky] affair and the trial that followed and made certain his anchors hammered it ceaselessly, 24 hours a day”).
176. Michael D. Tanner, The Overrated Debt Ceiling, Cato Inst. (Jan. 15, 2013),
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/overrated-debt-ceiling [http://perma.cc/
ZPQ8-9NGE]; see also, e.g., Tad DeHaven, The Debt Ceiling Game, Cato Inst. (Feb. 22,
2011), http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/debt-ceiling-game [http://perma.cc/
8S7L-6ZG7] (“The political stakes in the latest debt ceiling game are high. The consequences of failing to use it as an opportunity to start reining in the federal government are
even higher.”).
177. See, e.g., Barber & McCarty, supra note 101, at 20–21 (“From the 1930s until the
mid-1970s, . . . [n]ot only were [roll-call voting] differences between the typical
Democratic and Republican legislators small, but there also were signiﬁcant numbers of
conservative Democrats and liberal Republicans.”); id. at 21–22 (noting that, “[s]ince the
1970s, . . . there has been a steady and steep increase in the polarization of both the House
and Senate” and that “[m]any issues that were once distinct from the party-conﬂict
dimension have been absorbed into it”); Robert S. Erikson et al., Public Opinion in the
States: A Quarter Century of Change and Stability, in Public Opinion in State Politics 229,
238 (Jeffrey E. Cohen ed., 2006) (“It is approaching common knowledge that the United
States is becoming increasingly polarized in terms of the party-ideology connection.”);
Yphtach Lelkes, Mass Polarization: Manifestations and Measurements, 80 Pub. Opinion Q.
392, 395 (2016) (arguing that while evidence of some forms of polarization is more contested, evidence of increased “alignment between party identity and issue attitudes” in the
mass public is unequivocal); see also Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of
Parties, Not Powers, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 2311, 2333 & nn.80–83 (2006) (reviewing the liter-
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resulting polarization opens the door to constitutional hardball on both
sides. As a general matter, if each party has many moderates in office, or
if many high-proﬁle policy issues do not break neatly along party lines,
there will be many opportunities for bipartisan bargaining and compromise. Legislators who contemplated hardball tactics in the midtwentieth century could expect to encounter opposition within their own
party, making such tactics not only costlier to pursue but also less effective.178 As we suggested at the outset and began to ﬂesh out in preceding
sections, the fact that polarization itself has been asymmetric since the
1970s—with Republicans moving further to the right than Democrats
have moved to the left—is likely bound up on several levels with the rise
of asymmetric constitutional hardball over the past twenty-ﬁve years.179
The main question we examine in this section is slightly different. So
far we have talked of polarization (and its asymmetric character) largely
without regard to the speciﬁc ideological commitments around which
the parties have come to cohere. Does the content of those commitments
also have implications for each side’s propensity to play constitutional
hardball? The answer to this question may play a signiﬁcant role in determining whether use of these tactics remains asymmetric in the years
ahead.
We believe that the answer is yes—that constitutional hardball cannot be well understood without taking into account the values and ideas
espoused by its practitioners. The axes of disagreement between the two
major party coalitions now include views about (i) government, (ii) the
Constitution, and (iii) the stakes of constitutional politics, all of which
bear on officeholders’ assessments of the risks and rewards of engaging
in certain forms of constitutional hardball. These ideological factors
complement, and to some degree underpin, the institutional and electoral incentives discussed above.180
ature on party polarization and ideological coherence). The increasing distinctness of the
parties in terms of ideology and policy preferences does not mean that either party lacks
internal disagreement. But it does mean that there is less room than before for agreement
across party lines.
178. Cf. supra notes 105–106 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between party unity and constitutional hardball).
179. See supra notes 11, 101–106 and accompanying text; supra section III.A.
180. Some political science models of legislators’ behavior focus almost exclusively on
their electoral incentives. See, e.g., David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection
13 (1974) (positing that “United States congressmen are interested in getting reelected—
indeed, . . . interested in nothing else”); see also Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics,
and Impartial Justice, 58 Duke L.J. 623, 646 (2009) (describing Professor Mayhew’s
electoral-incentive assumption as “the central principle in theories about legislative
politics and empirical analyses of it”). Other models assume that legislators are motivated
in signiﬁcant part by a desire to implement their own views. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin,
Beyond Public Choice: Comprehensive Rationality in the Writing and Reading of Statutes,
66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 14–45 (1991) (critiquing the legislator “re-election-maximizer” model
and emphasizing the role of ideological motivations). The analysis of asymmetric constitutional hardball offered in this section does not depend on which of these two models is
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1. Views of Government and the Costs of Constitutional Hardball. — Some
of the last several decades’ most forceful—and Republican-identiﬁed—
forms of constitutional hardball drew their force from the way in which
they threatened to disrupt the ordinary operations of government. The
thousand-plus subpoenas that Representative Burton issued to the
Clinton Administration consumed an enormous amount of executive
branch time and energy.181 The routinization of Senate ﬁlibusters under
President Obama made it more difficult to advance legislation and nominations.182 Government shutdowns under both Clinton and Obama
forced agencies to curtail nonessential operations and services for
nontrivial periods of time.183 Lately, large blocs of Republican legislators
have ﬂirted with defaulting on the national debt, with potentially severe
economic and geostrategic consequences, by failing to raise Congress’s
self-imposed “debt ceiling.”184 All of these tactics seek to gain political
leverage through behaviors that risk hobbling the government.
Whether this seems like a worthwhile risk to take depends in part on
one’s views about how bad it would be to hobble the government. That
question is a proxy for what one thinks about the value of the institution.
Is government primarily a force for good that implements important
public values, or is it primarily an impediment to individual freedom and
a source of corruption and waste? There is ample reason to believe that
Republicans’ views on this question lubricate the path to constitutional

more accurate, as the ideological commitments we consider are widely espoused both by
politicians themselves and by many of the key players within each of the party coalitions.
181. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 70 and accompanying text; see also Josh Chafetz, Congress’s
Constitution, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 715, 762 (2012) (explaining that the ﬁlibuster, as of 2012,
operated “as an absolute bar to the passage of measures that command[ed] the support of
fewer than sixty Senators”).
183. See supra notes 30, 56, 72 and accompanying text. This is constitutional hardball
of the convention-straining kind, although after the government shutdowns of the mid1990s, 2013, and now 2018, see supra note 13, it is becoming less certain that there is a
convention against shutting down the government over policy disagreements.
184. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. The debt ceiling is a particularly
interesting animal from the perspective of constitutional hardball. Imposing the statutory
ceiling was not itself a form of constitutional hardball, so much as an act of symbolic
politics intended to signify opposition to excessive debt. See Neil H. Buchanan & Michael
C. Dorf, How to Choose the Least Unconstitutional Option: Lessons for the President
(and Others) from the Debt Ceiling Standoff, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 1175, 1201 (2012).
However, once the law was in place and subject to periodic votes to increase the ceiling in
line with the amounts necessary to close the gap between the money Congress
appropriates and the money it raises, the debt ceiling created the possibility of a
particularly dangerous form of hardball: brinkmanship over default. See Jonathan Chait,
The Shutdown Prophet, N.Y. Mag. (Oct. 4, 2013), http://nymag.com/news/politics/
nationalinterest/government-shutdown-2013-10 [http://perma.cc/LCC4-WKSH] (“Lifting the debt ceiling, a vestigial ritual in which Congress votes to approve payment of the
debts it has already incurred, is almost a symbolic event, except that not doing it would
wreak unpredictable and possibly enormous worldwide economic havoc.”).
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hardball.185 The value of government—especially, but not only, the federal
government—has become a point of deep division between the parties,
with contemporary Republicans more likely to oppose taxes186 and “view
the [state] with suspicion even when in power,” and Democrats more
likely to trust public entities and experts and to believe “a strong government is necessary in order to counterbalance private economic domination.”187 If conservatives assume that they have largely lost the war to
limit the size and scope of the federal government, that by itself may tend
to make certain forms of government-hobbling constitutional hardball
appealing, as a sort of guerrilla tactic or rearguard action.188

185. As Mike Konczal observes, “liberals and those to their left look to government to
provide for the common good, and therefore have an interest in showing that the government can work well.” Konczal, supra note 133. For conservatives, in contrast, “sabotage of
governmental processes is useful”; “when domestic government fails in the eyes of the
public . . . it serves the right politically.” Id.; see also Mike Lofgren, Goodbye to All That:
Reﬂections of a GOP Operative Who Left the Cult, Truthout (Sept. 3, 2011),
http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/3079:goodbye-to-all-that-reflections-of-a-gopoperative-who-left-the-cult [http://perma.cc/X76F-N4LX] (critiquing “the long-term
Republican strategy of undermining conﬁdence in our democratic institutions” and linking this strategy to tactics of “political terrorism”); id. (“A couple of years ago, a Republican
committee staff director told me candidly (and proudly) what the method was to all this
obstruction and disruption . . . . By sabotaging the reputation of an institution of government, the party that is programmatically against government would come out the relative
winner.”); Alec MacGillis, Opinion, Can Democrats Be as Stubborn as Mitch McConnell?,
N.Y. Times (Feb. 5, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/03/opinion/can-thedemocrats-be-as-stubborn-as-mitch-mcconnell.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review)
(stating that Democrats “are more philosophically invested in showing that government
can function” and that this makes it unclear whether they could “really bring themselves
to replicate [Senator Mitch] McConnell’s obstructionist methods”).
186. See David Scott Louk & David Gamage, Preventing Government Shutdowns:
Designing Default Rules for Budgets, 86 U. Colo. L. Rev. 181, 206 (2015) (arguing that the
“emergence of a broad anti-tax sentiment among conservatives” in the 1970s, coupled
with political polarization, has enhanced incentives for many Republican representatives
“to participate in game-of-chicken-style [budget] negotiations”).
187. Freeman, supra note 105, at 336–37; see also Russell Heimlich, Wide Gap
Between Republicans, Democrats in Views of Government Effectiveness, Pew Research
Ctr.: Fact Tank (June 7, 2012), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2012/06/07/widegap-between-republicans-democrats-in-views-of-government-effectiveness [http://perma.cc/
EZ4C-S6S3] (“About three-fourths of Republicans (77%) say that when something is run
by the government it is usually inefficient and wasteful . . . . In contrast, just 41% of
Democrats say the same . . . .”); Frank Newport, On Economy, Republicans Trust Business;
Dems Trust Gov’t, Gallup (Mar. 12, 2009), http://www.gallup.com/poll/116599/
economy-republicans-trust-business-dems-trust-gov.aspx (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review) (“While 64% of Republicans say they place more trust in businesses to solve the nation’s economic problems, 72% of Democrats say they trust the government more, underscoring the enormous philosophical divide in the way Republicans and Democrats view the
government’s role in solving the country’s economic problems.”). The proportion of
Republicans and Democrats who report negative views of government rises when the presidency is controlled by the other political party. See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 55, at 1119–
20; Heimlich, supra.
188. We thank Peter Schuck for this point.
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Republican rhetoric surrounding recent government shutdowns and
threatened shutdowns vividly conveys the connection between constitutional hardball and views of government. Asked about a possible veto
by President Clinton of a balanced budget bill in 1995, House Speaker
Gingrich retorted, “Which of the two of us do you think worries more
about the government not showing up?”189 “We’re very excited,”
Representative Michele Bachmann said on the eve of the 2013 shutdown
over the ACA. “It’s exactly what we wanted, and we got it.”190 Prominent
conservative commentators ampliﬁed these sentiments. “Bring on the
shutdown,” wrote Tom Giovanetti, president of the libertarian Institute
for Policy Innovation, in 2011. “Every day that Americans wake up and
ﬁnd that the coffee still brews and the water still comes out of the faucet
without the assistance of the federal government, Republicans win.”191
RedState contributor Jeff Emanuel celebrated a shutdown that same year
as a means to combat “our bloated, overfunded (with borrowed money),
unsustainable government, which is badly in need of trimming and
streamlining.”192 RedState’s then-editor-in-chief Erick Erickson tweeted in
2010: “The upside? No laws passed. No gov’t spending. Can’t wait for the
shutdown.”193 Picking up on these attitudes toward the federal government, President Trump recently touted the idea of a shutdown, even in a
period of uniﬁed Republican control of Congress, as a way to “ﬁx [the]
mess” in Washington.194
189. Karen Tumulty, Getting the Edge, Time, June 5, 1995, at 22, 22. Reﬂecting on
this episode in 2013, Gingrich enthused: “I helped close the government twice. It actually
worked. Bill Clinton came in and said ‘the era of big government is over’ after two closures, not before.” Liz Marlantes, Republicans Talk Up a ‘Government Shutdown.’ Do
They Mean It?, Christian Sci. Monitor (Jan. 7, 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted),
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/Decoder/2013/0107/Republicans-talk-upa-government-shutdown.-Do-they-mean-it [http://perma.cc/GZ3E-Z48T]; cf. Hacker
& Pierson, No Cost for Extremism, supra note 90 (describing Gingrich’s political strategy,
when in the House, as “simultaneously ratcheting up dysfunction and disgust while more
sharply distinguishing the GOP as the anti-government party”).
190. Ed O’Keefe & Rosalind S. Helderman, On Cusp of Shutdown, House
Conservatives Excited, Say They Are Doing the Right Thing, Wash. Post (Sept. 28, 2013),
http://wapo.st/14Tl7r1 [http://perma.cc/C34E-FSUP].
191. David Mark, Would a Government Shutdown Be that Bad?, Politico: The Arena
(Apr. 7, 2011), http://www.politico.com/arena/archive/would-a-government-shutdownbe-that-bad.html [http://perma.cc/J2FM-5ECA].
192. Id.
193. Erick Erickson (@EWErickson), Twitter (Aug. 30, 2010), http://twitter.com/
EWErickson/status/22571962647 [http://perma.cc/C7F3-2FM7].
194. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (May 2, 2017), http://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/859393829505552385 [http://perma.cc/9TYT-KJ55] (“Our
country needs a good ‘shutdown’ in September to ﬁx mess!”). In light of the connection
between constitutional hardball and views of government, it is perhaps unsurprising that
when Democrats tried to borrow this particular page from the Republican playbook and
shut down the government in January 2018, they began looking for an exit strategy almost
immediately—and after one weekday allowed the government to reopen without obtaining any signiﬁcant concessions. See supra note 13.
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It is less clear whether this divide over the value of government
affects the parties’ propensity to engage in other types of constitutional
hardball that do not have such obvious implications for government
capacity. We might draw a distinction here between obstruction-creating
forms of constitutional hardball and obstruction-clearing forms of
constitutional hardball. The latter aim to minimize or circumvent barriers that have arisen—sometimes as a result of forceful uncompromising
methods by the other side—to prevent legislative or administrative
action. Such forms of hardball enable the government to get things done.
President Obama’s most controversial recess appointments and executive
initiatives, for instance, were pitched in these terms.195 Even if Democratic
officeholders are more likely than Republicans to be constrained by a
commitment to “the smooth functioning of government,”196 as a former
aide to Senator Harry Reid asserted last year, their corollary commitment
to a strong government that solves economic problems197 may have disinhibiting effects.
Overall, though, it seems safe to assume that the practice of constitutional hardball, and especially obstruction-creating hardball, tends in
the aggregate to raise the transaction costs of governance. It may also
lead to less durable and effective policy, insofar as it pushes those in
power toward relatively precarious or piecemeal solutions that do not
command broad bipartisan support and do not necessarily become
legally entrenched. These policy consequences, in turn, may contribute
to a decline in public trust in government as well as an exacerbation of
constitutional conﬂict.198 And so on multiple levels, one would expect
that a party whose main commitments are framed in terms of incapacitating the government199 would have a stronger political motivation to
engage in more, and more destabilizing, forms of constitutional hardball.
Conversely, one would expect that a party whose commitments are

195. See Pozen, Self-Help, supra note 22, at 4–8, 41–47.
196. Adam Jentleson, Senate Democrats Have the Power to Stop Trump. All They
Have to Do Is Use It., Wash. Post (Jan. 27, 2017), http://wapo.st/2jFGKGP?tid=ss [http://
perma.cc/WJN9-6ZBL] (“The kind of universal obstruction pioneered by McConnell during Obama’s presidency is not in Democrats’ nature: They believe in the smooth functioning of government.”).
197. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
198. Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicial Supremacy, Departmentalism, and the Rule of
Law in a Populist Age, 96 Tex. L. Rev. 487, 548 (2018) (“Through much, though not all, of
our history, individual and institutional norms of accommodation and restraint have played invaluable roles in averting both governmental paralysis and constitutional crises.”).
199. Of course, Republican officeholders may seek to expand various public-sector
functions (for instance, law enforcement and national security), while Democratic officeholders may seek to limit various other public-sector functions for reasons of principle or
political calculation (as with welfare reform under President Clinton). Still, the two parties
differ starkly in their rhetoric, framing, and self-conception in relation to the general project of governance.
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framed primarily in terms that demand government action would, as a
general matter, be warier of constitutional hardball.
2. Originalism, Constitutional Restorationism, and Forms of Fidelity. — In
addition to becoming more ideologically coherent and distinct, the
parties have also become more constitutionally coherent and distinct over
the past several decades. As numerous scholars have observed, the
Republican Party has been associated since the 1980s with the interpretive theory of originalism,200 often paired in political discourse with a
commitment to judicial restraint and strict construction of the federal
government’s powers.201 The rise of the Tea Party only intensiﬁed these
associations.202 The Democratic Party, on the other hand, has been
identiﬁed with a philosophy of “living constitutionalism” that is pluralistic as to interpretive method but generally concerned to construe the
Constitution in a manner that safeguards canonical precedents and
supports contemporary needs and values.203
200. See, e.g., Jamal Greene et al., Proﬁling Originalism, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 356, 373
(2011) (“Eighty-ﬁve percent of originalists [in surveys from 2009 and 2010] identify as or
lean toward Republican . . . , whereas 21% of nonoriginalists identify as or lean toward
Republican . . . .”); id. at 398 (“[A]mong those who identify as ‘strong Republicans,’ 59%
are originalists, and among those who identify as ‘extremely conservative,’ 78% are originalists.”); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Supermajority Rules and the
Judicial Conﬁrmation Process, 26 Cardozo L. Rev. 543, 554 (2005) (“[O]ur parties now
seem to be divided on originalism, with the Republican Party much more sympathetic to
originalism and the Democratic Party opposed.”); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism
as a Political Practice: The Right’s Living Constitution, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 545, 554–74
(2006) (discussing the rise of originalism as a political practice on the right). “Beginning . . . in the 1980s, originalism gave conservative activists a language in which to attack
the progressive case law of the Warren Court on the grounds that it had ‘almost nothing to
do with the Constitution’ and was merely an effort to enact ‘the political agenda of the
American left.’” Post & Siegel, supra, at 555 (quoting Lino A. Graglia, “Constitutional
Theory”: The Attempted Justiﬁcation for the Supreme Court’s Liberal Political Program,
65 Tex. L. Rev. 789, 789 (1987)).
201. See Neil S. Siegel, Interring the Rhetoric of Judicial Activism, 59 DePaul L. Rev.
555, 557–74 (2010) (describing the development of these themes in Republican political
rhetoric).
202. See Greene et al., supra note 200, at 356 (“Two of the largest Tea Party organizations have been at odds on occasion, but they both agree on a commitment to the intentions of the Framers.”); Kate Zernike, In Justice Conﬁrmation Hearings, Echoes of the Tea
Party, N.Y. Times (July 2, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/03/us/politics/
03constitution.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (“The Tea Party is often called
‘loosely organized,’ but the unifying philosophy for groups across the country is a belief
that the nation can solve its problems—primarily its economic problems, which is what its
supporters care most about—if lawmakers stick to a strict interpretation of the
Constitution.”).
203. See, e.g., 2 Howard Gillman et al., American Constitutionalism: Rights and
Liberties 690 (2d ed. 2017) (“Democrats retain . . . constitutional commitments from the
New Deal/Great Society Era. Liberal . . . commentators either insist on a living
Constitution or devise an originalism that requires constitutional interpreters to understand the original meaning of constitutional language in terms of contemporary understandings of the principles laid down in 1791 or 1868.”); Mark A. Graber, Judicial
Supremacy and the Structure of Partisan Conﬂict, 50 Ind. L. Rev. 141, 168 (2016) (“The
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This partisan divide is itself asymmetric. While both coalitions have
developed increasingly clear views about the basic direction in which they
would like to see constitutional law go,204 Republican politicians and
activists have promoted their themes—originalism, strict construction, judicial restraint—far more vigorously than Democrats have promoted any
alternative high-level constitutional vision.205 Republican and Democratic
voters show the same asymmetry, whether as a consequence of their politicians’ rhetoric or a cause of it or both. Signiﬁcantly more Republicans
tell pollsters that they regard the Supreme Court as an important or the
most important issue when they vote for President,206 and the content of
their views about the Court indicates that “originalism has been translated into common parlance with some success.”207
As suggested above,208 the Republican Party’s embrace of originalism
and its denigration of living constitutionalism may be relevant to its
propensity to play constitutional hardball, in at least two ways. Rhetorically, these arguments have contributed to a narrative of constitutional corruption that authorizes, and maybe even requires, bold moves
to recover a prelapsarian past. Conceptually, these arguments frame constitutional ﬁdelity in a manner that heavily discounts the importance of
judicial precedent and of unwritten norms that have developed over time
to structure and facilitate the government’s work. The combination supplies both motivation and justiﬁcation for acts of hardball that aim to
deprive Democrats of the opportunity to make or apply constitutional
law.
Uniting its stances on constitutional interpretation, constitutional
history, and the proper role of government, we might say that the
contemporary Republican and Democratic Parties champion very different constitutional
approaches and visions. Republicans are originalists while Democrats celebrate a living
constitution.”).
204. See H.W. Perry, Jr. & L.A. Powe, Jr., The Political Battle for the Constitution, 21
Const. Comment. 641, 641–45, 649–89 (2004) (detailing how the two parties have developed “fundamentally different” constitutional philosophies and agendas since the Warren
Court era).
205. See Simon Lazarus, Hertz or Avis? Progressives’ Quest to Reclaim the
Constitution and the Courts, 72 Ohio St. L.J. 1201, 1214 (2011) (“During the last three
decades, while . . . conservative advocates, politicians, and judges never missed an opportunity to trumpet their fealty to the ‘original’ Constitution, the Framers’ intent, ‘strict construction,’ and ‘judges who do not legislate from the bench,’ their . . . progressive adversaries were all but mute on these issues.”).
206. See, e.g., Karlyn Bowman, Reading the Polls: Supreme Court Nominations, Public
Opinion and Litmus Tests, Forbes (Jan. 30, 2017), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
bowmanmarsico/2017/01/30/reading-the-polls-supreme-court-nominations-public-opinionand-litmus-tests [http://perma.cc/6MH4-TA2C] (reporting on 2016 national exit-poll
data showing that voters who said Court appointments were the most important factor in
their vote split 56% to 41% for Trump, whereas voters who said Court appointments were
not a factor at all in their vote split 55% to 37% for Clinton).
207. Greene et al., supra note 200, at 417.
208. See supra notes 107–108 and accompanying text.
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Republican Party has cultivated a politics of constitutional restorationism.
One extreme form of this politics centers on the “Constitution in exile,”
or the belief that the entire ediﬁce of New Deal precedents enabling the
growth of congressional and administrative power is unsupportable and
ought to be overturned.209 But well short of the Constitution-in-exile
position, Republican activists have mobilized around ideas and tropes of
constitutional restorationism for years now.210 In political time, in other
words, it seems that both sides’ basic constitutional outlooks remain the
ones that were forged in the 1970s and ’80s, when a more rightwardleaning Supreme Court began to reshape the jurisprudence of the previous era. Wielding the charge of judicial activism and, subsequently, the
theory of originalism, Republican officials going back to President Nixon
have agreed on the necessity of restoring the Constitution’s true, real,
lost meaning in the face of subversion by liberal judges and politicians.
This view lends itself naturally to engaging in constitutional hardball. The more illegitimate the other side’s constitutional usurpations,
the more legitimate are the measures taken to counter them211—up to
and including “united and unyielding opposition” to a President’s
agenda212 or ﬂatly refusing to consider a Supreme Court nominee.213 And
if the key inputs into constitutional analysis are those that illuminate the
meaning of the text at the time of its adoption, then the institutional
norms and settlements that developed over the course of the twentieth
century are not necessarily owed any constitutional respect, whether as a
matter of precedent, prudence, or epistemic insight.
None of this is to suggest that Republicans’ views on constitutional
hardball and their ideas about originalism or the lost Constitution will
209. See generally Symposium, The Constitution in Exile, 51 Duke L.J. 1 (2001). For a
classic statement of these themes, see Douglas H. Ginsburg, Delegation Running Riot,
Regulation, Winter 1995, at 83, 84 (book review) (contending that “for 60 years the
nondelegation doctrine” and related doctrines such as “enumerated powers” have been
“banished for standing in opposition to unlimited government” and hence have “existed
only as part of the Constitution-in-exile”).
210. See Peter Beinart, The Republican Obsession with ‘Restoring’ America, Atlantic
(Nov. 13, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/11/the-republicanobsession-with-restoring-america/382689 [http://perma.cc/5ZCM-8UY6] (noting that
conservative politicians “love the word ‘restore’” and that the 2012 “Republican platform
promised the ‘Restoring of the American Dream’ and the ‘Restoration of Constitutional
Government’”); see also Randy Barnett, Constitution in Exile?, Legal Affairs: Debate Club
(May 2, 2005), http://legalaffairs.org/webexclusive/debateclub_cie0505.msp [http://
perma.cc/V8ZQ-Q38Y] (denying that there is a “‘Constitution in Exile’ movement” but
defending originalism and linking it to the idea of the “Lost Constitution,” which “is
about restoring various provisions of the written text that have been gutted or weakened
by judicial decisions”). For a more recent example, see generally Senator Mike Lee, Our
Lost Constitution: The Willful Subversion of America’s Founding Document (2015).
211. See generally Pozen, Self-Help, supra note 22, at 61–76 (describing norms of
proportionality that have traditionally constrained “constitutional countermeasures”).
212. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text.
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always or necessarily be in perfect alignment. Most people’s constitutional beliefs seem to be motivated in complex and often unconscious ways by their political preferences, moral values, and cultural
worldviews,214 and there is no reason to think that partisans on the right
(or left) would be an exception.215 People’s views about the efficacy and
desirability of constitutional hardball are likewise the product of a range
of factors. But at a minimum, ideas about originalism and the lost
Constitution furnish a powerful legal vocabulary and conceptual toolkit
with which to explain, defend, and rally around constitutional hardball.
Along with its resonance with conservative voters’ moral and cultural
commitments, part of what makes originalist talk of constitutional restoration such a powerful discursive mode, and one that creates such a
hospitable climate for constitutional hardball, is that it works on different
levels for different audiences. Some appeals to originalism function as a
kind of “value-laden . . . symbolic language” for the Republican electorate,216 while others are highly nuanced—indeed, far more nuanced
than the opinions of the Supreme Court—and suitable for debate among
legal theorists, historians, and philosophers of language.217 The more
sophisticated versions cast a vague legitimating halo over the less sophisticated versions.218 Ordinary voters may not know the difference between
original expected application and original public meaning, but they get
the message that liberal courts have gone wild, administrative agencies
have ballooned, and drastic measures are needed to rein them in.219
214. See Pozen, Bad Faith, supra note 22, at 934–39.
215. Cf. Greene et al., supra note 200, at 375–85 (presenting survey evidence showing
that originalists tend to be “more religious, conservative,” “morally traditionalist, and
economically libertarian” and “to hold the predictably conservative views on the ‘hot’
constitutional controversies of the day,” including abortion, gay rights, gun rights, school
prayer, and the death penalty).
216. Jamal Greene, How Constitutional Theory Matters, 72 Ohio St. L.J. 1183, 1192
(2011).
217. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Methodology, 84 U. Chi. L. Rev. 269,
269–72 (2017) (offering an account of originalist methodology that draws on “legal theory
and theoretical linguistics,” using three meanings of the word “meaning,” two conceptions
of “content,” and a master distinction between “constitutional interpretation” and “constitutional construction”). Without taking anything away from the impressiveness or importance of work of this kind, it is fair to assume that most voters and politicians who endorse
“originalism” are unaware of these distinctions.
218. See Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, Working Themselves Impure: A Life
Cycle Theory of Legal Theories, 83 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1819, 1886 (2016) (discussing “the
potentially productive tension between byzantine academic defenses of a [legal] theory
and the existence in popular discourse of a simpler, idealized version of that theory” and
noting that “scholars have posited just such a double life in the case of originalism”).
219. Republican Senators routinely draw a connection between nonoriginalism and
judicial activism in arguments addressed to their supporters and constituents. See, e.g.,
Press Release, Sen. Marco Rubio, Rubio Praises Nomination of Judge Neil Gorsuch to the
U.S. Supreme Court (Jan. 31, 2017), http://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?id=FA887AB9-2CC7-4C0A-8797-45AB8A05350E [http://perma.cc/9PFX-8N7T]
(“Most importantly, [Judge Gorsuch] is committed to the principles of original intent and
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Originalist talk of constitutional restoration simultaneously provides professional respectability and populist ballast for a political coalition that,
while conceiving of itself as an insurgent challenger to a left-wing
judiciary, has controlled the Supreme Court for over forty years.220 The
Court’s conservatism, in turn, feeds back into the dynamics of constitutional hardball by decreasing the odds (real or perceived) that
Republican hardball will be met with a judicial rebuke.221
This same historical trajectory has had a very different effect on the
other major political coalition and its orientation toward the Constitution.
Democrats have been on the defensive in American constitutional politics since the late 1970s, and this has put a premium on articulating
arguments for leaving past gains in place.222 Like conservatives, liberals
have come to insist on particular forms of constitutional ﬁdelity. But
instead of aligning themselves with the Founders’ Constitution and
advancing claims about its “true” meaning, they tend to align themselves
with the constitutional law that has developed in certain transformative
periods of American history, especially Reconstruction and the Second
Reconstruction that took place from 1954 through the early 1970s.
Liberals argue for ﬁdelity to, among other things, the Reconstruction
Amendments;223 Brown v. Board of Education’s promise of racial
judicial restraint. This is critical, because too many in the federal judiciary today believe it
is appropriate for judges to invent new policies and rights instead of interpreting and
defending the Constitution as it is written.”).
220. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Opinion, The Conservative Era of the Supreme Court Is
Over [sic], L.A. Times (June 29, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oechemerinsky-end-of-conservative-supreme-court-20160628-snap-story.html (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review) (“From the time President Nixon’s fourth court nominee was conﬁrmed in 1971 until Justice Antonin Scalia’s death in February [2016], there have always
been ﬁve ideologically conservative Republican appointees on the bench.”).
221. Cf. Lee Epstein, Some Thoughts on the Study of Judicial Behavior, 57 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 2017, 2041–44 (2016) (reviewing empirical research showing that “[n]o
matter how we measure it, ideology plays a role in judicial decisions,” although adding
that “ideological (or partisan) motivations have their limits”); Michael S. Kang & Joanna
M. Shepherd, The Long Shadow of Bush v. Gore: Judicial Partisanship in Election Cases, 68
Stan. L. Rev. 1411, 1424 (2016) (observing that “the partisanship of the many judges and
political actors in the 2000 postelection process uncannily predicted their decisionmaking
for and against Bush and Gore”).
222. The point transcends constitutional politics. See Tony Judt, What Is Living and
What Is Dead in Social Democracy?, in When the Facts Change: Essays, 1995–2010, at 319,
337 (Jennifer Homans ed., 2015) (“The Left, to be quite blunt about it, has something to
conserve. It is the Right that has inherited the ambitious modernist urge to destroy and innovate in the name of a universal project.”).
223. See Pozen, Bad Faith, supra note 22, at 927 (noting the “strain of commentary on
the political left [that] accuses conservatives of refusing to accept the full scope of constitutional change wrought by the Reconstruction Amendments”); cf. Kermit Roosevelt III,
Reconstruction and Resistance, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 121, 141–42 (2012) (book review) (discussing the “constant struggle” in constitutional politics “between the values of the Founding
and the values of Reconstruction,” in which “Reconstruction stands for equality, for
broader federal authority, for federal rights and federal laws protecting individuals from
their own states”).
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integration;224 Roe v. Wade’s promise of reproductive autonomy;225 and
the precedents of the Warren Court that set the high-water mark for
liberal constitutional interpretation in a variety of spheres, especially
those having to do with electoral representation and the rights of the
politically disempowered.226
From the perspective of this sort of ﬁdelity, plenty has been lost in
recent decades, and there is plenty to restore. A few recent Supreme
Court decisions, above all Citizens United v. FEC, have stirred Democratic
voters and politicians to call for dramatic change, such as a constitutional
amendment or a judicial reversal.227 But for the most part, liberal constitutionalism in recent decades has instead emphasized ﬁdelity to midtwentieth-century precedents and to the established order.228 If anything,

224. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Constitutional Law as
Trademark, 43 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 385, 401–05 (2009) (discussing the political struggle
over Brown’s legacy and liberals’ commitment to an “antisubordination” account that
“sees the promise of Brown as the full integration of African Americans (and other
historically excluded groups) into American society, rather than the abolition of formal
racial distinctions”).
225. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see Perry & Powe, supra note 204, at 670–78 (reviewing the
development of the parties’ positions on constitutional abortion rights since Roe).
Compare, e.g., Democratic Nat’l Comm., Moving America Forward: 2012 Democratic
National Platform 18 (2012), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/papers_pdf/101962.pdf
[http://perma.cc/93NF-S9E3] (“The Democratic Party strongly and unequivocally supports Roe v. Wade and a woman’s right to make decisions regarding her pregnancy . . . . We
oppose any and all efforts to weaken or undermine that right.”), with Republican Nat’l
Comm., We Believe in America: 2012 Republican Platform 13–14 (2012), http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/papers_pdf/101961.pdf [http://perma.cc/XA4F-F7R4] (“We
support a human life amendment to the Constitution and endorse legislation to make
clear that the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections apply to unborn children.”).
226. See, e.g., Conﬁrmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to Be
an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 728, 730 (2006) (statement of “veteran civil rights
attorney” Fred D. Gray) (“I cannot overstate to this Committee the importance of [the
Warren Court voting rights] cases, for they laid the foundation for our democracy . . . . A
nominee to the Supreme Court who has a judicial philosophy . . . set against . . . the reapportionment cases is . . . saying that he would turn the clock back.”). In Professor James
Fleming’s terms, liberals are more likely to conceive of constitutional ﬁdelity as a matter of
“honoring” the Constitution’s “aspirational principles,” rather than “following” the document’s “concrete original meanings.” James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Our Imperfect
Constitution: For Moral Readings and Against Originalisms 20 (2015).
227. 558 U.S. 310 (2010); see, e.g., John Nichols, Her First 30 Days: Clinton Will
Propose an Amendment to Overturn ‘Citizens United,’ Nation (July 16, 2016), http://
www.thenation.com/article/her-ﬁrst-30-days-clinton-will-propose-amendment-to-overturncitizens-united [http://perma.cc/224W-R2NU] (describing Hillary Clinton’s pledge, if
elected President, to propose an amendment “to overturn the Supreme Court’s Citizens
United decision” and the positive response this pledge received from Senator Bernie
Sanders and “progressive activists”).
228. See Post & Siegel, supra note 200, at 571 (“[I]n recent years, it has been liberals,
rather than conservatives, who have been unable to ﬁnd ways to connect constitutional
vision to living political values.”); id. (“In recent conﬁrmation hearings, . . . liberals have
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the erosion of that order has prompted liberals to become even more
staunchly protective of what remains. The net result for the Democratic
Party has been a small-c conservative orientation toward the Constitution.
It is an orientation that emphasizes incremental progress, the insulation
of law from politics, and respect for the prevailing conventions and
understandings of constitutional practice—and that, as such, is distinctively unsuited to constitutional hardball. If the Republican Party’s dominant conception of constitutional ﬁdelity has emboldened its officials to
play hardball, the Democratic Party’s “defensive crouch”229 since losing
the Supreme Court has made its officials wary of staking bold claims on
the Constitution.230
3. Existential Politics. — Constitutional narratives of debasement and
restoration are consonant with a broader type of narrative in contemporary conservative politics: a story that something has gone fundamentally awry in the republic, on the order of an existential crisis, and that
unpatriotic liberals have allowed or caused it to happen. We use the
phrase type of narrative because it is not a single story. Within the conservative movement, there are some who worry deeply about the
unsustainability of the national debt and excessive government spending;
others focused on the perceived threat of unchecked immigration;
others concerned that a growing bureaucratic state is stiﬂing private
enterprise; others who decry a deterioration in respect for institutions
like the family or the police; and still others who believe their side to be
losing the “culture wars” in ways that threaten the nation’s moral
defended the constitutional values of the Warren Court by invoking stare decisis and by
emphasizing the importance of protecting constitutional law from the taint of politics.”).
229. Cf. Mark Tushnet, Abandoning Defensive Crouch Liberal Constitutionalism,
Balkinization (May 6, 2016), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2016/05/abandoning-defensivecrouch-liberal.html [http://perma.cc/PDJ5-LB6R] (“Several generations of law students
and their teachers grew up with federal courts dominated by conservatives. . . . The result:
Defensive-crouch constitutionalism, with every liberal position asserted nervously, its
proponents looking over their shoulders for retaliation by conservatives . . . .”).
230. Although this is more speculative, the tenets of liberal constitutionalism itself may
have evolved in a manner that reinforces this divide. It is arguably constitutive of post–
Warren Court liberal constitutionalism (and characterological of contemporary legal
liberals) to venerate, on the one hand, procedural regularity and, on the other, “commonsense notions of fairness” that can accommodate a wide range of values and groups. See,
e.g., David A. Strauss, The Living Constitution 34 (2010) (discussing and defending the
central role of “precedents” and “commonsense notions of fairness” in American
constitutional practice). These commitments suggest a deferential stance toward the
unwritten rules of the political game; they ﬁt poorly with efforts to upend longstanding
norms in the name of building a better constitutional order. To be sure, there will always
be context-speciﬁc reasons that can be adduced to justify a given act of constitutional
hardball. Democratic politicians who have used hardball tactics have hardly hung their
heads in shame. But in general, plausible accusations that one’s own side has used
“forceful uncompromising methods” in pursuit of partisan gain, see supra note 20 and
accompanying text (deﬁning hardball), would seem especially uncomfortable for liberals
whose constitutional commitments, as they have developed since the Warren Court era,
especially emphasize pluralism, procedural regularity, and procedural fairness.
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fabric.231 Although it has become more ideologically coherent in recent
decades, the conservative movement remains far from monolithic. Many
who hold conservative positions on such issues do not frame them in
existential terms. But many Republican Party activists and politicians do.
As fears of the Party’s own “demographic extinction”232 have mounted in
recent years, a significant proportion of the Party’s most influential media
personalities and legislators, from Rush Limbaugh to House Speaker
Paul Ryan to Senator Ted Cruz (a famously ﬁerce constitutional hardball
player233), have drawn repeatedly on these themes when describing the
stakes of partisan politics.234
President Obama aroused a great deal of existential alarm on the
right. Republican politicians questioned his commitment to principles
231. For journalistic accounts of such narratives, see, for example, Conor Friedersdorf,
How the Conservative Movement Enabled the Rise of Trump, Atlantic (Feb. 25, 2016),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/how-the-conservative-movementenabled-donald-trumps-rise/470727 [http://perma.cc/D2J9-MX7G] (describing strains in
the conservative movement that portray the United States as “under siege,” elites as conspiring to “have illegal aliens overrun the nation,” and Democratic Party leaders as plotting “to deliberately destroy the country”); Jeet Heer, Apocalypse Now and Then, New
Republic (Jan. 14, 2016), http://newrepublic.com/article/127778/apocalypse-now
[http://perma.cc/MW8J-38D4] (“The Republican Party is often portrayed as deeply
divided against itself . . . . But the [presidential primary] debate in South Carolina on
Thursday night made clear there is one idea that uniﬁes the party: the strong conviction
that we are all doomed.”).
232. Jonathan Chait, 2012 or Never, N.Y. Mag. (Feb. 26, 2012), http://nymag.com/
news/features/gop-primary-chait-2012-3 [http://perma.cc/ZP5Y-SPVL] (describing “apocalyptic rhetoric” as “the premise” of the Republican Party’s 2012 electoral strategy and
arguing that such rhetoric reﬂects the Party’s fear of “its own demographic extinction”).
233. See, e.g., Pozen, Self-Help, supra note 22, at 45 (noting that Senator Cruz
“employed a battery of unorthodox procedural maneuvers in a campaign to defund
‘Obamacare’”).
234. See, e.g., Paul D. Ryan, A Roadmap for America’s Future: Version 2.0, at 3
(2010), http://paulryan.house.gov/uploadedﬁles/rfafv2.0.pdf [http://perma.cc/M2DECARD] (“Now America is approaching a ‘tipping point’ beyond which the Nation will be
unable to change course—and this will lead to disastrous ﬁscal consequences, and an
erosion of economic prosperity and the American character itself. The current administration and Congress are propelling the Nation to the brink . . . .”); Paul Egan, GOP
Candidate Sen. Ted Cruz: “Our Country Is in Crisis,” Det. Free Press (Sept. 19, 2015),
http://www.freep.com/story/news/2015/09/19/gop-candidate-sen-ted-cruz-our-countrycrisis/72468618 [http://perma.cc/3F4A-SD8F] (quoting Senator Cruz as telling Republican
voters, “It’s now or never. We are bankrupting our kids and grandkids, our constitutional
rights are under assault from Washington and America has receded from leadership in the
world and it’s made the world a much more dangerous place” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Must Hear!!! Rush Blows the Lights Out in the Final Hour! What This Election
Is Really About and What’s Really at Stake, Rush Limbaugh Show (Feb. 23, 2016),
http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/daily/2016/02/23/must_hear_rush_blows_the_lights_
out_in_the_final_hour_what_this_election_is_really_about_and_what_s_really_at_stake
[http://perma.cc/5P8C-H2RP] (“[The 2016 election is] a last chance, a last-gasp effort at
preserving the culture that developed after the founding . . . . It’s no more complicated
than that, folks. The country’s under siege from all quarters, and recently the Democrat[ic]
Party has joined those who have put the country under siege.”).
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such as free-market capitalism235 and American exceptionalism,236 and
they encouraged a “birther” movement that insisted he was born in
Kenya and therefore ineligible to hold office.237 If one widens the historical lens, however, it is apparent that this general brand of racially
charged alarmism laced with conspiracy theory was not simply a product
of what some called Obama Derangement Syndrome.238 Bolstered by the
rise of fundamentalist groups and a conservative-media echo chamber,
the “paranoid style in American politics”239 had been making inroads
into the Republican coalition for some time before President Obama was
elected.240 Republican officials at the state and national level, for
235. See, e.g., Newt Gingrich with Joe DeSantis, To Save America: Stopping Obama’s
Secular-Socialist Machine (2010).
236. See, e.g., Darren Samuelsohn, Giuliani: Obama Doesn’t Love America, Politico
(Feb. 18, 2015), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/02/rudy-giuliani-president-obamadoesnt-love-america-115309.html [http://perma.cc/B9CS-LL55].
237. The most prominent such advocate, of course, was President Trump. See Barack
Obama Citizenship Conspiracy Theories, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barack_
Obama_citizenship_conspiracy_theories [http://perma.cc/F3DK-348D] (last visited
July 20, 2017) (reviewing the development of the birther movement into a signiﬁcant political force and listing numerous Republican politicians among “[n]otable advocates of
the view that Obama may not be eligible for the Presidency”); see also Rosenberg, supra
note 61 (suggesting that “the birther hysteria over Obama is perhaps the sharpest reminde[r] of just how radical the GOP’s commitment to constitutional hardball really is”
and that this commitment is rooted in contemporary conservatives’ “apocalyptic turn of
mind”).
238. See, e.g., Eric Boehlert, Obama Derangement Syndrome Is Terminal: The GOP
Is Going to Make the Next Year a Living Hell, Salon (Jan. 14, 2016), http://www.
salon.com/2016/01/14/obama_derangement_syndrome_is_terminal_the_gop_is_going_t
o_make_the_next_year_a_living_hell_partner [http://perma.cc/4G7P-B65T]. The proliferation of “derangement syndrome” labels in our public discourse (Clinton, Bush,
Obama, and perhaps now or soon Trump Derangement Syndrome) is itself an interesting
indication of the fact that the story is not only about Obama but also about longer-run
trends in American politics. Coded appeals to white racial anxieties, in particular, have
been a strand of Republican electoral politics ever since Richard Nixon’s “southern strategy,” see Thomas Byrne Edsall & Mary D. Edsall, Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race,
Rights, and Taxes on American Politics 74–98 (1991); Ian Haney López, Dog Whistle
Politics: How Coded Racial Appeals Have Reinvented Racism and Wrecked the Middle
Class 17–34 (2014); Tali Mendelberg, The Race Card: Campaign Strategy, Implicit
Messages, and the Norm of Equality 134–65 (2001), and demographic change has likely
sharpened some of the anxieties that underlie this type of political strategy.
239. Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics, Harper’s Mag.
(Nov. 1964), http://harpers.org/archive/1964/11/the-paranoid-style-in-american-politics
[http://perma.cc/PR8R-SEV2].
240. See Cary C. Franklin, The Paranoid “Fringe” in American Politics, Jotwell (Dec.
6, 2017), http://conlaw.jotwell.com/the-paranoid-fringe-in-american-politics [http://
perma.cc/46PG-GX4H]; see also supra section III.A.3 (discussing the rise of right-wing
media). Insofar as media outlets such as Fox News set out to undermine the credibility of
their “mainstream” counterparts and the liberal establishment generally, it appears this
project has been highly successful on the right. According to a recent Pew survey, liberals
trust a “large[] mix of news outlets.” Pew Research Ctr., Political Polarization and Media
Habits, supra note 164, at 5. “Consistently conservative” individuals, in contrast, tend to
trust only Fox News and a small number of other identiﬁably conservative news sources
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instance, have been warning since Bush v. Gore, without any good evidence, of a “plague” of Democratic voter fraud that imperils the electoral system.241 In the 2016 election cycle, a prominent politician on the
right edge of the Republican Party argued explicitly that if Hillary Clinton
were to win the presidency in 2016, it would be “the last election” the
country would ever hold, as Democrats would ﬁnally go ahead and end
American democracy.242 A widely cited conservative essay described the
Trump–Clinton contest as “the Flight 93 election,” in which American
voters must “charge the cockpit or . . . die.”243 Assertions like these make
political sense only in the context of a coalition in which existential (or
eschatological) thinking and profound suspicion of the other side play
an important, and perhaps unifying, role.244
(including The Sean Hannity Show, The Rush Limbaugh Show, and The Glenn Beck Program),
and they strongly distrust all of the major broadcast networks and national newspapers. Id.
at 53.
241. U.S. Senate Republican Policy Comm., Putting an End to Voter Fraud 1 (2005),
http://www.votelaw.com/blog/blogdocs/Voter%20Fraud%20Paper%20(no%20sig).pdf
[http://perma.cc/8CKY-GCTR]; see also Lorraine C. Minnite, The Myth of Voter Fraud
89 (2010) (describing “Republican efforts to tar the Democrats with . . . fraud allegations”); Thomas B. Edsall, Opinion, The Paranoid Style in American Politics Is Back, N.Y.
Times (Sept. 8, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/08/opinion/campaign-stops/
the-paranoid-style-in-american-politics-is-back.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review)
(characterizing Republican claims of voter fraud and vote-rigging as an instance of the
“paranoid style”).
242. See Nikita Vladimirov, Bachmann: If Clinton Wins, 2016 Will Be “Last Election,”
Hill (Sept. 2, 2016), http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/presidential-races/294283bachmann-if-clinton-wins-2016-will-be-last-election [http://perma.cc/SWT7-2VCU] (quoting
former Representative Michele Bachmann as saying, “I don’t want to be melodramatic but
I do want to be truthful. I believe without a shadow of a doubt this is the last election”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
243. Publius Decius Mus, The Flight 93 Election, Claremont Rev. Books (Sept. 5,
2016), http://www.claremont.org/crb/basicpage/the-ﬂight-93-election [http://perma.cc/
649R-LAS3]; see also id. (“To compound the metaphor: a Hillary Clinton presidency is
Russian Roulette with a semi-auto.”). The author of this essay is now reportedly “a senior
national-security official in the Trump White House.” Michael Warren, The Anonymous
Pro-Trump “Decius” Now Works Inside the White House, Wkly. Standard (Feb. 2, 2017),
http://www.weeklystandard.com/the-anonymous-pro-trump-decius-now-works-inside-thewhite-house/article/2006623 [http://perma.cc/Q37M-87SW].
244. Narratives of existential threat need not be entirely congruent with one another
to help sustain a collective sense of Manichean conﬂict between the two parties, especially
if they resonate with the general worldview or psychology of a party’s base. That is, even if
some members of the conservative coalition do not share or even ﬁnd credible all of the
precise fears that motivate various other members, this kind of politics has a certain
internal momentum. If many people on your side believe that the stakes are high and
clear, the two sides are good and evil, and the time to act is now, then there is little to be
gained by insisting, instead, that the situation is nuanced, the other side has some good
ideas, and the best approach is to cut a deal.
Although we put no great weight on it, a growing body of evidence suggests that
liberals and conservatives have different “cognitive styles,” with conservatives more likely
on average to focus on clear, stable, and persistent overall patterns in the world, and liberals more likely to be “responsive to informational complexity, ambiguity[,] and novelty.”
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Existential politics is not genteel. For obvious reasons, it does not
facilitate bipartisan compromise or foster respect for the prevailing
norms of governance. If enough of an elected official’s supporters conceive of politics in existential terms, the fact that a particular tactic ﬂouts
constitutional conventions or settled constitutional understandings may
count in its favor. The question is whether that ﬂouting can be linked to a
politically credible claim that extraordinary threats to the republic call
for an extraordinary response. As Richard Hofstadter argued in his
famous essay on the paranoid style, if “what is at stake is always a conﬂict
between absolute good and absolute evil, what is necessary is not compromise but the will to ﬁght things out to a ﬁnish.”245
Existential themes have not played nearly so prominent a role in
liberal political discourse in recent decades—which gives us one more
clue as to why constitutional hardball did not similarly take hold in the
Democratic Party during this period. The closest analogy on the
Democratic side is telling. Many liberals with strong environmental commitments view climate change as quite literally an existential threat to
humanity, with apocalyptic implications if current trends are not reversed.246 Yet while environmental groups have long been important
actors in the Democratic political coalition, Democratic officeholders
have largely resisted framing the climate change issue in dire terms.247
David M. Amodio et al., Neurocognitive Correlates of Liberalism and Conservatism, 10
Nature Neuroscience 1246, 1246 (2007); see also, e.g., Serge Caparos et al., The Tree to
the Left, the Forest to the Right: Political Attitude and Perceptual Bias, 134 Cognition 155,
155 (2015) (ﬁnding, across a range of perceptual tasks, that conservatives have “a stronger
bias towards global perception” and “that this stronger bias is linked to higher cognitive
rigidity”). In any event, the Republican coalition’s disparate existential narratives—from
creeping socialism to rising debt to the loss of national identity—share a common
emotional valence. They evoke a sense of willful subversion by liberals and a politics of
fear. Cf. John R. Hibbing et al., Differences in Negativity Bias Underlie Variations in
Political Ideology, 37 Behav. & Brain Sci. 297, 303–04 (2014) (ﬁnding a correlation between conservatism and the tendency to put more weight on negative stimuli, including
those that induce fear).
245. Hofstadter, supra note 239. If these are the stakes in the eyes of the key voters,
donors, or mediating institutions, then a rational reelection-seeking officeholder—regardless of her own views—ought to respond with both the reality and, if at all possible, the
appearance of engaging in constitutional hardball.
246. See generally, e.g., James Hansen, Storms of My Grandchildren: The Truth About
the Coming Climate Catastrophe and Our Last Chance to Save Humanity (2010); Naomi
Klein, This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. the Climate (2014).
247. Indeed, it is a common lament of environmental activists that the Democratic
Party has failed to adopt an appropriately existential perspective on climate change. See,
e.g., James Hansen, Isolation of 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue: Part I, at 2 (2015), http://
www.columbia.edu/~jeh1/mailings/2015/20151127_Isolation.pdf [http://perma.cc/7D8UY59W] (“The scientiﬁc community agrees on a crucial fact: we must leave most remaining
fossil fuels in the ground, or our children and future generations are screwed. Yet Obama
is not proposing the action required for the essential change in energy policy direction . . . .”); id. (describing the Obama Administration’s expressed optimism about climate
policy as “unadulterated 100% pure bullshit”).
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The presidency of Donald Trump, on the other hand, has both uniﬁed the coalition on the left (including some independents in the middle) and generated a raft of apocalyptic rhetoric among liberal elites.248
This presents an interesting test case, albeit one that is in certain respects
sui generis. The short-term question is whether President Trump will
inspire liberals in the same way that President Obama inspired conservatives—leading them to embrace a more existential view of politics and,
on that basis, a correspondingly greater willingness, even eagerness, to
engage in constitutional hardball in opposition to the President. This
question quickly leads to several others. If President Trump does prove
galvanizing in this way, will the partisan asymmetry in constitutional
hardball that has been a deﬁning feature of our politics for the past
quarter century disappear or even reverse itself? Would such a change, if
it occurs, prove more durable than the Trump presidency? And ﬁnally,
would it be a good thing for the country? We conclude with some
thoughts on these questions.
CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL HARDBALL—
AND THE REPUBLIC
The central organizing claim of this Essay is that the Republican
Party has played constitutional hardball with greater intensity and
efficacy than the Democratic Party over the past quarter century or so. As
the Essay has tried to show throughout, it is simply impossible to
understand contemporary constitutional politics in the United States
without understanding this point. Our project has been primarily
descriptive and explanatory: to illustrate what asymmetric constitutional
hardball has meant in practice; to set this asymmetry in a larger
historical, institutional, and intellectual context; and to examine a range
of factors that have likely contributed to it. We expect that some rightleaning readers may remain skeptical of the asymmetry thesis, while some
left-leaning readers may feel we have enacted something analogous to
the very Democratic tendencies we discuss, by being overly anxious to
identify caveats and complications. Yet even if we cannot hope to garner
agreement on all the particulars of our argument, we hope this Essay will
spur sustained reﬂection from scholars of all stripes on the phenomenon
of asymmetric constitutional hardball.
Although our aims in this Essay have been primarily descriptive and
explanatory, the analysis also has predictive implications for whether
Republicans will continue to play more constitutional hardball than
Democrats in the years ahead. The evidence from President Trump’s ﬁrst
year in office has been mixed. Moreover, American politics is sufficiently
248. See, e.g., Jessica Mendoza, In Age of Trump, Apocalyptic Rhetoric Becomes
Mainstream, Christian Sci. Monitor (Feb. 22, 2017), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/
Politics/2017/0222/In-age-of-Trump-apocalyptic-rhetoric-becomes-mainstream [http://
perma.cc/RJE9-NLB8].
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unsettled right now that its future course seems even harder than usual
to predict. It is quite possible, as Balkin has argued, that we are nearing
the end of the long Reagan regime in American political time and will
soon begin a very different era.249 However, the factors identiﬁed in Part
III are stubborn; despite our unsettled present, they show few signs of
imminent change. Taken together, they give good cause to believe that
the basic asymmetry explored in this Essay will persist through and
beyond the Trump Administration. These factors illuminate preconditions that may need to be met for Democrats to eliminate the constitutional hardball gap. At this writing, they have not been met.
Brieﬂy consider a few of them. The ﬁnancial engine that drives a
number of the central institutional players on the right, such as the Koch
brothers’ network and the Heritage Foundation, continues to hum. The
prospects for an equal and opposite counterweight on the left—a dramatic revival of the power of unions, say, or a decision by wealthy liberals
to begin investing in political advocacy on a Koch-network-like scale—
appear unlikely at this juncture.250 In the media, the story is more
equivocal. There has been a recent uptick in viewers for programs such
as The Rachel Maddow Show that are unabashedly partisan on the left,251
and some have suggested that mainstream outlets might respond with a
sharper-edged, more liberal brand of news.252 Even still, the conservative
media bubble is likely to remain more insular than the liberal one for the
foreseeable future, given the way each side’s news organizations and
think tanks have been shaped by their development in political time.253
Barring a major rearrangement in Democratic funding patterns or media
249. See Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Rot, in Can It Happen Here? Authoritarianism
in America 19, 32–35 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2018); Balkin, Last Days of Disco, supra note
109, at 1169–77.
250. Although this could change, the most signiﬁcant anti-Trump groups that have
emerged since his election have strived “‘to maintain [their] independence both from the
funders and from the [Democratic] party.’” Kenneth P. Vogel, The ‘Resistance,’ Raising
Big Money, Upends Liberal Politics, N.Y. Times (Oct. 7, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/
2017/10/07/us/politics/democrats-resistance-fundraising.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia
Law Review) (quoting an official from Indivisible). Tom Steyer’s multimillion-dollar
campaign to impeach President Trump may reﬂect a new boldness on his part, cf. supra
note 130 and accompanying text, but it has been even more disconnected from Democratic
Party politics. See Mark Z. Barabak, Tom Steyer Has Gathered More than 3 Million
Signatures to Impeach President Trump. So Why Are Democrats So Annoyed?, L.A. Times
(Nov. 30, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-on-politics-column-20171130story.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (quoting numerous Democratic Party
leaders who have criticized Steyer’s campaign as a distraction with “precisely zero chance
of success”).
251. See supra note 168.
252. See, e.g., Jonathan Mahler, CNN Had a Problem. Donald Trump Solved It., N.Y.
Times Mag. (Apr. 4, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/04/magazine/cnn-had-aproblem-donald-trump-solved-it.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing that
conﬂict with Trump pushed CNN into a posture that was “no longer neutral programming” from the perspective of viewers).
253. See supra section III.A.3.
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consumption habits, it is hard to see what could generate and sustain a
wave of primary challenges from the left to rival the Tea Party wave of
challenges to Republican incumbents from the right.
Moreover, the two party coalitions seem set to retain their
underlying attitudes about government. There will be no near-term
reversal in the identity of the party that feels more keenly the danger of a
prolonged government shutdown, a debt ceiling standoff, or the destruction of small-c constitutional norms that facilitate negotiation and
legislation. Contemporary Democrats and liberals believe, centrally, in
the promise and usefulness of government; outside of certain domains
such as the military, contemporary Republicans and conservatives do
not.254 President Trump’s victory might have been thought to presage a
radical realignment in this regard: the possible emergence of a populist
conservatism that favors the welfare state and direct public spending on
domestic infrastructure. Soon after his inauguration, however, it became
clear that this (always remote) possibility was not occurring.255 Democrats
are likely to continue to see greater risk than Republicans in the numerous types of constitutional hardball that threaten to disable the
machinery of government.
Perhaps even more importantly, the two party coalitions seem set to
retain their views of the constitutional order. Notwithstanding the emergence of liberal versions of originalism within the legal academy,
Democrats today largely continue to defend a doctrinal regime built up
in accretive steps through Reconstruction, the New Deal, and the Warren
Court era,256 while conservatives largely continue to advocate fundamental revisions to the prevailing constitutional order. Conservatives may disagree internally about exactly which form of constitutional “restorationism” is preferable, but for our purposes these disagreements are
unimportant. Any of the available options, or any combination of them,
will do the work of justifying constitutional hardball.
As noted above, President Trump certainly seems to have moved the
needle on liberals’ receptiveness to what we have called existential
politics.257 But some caution is in order. The existential alarm about
Trump has ﬁxated on him and his Administration, not on the
254. See supra section III.B.1.
255. See Matt Grossmann & David A. Hopkins, Trump Isn’t Changing the Republican
Party. The Republican Party Is Changing Trump., Wash. Post: Monkey Cage (Aug. 2,
2017), http://wapo.st/2vnFFNn [http://perma.cc/9ZGD-523M]; John Wagner & Juliet
Eilperin, Once a Populist, Trump Governs Like a Conservative Republican, Wash. Post
(Dec. 6, 2017), http://wapo.st/2BCTrdR [http://perma.cc/XVW4-SVXP].
256. For a prominent recent statement of this position, see Conﬁrmation Hearing on
the Nomination of Neil M. Gorsuch to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 4 (2017)
(statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein) (“This is personal, but I ﬁnd this ‘originalist’ judicial
philosophy to be really troubling . . . . I ﬁrmly believe the American Constitution is a living
document intended to evolve as our country evolves.”).
257. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
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Republican Party. It lacks the Manichean quality of the existential alarm
that has been directed at Democrats and is therefore less apt to prove
durable. Far from appearing the leader of a well-oiled national machine,
President Trump appears to liberals (as well as to some members of his
own party) a frightening and solitary sower of chaos. The resulting sense
of crisis seems unlikely to survive without Trump in the Oval Office.
For all these reasons, we anticipate that the deep forces that drive
asymmetric constitutional hardball will outlast the Trump Administration.
They are too closely linked to the main disagreements that deﬁne the
current party coalitions. Some liberal voices will continue to call on
Democratic officeholders to “ﬁght like Republicans” and play more
constitutional hardball.258 And in the short run, with Trump as President,
they may occasionally get their wish. But in the medium and long run,
any such hopes for equalizing the practice of constitutional hardball will
be realized only if far-reaching institutional or ideological shifts have ﬁrst
altered the landscape this Essay has described. It is always possible that
unanticipated new developments will reconﬁgure American constitutional politics. Our point is that these developments would have to be
quite fundamental to remake the dynamics of constitutional hardball.
Finally, even if they were able to ramp up the practice of constitutional hardball in the medium and long run, it is not obvious to us
that it would be wise for Democrats to do so. There are two basic gametheoretic models for the interaction between the parties’ approaches to
constitutional hardball. According to one model, Republicans continue
to deviate from cooperative strategies in part because Democrats—at least
since the advent of Clintonian triangulation259—have failed to respond
proportionately. More forceful “punishments” might have imposed
political costs sufficient to compel Republicans to let up. This ﬁrst model
258. Lithwick & Cohen, supra note 96; see also, e.g., David Faris, Opinion, Obstruct
and Delay Trump: Opposing View, USA Today (Jan. 4, 2017), http://www.usatoday.com/
story/opinion/2017/01/04/congress-donald-trump-president-obama-editorials-debates/
96166892 [http://perma.cc/GB3M-ZAST] (“Democrats must . . . adopt the GOP’s
scorched-earth philosophy.”); Jonathan Martin & Alexander Burns, Democratic Leaders
Try to Slow Calls to Impeach Trump, N.Y. Times (May 18, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/
2017/05/18/us/politics/democrats-trump-impeachment.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia
Law Review) (describing the efforts of Democratic leaders in Congress to tamp down calls
by “liberal activists” for President Trump’s impeachment); cf. Michael Tomasky, The
Resistance So Far, N.Y. Rev. Books (Nov. 9, 2017), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/
2017/11/09/the-resistance-so-far [http://perma.cc/6MAM-SCRM] (“The Democrats are
showing more resolve partly because of the extreme nature of this presidency, but mostly
because their base is getting a bit—a bit—more like the Republican base.”).
259. See Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court, 1998 Term—Foreword: The New
Constitutional Order and the Chastening of Constitutional Aspiration, 113 Harv. L. Rev.
29, 39 n.37 (1999) (discussing President Clinton’s “political strategy of triangulation, in
which he distanced himself both from what he characterized as the rigid and excessive
conservatism of the Republicans who controlled Congress, and from what he characterized as the old-fashioned New Deal/Great Society liberalism of many Democrats in
Congress”).
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suggests that greater Democratic constitutional hardball would ultimately
lead to an equilibrium with less Republican constitutional hardball.
Prominent liberal law professors have urged greater Democratic constitutional hardball based implicitly on this model.260
The second model, however, is one of tit-for-tat escalation with no
obvious endpoint. According to this model, greater use of constitutional
hardball by Democrats now would, if anything, tend to increase even
further the use of constitutional hardball by Republicans, as members of
both parties successively shred cooperative norms, shrink the space for
bipartisan policy solutions, and make governance more difficult—all
without paying a signiﬁcant political price because of current levels of
partisan polarization. The general observed pattern of mutual escalation
of constitutional hardball over the past generation lends some support to
the second model over the ﬁrst, even though this escalation has so far
been asymmetric.261
Ramping up constitutional hardball, then, is a dangerous game to
play over any extended period of time. It might bring the other side to
the bargaining table. But especially if it does not produce immediate
payoffs, it might also undermine the constitutional system and leave
everyone worse off.262
For liberals who are troubled by this Essay’s asymmetry thesis and yet
also worry that sustained Democratic hardball is as likely to lead to
260. See Fontana, supra note 47, at 307 (“This Essay argues that the tactical roots
of . . . failures to do more on judicial nominations during the Obama Administration reside in a common tactical error made by political leaders in the Democratic Party: excessive cooperation with political forces that do not manifest the same behavioral patterns of
cooperation.”); Jack M. Balkin, Declaring a Payroll Tax Holiday, Balkinization (Dec. 3,
2010), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2010/12/declaring-payroll-tax-holiday.html [http://
perma.cc/VK5G-N58Y] (“[W]hen your opponents engage in constitutional hardball . . .
the correct response is not to wring your hands and urge them to play fair . . . . Rather, the
correct response . . . is to engage in constitutional hardball of your own, in order to make
the other side come to the bargaining table . . . .”).
261. Game theory itself cannot answer which model is more plausible. A set of wellknown results in game theory, often referred to as folk theorems, suggests that virtually
any set of strategies that Pareto-dominate the one-shot uncooperative outcome (constitutional hardball by both sides) may constitute a repeat-play equilibrium, so long as the
players are sufficiently patient. See Peter T. Leeson, The Laws of Lawlessness, 38 J. Legal
Stud. 471, 480 (2009) (“The folk theorem suggests that when play is inﬁnitely repeated
and players are sufficiently patient, the shadow of the future can support the cooperative
equilibrium . . . . Of course, as the folk theorem also suggests, other equilibria, including
violent equilibria, are also possible when play is inﬁnitely repeated.”).
262. In a book that came out while this Essay was in production, Professors Steven
Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt draw on experiences abroad to argue that “the idea that
Democrats should ‘ﬁght like Republicans’ is misguided,” as it is liable to “play[] directly
into the hands of authoritarians” and leave American politics “dangerously unmoored.”
Steven Levitsky & Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die 215–17 (2018); see also
Whittington, supra note 48 (asserting that the “constitutional system functions best if the
formal rules are supplemented by a robust set of norms and practices that deter government officials from using all the political weapons at their disposal”).
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mutual escalation as to de-escalation or Democratic electoral gains,263
there are at least two other possible responses to the present asymmetry.
First, liberals could try to work toward the sort of fundamental
realignment of the political system—either a fracturing of the
Republican coalition264 or a wholesale reorientation of the Democratic
one—that might alter the underlying drivers of constitutional hardball.265
It goes without saying that any such effort would face immense challenges. We do not purport to know how best to tackle these challenges,
although we hope this Essay has helped to clarify some of them.
A second possible response is not to play constitutional hardball
whenever the opportunity arises, but instead to use temporary points of
leverage to press for procedural changes that amount to anti-hardball. For
instance, independent redistricting commissions, professionalized nonpartisan election bureaucracies, and the like, while far from optimal in
terms of maximizing political advantage, have the effect of taking certain
types of constitutional hardball off the table (and also, in the case of the
redistricting commissions, of altering the constituencies of Republican
and Democratic representatives alike so that elected officials would have
somewhat less to fear from ideological primary challengers and thus
from being seen as moderate, an effect that would likely be more transformative on the Republican side). Unfortunately and paradoxically, the
“voting wars” have reached such a high temperature that even effectuating these temperature-lowering, anti-hardball solutions might in
some cases require constitutional hardball.
Our analysis raises a different set of strategic questions for conservatives. The Republican coalition, this Essay has suggested, has
increasingly been built around a set of narratives, beliefs, and institutional structures that justify and demand constitutional hardball. Indeed,
this orientation toward constitutional hardball seems to be doing important work to unify a Republican coalition of considerable internal
263. For an eloquent statement of this anxiety from a leading liberal constitutional law
scholar, see Richard Primus, Rulebooks, Playgrounds, and Endgames: A Constitutional
Analysis of the Calabresi-Hirji Judgeship Proposal, Harv. L. Rev. Blog (Nov. 24, 2017),
http://blog.harvardlawreview.org/rulebooks-playgrounds-and-endgames-a-constitutionalanalysis-of-the-calabresi-hirji-judgeship-proposal [http://perma.cc/S3QQ-APK4] (“One of
the nice things about living in post-Reconstruction America has been that conﬂict between
the major political parties has not escalated all the way to the point of ultimate crisis. I’d
like us to keep that going.”).
264. Cf. Levitsky & Ziblatt, supra note 262, at 223 (suggesting that restoring norms of
mutual tolerance and forbearance “requires that the Republican Party be reformed, if not
refounded outright”).
265. Certain revisions to the Constitution itself might also alter the underlying drivers
of constitutional hardball—for instance, revisions designed to break up the two-party
duopoly or to reduce the number of vetogates in the legislative process. We bracket this
possibility because Article V amendments of this sort are such an unlikely route to
effecting change in our polarized political system. But the broader question of how the
structure of the hard-wired Constitution bears on the practice of constitutional hardball,
and on the prospects for asymmetric constitutional hardball, deserves further study.
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complexity. That is a major beneﬁt, but there are also costs. Constitutional hardball has internal as well as external feedback effects. Engaging
in hardball normalizes hardball; arguments offered in its defense put a
premium on ideological purity and make it tougher to compromise at a
later date. The more your side plays hardball, the less it even feels like
you are playing hardball.
The appeal of ﬂouting Washington norms is now very strong among
Republican voters, and it takes no great public-opinion expertise to see
that this appeal was central to the electoral success of President
Trump.266 The long-term problem is that organizing a coalition (in part)
around constitutional hardball puts continual pressure on the conventions at the foundations of governance. If the ultimate goal is to build
a broad and effective legislative majority, it is not at all clear that the
Republican Party’s optimal strategy is to engage in continued escalation
of the most polarizing forms of constitutional politics. And yet, for the
reasons this Essay has discussed, it will often be risky for Republican
officeholders to resist the incentives our system currently provides to
engage in constitutional hardball.
Our conclusion is thus depressing for all sides—but asymmetrically
so. Liberals have the strongest cause for despair. As long as the two major
party coalitions and their institutional infrastructures look roughly as
they do now, calls for Democratic officeholders to engage in persistent,
Republican-style constitutional hardball are unlikely to succeed, while
strategies that aim to reduce the overall amount of hardball face daunting odds. Conservatives, however, have reason to worry as well. It is
possible for a political coalition to become too devoted to hardball culture for its own good, let alone the good of the republic. Constitutional
hardball may have helped Republicans win a number of partisan
skirmishes in recent decades, but it has also fueled demand for a mode
of governance that makes governance itself more difficult. Breaking out
of this vicious cycle will be one of the great challenges for American constitutionalism in the twenty-ﬁrst century.

266. In office, President Trump has continued the pattern. See Emily Bazelon, How
Do We Contend with Trump’s Deﬁance of ‘Norms’?, N.Y. Times Mag. (July 11, 2017),
http://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/11/magazine/how-do-we-contend-with-trumps-defianceof-norms.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (“Trump’s ﬂouting of norms was the
siren song of his candidacy, and it has become a deﬁning feature of his presidency.”).
Perhaps the most unifying action he has taken to date—the action that most appeals to the
disparate strands of the Republican coalition—is the move with which we began this Essay:
pushing through ideologically conservative judicial nominees, in particular Justice
Gorsuch, under the banner of constitutional restorationism.

